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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The informativeness of audit reports has been of interest for nearly thirty years. 
The discussion has focused on the role of auditing and the subsequent relevance 
of the audit report. Particularly after the events in 2001 the audit profession has 
been under enormous pressure and investors increasingly expect the auditors to 
provide warning signals on threats to client failure (Geiger, Raghunandan and 
Rama 2005).  
 
Auditors, however, are not responsible for predicting failure and issuing a going 
concern audit report is not a prediction of impending failure. Interestingly, how-
ever, Chen and Church (1996), for example, find that going concern audit reports 
are useful in predicting bankruptcy, whereas Mutchler (1985) and Dopuch, Hol-
thausen and Leftwich (1987) suggest that many going concern audit reports can 
be predicted using public information and they simply confirm a pattern of finan-
cial decline. 
 
To restore and increase the reliability of accounting information after the scandals 
and corporate governance failures, and to protect the interests of investors the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) was enacted in the U.S. It placed increased re-
sponsibilities on audit committees, management and auditors. Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) together with Auditing Standard No.2 (PCAOB 
2004) required that the annual report of public firms must contain a manage-
ment’s assessments of the internal control over financial reporting and an audi-
tor’s report on the effectiveness of internal controls and on the assessment made 
by the management. The auditor’s report on the effectiveness of internal controls 
signals potential weaknesses and risks in the firm’s control environment that may 
affect the reliability of the accounting information. In comparison to the going 
concern problems, internal control weaknesses are more difficult to foresee using 
financial information, but on the other hand the implications of such reports on 
the future viability of the firm are not as severe.  
 
Does the audit report announcement convey new and important information for 
the decision-making of the investors and does this information have an affect on 
the stock markets? The opinions and the empirical evidence from prior research 
provide conflicting answers to this question. Auditing plays an essential role in 
the communication process between the firm and the owners or the financial mar-
kets as a whole. The auditors are contracted by the shareholders to monitor and 
ensure that the financial reporting provided by management fairly presents, in all 
material aspects, the financial position of the auditee. The financial statements of 
publicly traded firms are required by law to be audited before being filed. This is 
how the regulators want to ensure that the published financial information is reli-
able.  
 
2      Acta Wasaensia 
In the majority of firms all issues that the auditor highlights during the audit 
process, are solved and corrected before the financial statements are published, 
and thus the auditor usually has no reason to give any additional information in 
the audit report. In these cases the auditor issues a standard report with an unqua-
lified opinion. There are, however, exceptions. In these firms the financial state-
ments need to be accompanied by some additional information. There is a variety 
of report types that the auditor can issue, but in practice for publicly traded firms 
the audit report contains an unqualified opinion with additional information. The 
most typical reasons for deviations from standard reports are related to either 
some kind of uncertainties or changes in accounting principles applied in the firm. 
 
Theoretically considered, the relevance of the audit report in such cases where the 
auditor decides to diverge from the standard report would seem obvious. But as 
Wallace (1980, 1987 and 2004) suggested, auditing can serve multiple roles, the 
auditor may be a monitor, a source of information or an insurer. The question of 
interest in this study, the relevance of audit reports to shareholders, has been ap-
proached in existing research in two ways: (i) experimental studies examining the 
relevance of audit opinions in the decision-making process which measure the 
claimed behavior of decision-makers, and (ii) archival studies focusing on actual 
behavior through financial market reactions around the audit report information 
announcement.  
 
Experimental studies have most commonly used loan decision-makers as users of 
audited financial statements. Several experimental studies provide evidence that 
the audit reports have a significant influence on the financial conditions imposed 
by the lender (e.g. Bamber and Stratton 1997; LaSalle and Anandarajan 1997; 
Guiral-Contreras, Gonzalo-Angulo and Rodgers 2007). But on the contrary, Lin, 
Tang and Xiao (2003) and Bessel, Anandarajan and Umar (2003) do not find the 
information contained in a non-standard audit report to be of importance to the 
financial statement users’ decision-making process. Generally, Guiral-Contreras 
et al. (2007) divide the research on the information content of audit reports into 
three fields. The first deals with how the level of auditor attestation affects the 
loan officers’ decisions (Johnson, Pany and White 1983; Wright and Davidson 
2000). The second line studies how the audit report format affects the loan offic-
ers’ decision-making –processes (Miller, Reed and Strawser 1993). The third line 
of research focuses on differences in the relevance of qualified and unqualified 
audit reports (LaSalle et al. 1997; Bessell et al. 2003). 
 
However, in this dissertation the main interest is on the actual behavior of the 
investors when a firm receives either a going concern audit report or an internal 
control weakness report. The behavior of investors can be considered to reveal 
whether auditing and the audit report serve the information role mentioned above 
and whether these two types of audit reports contain relevant information for in-
vestors’ decision-making. The studies closely related to this dissertation can be 
divided into three categories according to their approach. First, studies examining 
the abnormal stock returns in a short event window around the expected audit 
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report announcement (Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich 1984; Chen, Su 
and Zhao 2000; Pucheta, Vico and Garcia 2004; Beneish, Billings and Hodder 
2008; Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare 2008). Second, Taffler, Lu and Kau-
sar (2004), Ogneva and Subramanyam (2007) and Herbohn, Ragunathan and 
Garsden (2007), Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2009) study whether the stock market 
underreacts in the 12-month period subsequent to the announcements of the audit 
reports. Third, studies approach the question from a different perspective, as for 
example Chen et al. (1996) who study the market reactions to bankruptcy filings 
for firms with and without a going concern audit report or Fields and Wilkins 
(1991) and Fargher and Wilkins (1998), who examine the market reactions after 
audit qualification withdrawal announcements. 
 
The most consistent results on the relevance of audit reports have been found on 
the going concern audit reports. Fleak and Wilson (1994) and Jones (1996) ex-
amine the abnormal stock reaction to going concern audit reports when they are 
expected or unexpected. Unexpected audit reports are defined as those that are 
inconsistent with previously known information about the firm’s financial posi-
tion. Both papers find that unexpected going concern audit reports are associated 
with abnormal returns.  
 
Chen et al. (1996) and Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) examine the reactions to 
bankruptcy filings between firms with going concern audit reports and firms 
without. The results are identical, firms receiving going concern opinions expe-
rience less negative abnormal returns after the bankruptcy filing. The findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that going concern audit reports contain relevant 
information. Carlson, Glenzen and Benefield (1998) use a matched-pair sample to 
investigate the differences in abnormal returns between a group of going concern 
audit report firms and a group of non-going concern audit report firms. The dif-
ference in stock returns is found to be significant, again confirming the relevance 
of going concern audit reports.  
 
Finally, Taffler et al. (2004) and Ogneva et al. (2007) study the stock market un-
derreaction to going concern audit report disclosures in the following 12-month 
period. The results are inconsistent, Taffler et al. (2004) find a significant under-
reaction in the U.K., while Ogneva et al. (2007) (in the U.S. and Australia) and 
Herbohn et al. (2007) (in Australia) are unable to document the same. Herbohn et 
al. (2007) on the other hand find a significant reaction in Australia in the 12-
month period prior to a first time going concern audit report. Finally, Kausar et al. 
(2009) find, contrary to Ogneva et al. (2007), that there is a stock market under-
reaction to going concern audit reports in the U.S. 
1.1 Purpose, relevance and hypothesis of the study 
 
This dissertation uses data from Russell 3000 Index firms listed in the U.S. This 
data is used because the U.S. market is the only market that has a sufficient num-
4      Acta Wasaensia 
ber of going concern audit reports issued to publicly traded firms. Additionally, 
auditor’s internal control weakness disclosures are mandated by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX 2002) and therefore available only for the firms listed in the U.S. 
stock exchanges. 
 
The purpose of this study is two-fold. The first purpose is to investigate the relev-
ance of going concern audit reports and auditors’ internal control weakness dis-
closures by studying abnormal stock returns and changes in volatility and syste-
matic risk around the audit report date. To test the robustness of the findings also 
the 10-K report filing date is applied as the event date. The second purpose of this 
study is to examine whether firm specific characteristics related to the conflict of 
interests, monitoring and accounting information affect the relevance of audit 
reports. The relationship between firm characteristics (information asymmetry, 
information environment and agency costs of debt) and stock market behavior 
(abnormal stock returns, volatility changes and systematic risk changes) around 
audit report announcements is studied. 
 
Related to the first purpose of this dissertation, there are four hypotheses to be 
tested (in this list the numbering of the hypotheses (in parenthesis) follows the 
numbering of the hypotheses as they are developed in the latter part of this disser-
tation):  
 
1. Going concern audit reports are associated with negative abnormal stock 
returns. (H1) 
2. Auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures are associated with nega-
tive abnormal stock returns. (H5) 
3. Going concern audit reports are associated with an increase in volatility 
and systematic risk. (H9) 
4. Auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures are associated with an in-
crease in the volatility and the systematic risk. (H13) 
 
Existing studies on abnormal stock returns to audit report information announce-
ments use the event study method. In a short event-window examination, the 
identification of the event date or event period is one of the most fundamental 
questions. Since if the reaction is measured in the wrong period, it may actually 
measure some other event and thus the results lose their reliability. In audit report 
research this issue has been discussed extensively and several alternative event 
dates have been used, even in the same papers. The most obvious event date is the 
date when the annual report is filed with the stock exchange, in the U.S. the 10-K 
filing date. This date has consequently been used in the majority of the studies 
(e.g. Chow and Rice 1982; Ameen, Chan and Guffey 1994; Carlson et al. 1998; 
Beneish et al. 2008). The problem with this date is that the audit report accompa-
nies the annual report, which also contains e.g. the annual earnings announce-
ment. 
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Studies have attempted to solve this problem first by concentrating on audit re-
ports attracting media attention (e.g. Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich 1986; 
Fargher et al. 1998). Media disclosure dates are considered to be relatively free 
from noise from simultaneous disclosures and thus the use of this date is war-
ranted. Later the relevance of audit reports has been studied using an indirect ap-
proach to resolve the event date noise. Here the aim is to investigate the abnormal 
returns of some other related announcement with less noise. For example, Chen et 
al. (1996) study the reactions to bankruptcy filings and expect that a bankruptcy 
announcement for a firm that receives a going concern audit report results in a 
smaller negative stock market reaction if the audit report contains information 
relevant to the investors. Again, this is another approach to solving the problems 
associated with event date selection. In a similar vein, Fields et al. (1991) and 
Fargher et al. (1998) study the reactions around audit qualification withdrawals, 
which are expected to neutralize the qualified audit report and thus contain posi-
tive information. Finally, studies have approached the event date problem using 
estimates of when the first day of trade on the audit report information was (Sol-
tani 2000; Pucheta et al. 2004). 
 
The selection of the alternative event date (i.e. alternative to the 10-K report date) 
in this study follows the findings of Carter and Soo (1999) and Knechel, Naiker 
and Pacheco (2007), who show that the stock market reacts as early as on the date 
of the actual event (e.g. auditor switching in Knechel et al. 2007), while most oth-
er switching studies have concentrated on a less timely date, the filing date of the 
8-K report. In this study the event date is consequently the date of the actual 
event, i.e. the date when the auditor has issued the audit report, rather than the 
date of the 10-K report, which is filed at a later date. Results applying this event 
date have not been reported previously. Soltani (2000) reported to have conducted 
the statistical tests also using this date, but did not report the results. 
 
In addition to the abnormal stock returns, this dissertation also analyzes the mar-
ket effects of audit reports by focusing on the change in volatility and systematic 
risk. First, the volatility of the stock returns measures the uncertainty surrounding 
the estimation of the firm’s stock price. As Kim and Verrecchia (1991) show, 
volatility is a function of the precision of the information available and the 
amount of private information. The going concern audit report has the potential to 
affect volatility by either increasing the precision of the available information by 
emphasizing the underlying uncertainties or, as is more likely, increasing noise 
around the available information by introducing information which may have 
implications for the cost of capital of the firm or increase the likelihood of bank-
ruptcy.  
 
Second, systematic risk provides more information on the potential effects of the 
audit reports. Systematic risk measures how sensitive the firm’s stock is to market 
movements. If an audit report issued to a firm is considered to be firm specific 
information which does not affect the overall stock market performance, then it is 
expected that there is a change in the systematic risk of the particular firms stock 
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after the audit report announcement, assuming that the information is relevant. 
Fargher et al. (1998) study the systematic risk changes around audit qualifications 
and qualification withdrawals. They find changes in systematic risk to be signifi-
cant for firms announcing audit qualification withdrawals and those firms with 
continuing uncertainties have significantly higher levels of systematic risk. How-
ever, they do not detect an increase in systematic risk to announcements of quali-
fied audit reports.  
 
The second purpose of this study is to investigate how firm characteristics affect 
the relevance of audit reports. Related to this purpose, the dissertation tests the 
following three sets of hypotheses (in this list the numbering of the hypotheses (in 
parenthesis) follows the numbering of the hypotheses as they are developed in the 
latter part of this dissertation): 
 
1. The information asymmetry between the management and the owners has:  
a. a negative affect on the market reaction to going concern audit re-
ports. (H2) 
b. a negative affect on the market reaction to auditors’ internal con-
trol weakness disclosures. (H6) 
c. a positive affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk af-
ter the going concern audit reports. (H10) 
d. a positive affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk af-
ter the auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. (H14) 
2. The information environment of the firm has: 
a. a positive affect on the market reaction to going concern audit re-
ports. (H3) 
b. a positive affect on the market reaction to auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures. (H7) 
c. a negative affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk af-
ter the going concern audit reports. (H11) 
d. a negative affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk af-
ter the auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. (H15) 
3. Agency costs of debt have: 
a. a positive affect on the market reaction to going concern audit re-
ports. (H4) 
b. a positive affect on the market reaction to auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures. (H8) 
c. a negative affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk af-
ter the going concern audit reports. (H12) 
d. a negative affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk af-
ter the auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. (H16) 
 
The question of whether conflict of interests is related to the relevance of audit 
reports has not been examined in the literature. According to the suggestions in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986, 1989) there is more conflict in 
firms with low management ownership. In this study it is expected that low levels 
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of management ownership will increase the information asymmetry between the 
owners and the managers, making the relevance of auditing greater in these firms.  
 
The implication of this expectation is that the greater the information asymmetry 
is between the management and the owners, the more relevant the audit report 
should be and consequently, the greater the reaction on the stock markets. This 
expectation is also supported by other studies in auditing. Chow (1982) finds 
some evidence that the level of asymmetries is positively related to demand for 
auditing. Later, Fan and Wong (2005) find that conflict of interests affects the 
likelihood of firms employing brand name auditors (Big 5 -auditors). Similarly, 
Gul and Tsui (1998, 2001) and Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) find that the man-
agement ownership has a significant relationship with audit fees. Finally, Carey, 
Simnett and Tanewski (2000) find that the demand for auditing is smaller in fami-
ly businesses where the conflict of interests is expected to be smaller. All these 
findings support the assumptions of this study, that the role of auditing and audit 
reports is affected by the level information asymmetry. 
 
Information asymmetry between managers and investors is an essential concern 
for investors and other market participants. Insiders are able to make trading prof-
its at the expense of outsiders if they have an information advantage. If investors 
are aware of the information asymmetry and the fact that insiders can profit on 
value relevant information before public disclosure, they can alternatively adapt 
their trading behavior (Admati and Pfeiderer 1988), leave the market (Merton 
1987) or respond to the information asymmetry and the risk of insider trading by 
gathering information themselves or acquiring information from intermediaries 
(Barth, Kasznik and McNichols 2001). The information environment is closely 
related to the latter choice of action and refers to the richness of the information 
available concerning the firm. Specifically, for larger firms there is greater distri-
bution of firm-specific information on the market from both accounting and non-
accounting sources (Mitra and Cready 2005). In richer information environments, 
management is exposed to monitoring by a greater number of external agents. 
 
Agency costs of debt refer to the conflict of interests between the shareholders 
and the bondholders. This conflict has an affect on investment and financing deci-
sions (Jensen et al. 1976; Myers 1977; Smith, Clifford and Warner 1979), as well 
as the level of management discipline (Agrawal and Mandelker 1982; Sengupta 
1998; Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris 2002, Francis, LaFond, Ols-
son and Schipper 2005; Beatty, Weber and Jiewei 2008; Bharath, Sunder and 
Sunder 2008; Ertugrul and Hedge 2008). Two reasons are suggested here as to 
why the agency costs of debt have an affect on the relevance of audit reports. 
First, due to the increased monitoring, management opportunism and actions per-
formed in self-interest are restricted. Second, debt financing is expected to in-
crease the quantity and quality of information disclosed, and therefore the infor-
mation risk of the investors is lower. As a result, the information content of an-
nual and quarterly filings are of less relevance to the investors (Callen, Livnat and 
Segal 2006). 
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1.2 Contribution of the study 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several respects. First, it ex-
amines market reactions to auditors’ going concern and internal control weakness 
reports around the date of the audit report, while also testing the reaction around 
the 10-K report filing date. Existing studies have identified two problems con-
cerning the direct measurement of abnormal market reactions to audit report an-
nouncements. The first issue is the difficulties in identification of the first day of 
trade on the audit report. This issue is discussed in the early studies by Dodd et al. 
(1984) and Craswell (1985), but still in the most recently published papers, e.g. 
Pucheta et al. (2004) and Herbohn et al. (2007), researchers continue to discuss 
this question. The second problem related to the measurement of abnormal returns 
is concurrent disclosures of relevant information. Most commonly the problem 
here is that the audit reports are filed with the stock markets together with the 
annual earnings information. Separating the proportion from the total abnormal 
reaction that is caused by the audit report is difficult if not possible.  
 
The audit report date is the date up to which the auditor has taken account of all 
available information in forming the conclusions. Typically this is also the date 
on which the audit report is presented to the firm. In relation to the above men-
tioned problems, this event date is timelier than any of the event dates used in 
existing research to measure the direct impact of audit report announcements on 
the stock returns.  
 
Timeliness here means that the audit report date is an earlier date than other dates 
used in existing studies. Furthermore, the other important benefit of this event 
date is that there are generally no concurrent disclosures of annual earnings in-
formation, or any other scheduled firm specific disclosures. Finally, the selection 
of this date is supported by the literature on abnormal reactions to various items 
contained in 8-K reports. Carter et al. (1999) and Knechel et al. (2007) find evi-
dence of an abnormal market reaction on the date of the actual event rather than 
the 8-K report filing date. The question remains unanswered, however, whether 
the information is transferred publicly to the public market or if it measures in-
formed trading. Informed trading is generally defined as the trading activities of  
all traders who are informed after an event occurs at a firm but before it is re-
leased to the market (see e.g. Tookes 2008, for a definition). 
 
Second, this study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the vola-
tility and systematic risk changes around the audit report announcements. Exist-
ing studies have mainly focused on analyzing abnormal stock returns associated 
directly or indirectly with going concern or internal control reports. However, 
stock price reactions may be a result of revisions in expected magnitude of future 
cash flows and in the risk of expected future cash flows. Change in volatility and 
change in systematic risk are useful for measuring whether the audit reports in-
crease the uncertainty and riskiness of the firm. Fargher et al. (1998) examine the 
change in systematic and unsystematic risk after qualified audit report announce-
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ments and announcements of qualification withdrawals. However, Fargher et al. 
(1998) use all types of qualifications for analyzing the change in risk. This study 
continues the work of Fargher et al. (1998) in three respects. First, audit report 
date is here considered to be an alternative date of the information release. 
Second, this study analyzes in addition the change in volatility. Third, only first 
time going concern audit reports are studied. 
 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the stock market reactions to 
audit reports by investigating whether firm characteristics related to the informa-
tion asymmetry, information environment or agency costs of debt are related to 
the market effects of audit report announcements (abnormal returns, change in 
volatility and change in systematic risk). Existing studies have not considered 
these factors that according to literature (Ryan 2005, Lennox and Park 2006; Cal-
len et al. 2006) affect the relevance of accounting information announcements. 
1.3 Structure and main results of the study 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 the eco-
nomic framework for auditing is presented. The main focus in this review is on 
conflict of interests, which suggests that auditing serves to monitor the behavior 
of management on behalf of the owners. Auditing is effective in managing the 
information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between managers and owners. It 
emerges that characteristics affecting the conflict of interests can be expected to 
be related to how relevant the audit report information is for the owners.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on the relevance of audit reports. The 
question has been approached by two means. First, the market reaction to audit 
report announcements has been studied since the late 1970’s. This branch has 
focused on measuring the relevance of audit reports using stock market reactions. 
The second branch has concentrated on experimental research, where the main 
question is whether the audit report affects the financial statement users’ deci-
sions or decision-making processes. The most important findings for the purposes 
of this dissertation are that since the mid-1980’s there has been an ongoing dis-
cussion about the timing of transmitting audit report information to the stock 
markets and finally that issues affecting conflict of interests have not been studied 
in the context of the relevance of audit reports. 
 
In Chapter 4 the data environment is presented. Initially, the chapter outlines the 
regulations on auditors’ reporting of financial statements and on internal controls 
over financial reporting. Moreover, the conclusion from reviewing the legislation 
and practical evidence is that two main types of audit reports are issued to public 
firms which may be relevant to investors: going concern audit reports and the 
auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures.  
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Chapter 5 presents new evidence concerning the event date problem, the relev-
ance of going concern audit reports, and the relationship between going concern 
audit reports and firm characteristics. First, existing studies have recognized that a 
key issue for reliable results is the accurate identification of the event date. This 
study uses the findings from other types of information announcements and fo-
cuses on the dates of the audit report and the filing of the 10-K report. The analy-
sis provides some evidence of statistically significant negative abnormal returns 
around the date of the 10-K report, but not around the audit report date.  
 
Moreover, the results from the regression analysis in Chapter 5 confirm the hypo-
thesis on the relationship between information environment, agency costs of debt, 
and the relevance of going concern audit reports. The richness of the information 
environment and the management discipline imposed by the agency costs of debt 
both reduce the negative abnormal returns around the going concern audit report 
date. This is consistent with the suggestion that these two factors may restrict the 
insiders of the firm from gaining on private information and increase investors’ 
possibilities to foresee firm-specific problems. 
 
Chapter 6 investigates the effect of internal control weakness disclosures on ab-
normal stock returns. The evidence from the univariate analysis suggests that the 
auditors’ reports on internal controls do not result in negative abnormal returns, 
but rather a positive reaction is observed. Furthermore, more negative reactions 
are found for firms where the management has reported efficient internal controls 
and the auditor reports weaknesses in internal controls. Conflicting results from 
the internal control assessments may cast some doubt on the abilities of manage-
ment, and therefore the reaction is more negative. Moreover, when firm characte-
ristics are controlled for the results show that the information environment is ne-
gatively related to abnormal returns. 
 
Chapter 7 presents first the results on the uncertainty and risk affects of going 
concern audit reports and second on the relationship of firm characteristics and 
uncertainty and changes in risk. The change in systematic risk after audit qualifi-
cations has been studied by Fargher et al. (1998). However they found no signifi-
cant direct relationship between audit qualification announcements and changes 
in risk, but the relationship between qualification withdrawals and changes in risk 
was documented. The results of this dissertation reveal that there is a significant 
change in systematic risk after the going concern audit report date and the 10-K 
report date. The regression analysis does not support any hypothesis on the rela-
tionship between the relevance of going concern audit reports and firm characte-
ristics. 
 
Chapter 8 investigates the volatility and risk effects of auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures. There is evidence suggesting that systematic risk increases 
significantly after the internal control report. The regression results show further 
that the information environment of the firm is negatively related to the change in 
volatility. 
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Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the study. First, the theoretical background used to 
develop the hypotheses is summarized. Next, the hypotheses and the main find-
ings of the dissertation are presented and discussed. Finally, the implications are 
discussed. 
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2 ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITING 
 
This section describes and develops the economic framework for auditing in the 
business environment. The first focus is on the characteristics in firms behind 
why and how the need for auditing arises. Second, an explanation on what issues 
auditing is expected resolve is evinced. Finally, the demand for auditing and its 
various roles are reviewed.  
2.1  Contracting view of the firm 
 
In economic theory the term “firm” was first defined by Coase (1937) as consist-
ing of a system of relationships which come into existence when the direction of 
resources is dependent on an entrepreneur. The paper suggests that operating in 
an open market and using the market price mechanism involves costs and that the 
costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transac-
tion are not eliminated when there is a firm, but rather that they are reduced. The 
paper thus concludes that the advantage of forming an organization to direct the 
resources is cost-saving. Jensen (1983) elaborates further that these contracts spe-
cify the performance evaluation system, the reward system and the decision rights 
within the organization. 
 
Furthermore, Coase (1937) specifies in his research why some activities are han-
dled by firms and others by open markets. This study led the way to research to 
further examine the characteristics of the firm. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) ex-
plain that there are circumstances or different kinds of organizational arrange-
ments under which the cost of managing resources in a firm is lower than the cost 
of allocating resources through market transactions. 
 
The firm is identified by Alchian et al. (1972) as a contractual structure with joint 
input production, several input owners and one party who is common to all the 
contracts of the joint inputs. This party last mentioned is empowered to renego-
tiate any contract independently of contracts with other input owners; additionally 
that party holds the residual claim and has the right to sell his/her central contrac-
tual status. This central party is the owner. 
2.2  Agency theory 
 
By definition, agency theory attempts to describe a relationship where one party 
(the principal) delegates work to another (the agent). Furthermore, it is concerned 
with resolving the problems in a relationship with conflict of interests and risk 
sharing when attitudes toward risk diverge (Eisenhardt 1989). The development 
of agency theory has resulted in two strands of literature which address the same 
problem: positive agency theory and principal-agent –theory (Jensen 1983). Ac-
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cording to Jensen (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989), positivist research has focused 
almost exclusively on the relationship between the owner and the manager in pub-
lic firms. Above all, positivist literature has aimed at identifying situations where 
the interests diverge and describing instruments that limit the agent’s opportunis-
tic behavior. Eisenhardt (1989) acknowledges the particular influence of three 
articles on the positivist agency literature: Jensen et al. (1976) on the ownership 
structure of the corporation, Fama (1980) on the role of efficient capital markets 
in controlling the behavior of managers and finally Fama and Jensen (1983) on 
the role of board of directors as a monitoring instrument. 
 
The principal-agent literature has concentrated on modeling the general relation-
ships between the principal and the agent (Jensen 1983). As a result the theory is 
more applicable e.g. to employer-employee, buyer-supplier and other agency rela-
tionships. Consequently, the literature is generally more mathematically orien-
tated than is the positive agency literature (Eisenhardt 1989). Furthermore, Eisen-
hardt (1989) describes the heart of principal-agent theory as the trade-off between 
the cost of measuring the agent’s behavior and the cost of measuring outcomes 
and transferring risk to the agent. 
 
A general description of an agency relationship states that it is a contract under 
which one or more principals engage another person or persons as their agent(s) 
to perform some service on their behalf. To enable this performance, delegation 
of some decision making authority to the agent is needed (Jensen et al. 1976). As 
previously mentioned, the financial accounting literature focuses mainly on the 
positive agency literature, i.e. the relationship between the owner and the manag-
er. However, as Wallace (1980) suggests, this relationship is also easy to observe 
between other actors such as employers-employees, creditors-shareholders, gov-
ernment-taxpayers, as the principal-agent theory illustrates. 
 
The standard positive agency theory involves a principal (owner) contracting an 
agent (manager) to act on his/her behalf. As Jensen et al. (1976) explain, contract-
ing involves delegating decision making authority to the agent. This distinguishes 
ownership from control. If both parties to the relationship strive to maximize their 
utility, there is the possibility that an agent will choose to act in his/her own inter-
ests, not in those of the principals, this results in conflict-of-interest problems 
(Jensen et al. 1976). To limit the divergences from his/her own interests, the prin-
cipal has the option of setting up incentives for the agent and limiting the conflict-
ing activities of the agent by establishing appropriate means of control to mitigate 
conflicts of interests (Jensen et al. 1976). 
 
As a conclusion to the description above, it can be noted that agency theory views 
the firm as a network of contracts. This view constitutes one of the major founda-
tions of theoretical accounting. The theory helps to understand and explain the 
behavior of business actors. Ross (1973) and Jensen et al. (1976) developed the 
theory of ownership structure of a firm. This theory is developed on the basis of a 
distinction between ownership and control. From this point of view, the positive 
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agency literature examines the use of information for contracting purposes, for 
example, how information can be used to persuade the manager to act in the in-
terests of the owner (Ng 1978). 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory focuses on resolving two problems 
occurring in the agency relationship: agency problems and the problem of risk 
sharing. An agency problem occurs when the interests of the principal and agent 
conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent’s 
actions. On the other hand, a problem of risk sharing occurs when the principal 
and agent have different attitudes towards risk.  
 
Agency costs are the expenses incurred due to the contracting process (Adams 
1994). The principal can, in general, reduce agency costs by monitoring. Howev-
er, monitoring may also involve costs. Fama et al. (1983) define agency costs as 
the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among agents 
with conflicting interests. Agency costs also include the costs due to the fact that 
it is not appropriate to monitor all contracts perfectly (Jensen 1983). Adams 
(1994) observes that, in order to ensure the optimal level of interest alignment and 
information asymmetry, both principals and agents will incur contracting costs. 
For example, principals will incur monitoring costs from subjecting the financial 
statements to external audits. Agents, on the other hand, incur costs e.g. for exter-
nal financial reporting and internal controls (Adams 1994).  
 
Alchian et al. (1972) note that the theory of rational expectations underlies the 
demand for monitoring. This concept expects actors to take into account all avail-
able information that influences the outcome of their decisions, and that they use 
this information intelligently and therefore do not make systematic mistakes. In 
other words, principals cannot be consistently deceived by agents.  
 
According to Alchian et al. (1972) the main implication of rational expectations 
theory for agents is that principals foresee the divergence between the interests of 
principals and agents. Therefore, the principals will insist on compensation for the 
risk of loss they perceive through adjustment of the agent’s wage (Wallace 1980 
and 1987). This causes the agent, rather than the principal, to reduce agency costs 
and the demand for monitoring activities (Alchian et al. 1972). 
2.3  Conflict of interests 
 
As noted, if in an agency relationship ownership is separated from control and 
both agent and principal strive to maximize their own utility, this will result in 
conflict of interests (Jensen et al. 1976). Studies on managerial compensation 
have generally found that firm size increases manager remuneration (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990; Conyon and Murphy 2000). This provides management with an 
incentive to focus on firm size growth, rather than growth in shareholder returns. 
Managers also tend to pursue growth by diversifying, which reduces manage-
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ment’s industry specific risk and strengthens their job security. However, Lang 
and Stulz (1994) find that shareholder returns are greater in undiversified firms 
and they also show that the value of the firms is reduced as they diversify further. 
 
According to Jensen (1986, 1989), managers of low growth and high free cash 
flow firms in particular are involved in non value-maximizing activities. Manag-
ers increase perquisite consumption and compensation as well as manipulation of 
accounting numbers at the expense of shareholders (Jensen 1989; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989; Lang, Stulz and Walking 1991; Christie and Zimmermann 1994). 
For a firm to operate efficiently and maximize shareholder value, free cash flow 
must be distributed to shareholders rather than retained (Jensen 1989). According-
ly, Jensen (1986) concludes that the agency costs are higher for firms with low 
growth and high free cash flow.  
 
The free cash flow hypothesis is further extended by considering the effects of 
separating ownership from control. Following theories from Jensen et al. (1976) 
and Jensen (1986) on the separation of ownership and control, agency costs of 
free cash flow are more likely to occur in firms with low management ownership. 
This is because managers’ interests are more aligned with shareholders’ interests 
when they own shares in the firm. Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) argue that the 
agency costs of free cash flow are a decreasing function of management owner-
ship. 
 
If agency costs are higher in low growth – high free cash flow firms, this would 
imply greater demand for monitoring on the part of the principal and therefore the 
relevance of auditing could also be greater. This phenomenon is expected to be 
present particularly in firms where ownership is separated from control as Gul et 
al. (1998, 2001) proposed.  
 
High level of free cash flow is also suggested to affect the assessment of the inhe-
rent risk, i.e. the risk of a material misstatement in the unaudited financial state-
ments by the auditor (Gul et al. 1998, 2001). Firms with agency problems caused 
by free cash flow are thus likely to pay higher audit fees (Gul et al. 2001; Nikki-
nen et al. 2004). Gul et al. (2001) also suggest that the positive association be-
tween free cash flow and audit fees is stronger for firms with low levels of man-
agement ownership. However, this association is weaker in firms with high levels 
of debt (Gul et al. 2001). 
2.4 Information asymmetry, management ownership 
and information environment 
 
An agency theory perspective also suggests that the principal-agent relationship 
may be associated with information asymmetry. The agent, as the party with 
greater involvement in the firm, has access to information which may not be 
available for the principal without cost. The agent has the opportunity to use this 
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information to his/her own advantage. This generates the need for regulated ac-
counting and financial reporting. 
 
Because of rational expectations the agent usually has incentives to publish the 
accounting figures. Accounting numbers are frequently used by owners to moni-
tor whether contractual obligations have been met and to restrict managers’ power 
to promote personal interests (Watts and Zimmerman 1979). However, financial 
reporting of accounting numbers is not usually considered an information system 
for managers, since the firm’s internal management accounting is assumed to cap-
ture the firm’s actual financial position for the purposes of management (Ng 
1978). 
 
Accounting and auditing are essential factors in monitoring the agency relation-
ship. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the need for financial reporting and dis-
closure arises from information asymmetry and conflict of interests between man-
agers and outside shareholders. Furthermore, the credibility of management dis-
closures is enhanced by regulation, auditing and capital market intermediaries 
(Healy et al. 2001). Accounting numbers are of little value unless they are pre-
pared according to generally accepted standards (regulation) and unless com-
pliance with these standards is monitored (auditing).  Therefore, the role of audit-
ing is associated with both conflict of interests and information asymmetry and 
thus it has indeed a significant role in monitoring agency contracts.  
 
A unique feature in financial reporting is that the owner does not have full control 
over what accounting information system is being applied and what will be re-
ported (Ng 1978). However, the generally accepted accounting principles guide to 
a certain extent the methods chosen by the manager and the existence of external 
auditing examines the application of these principals, but ultimately within those 
limitations the manager still decides, based on his/her own interests, what to re-
port and at what frequency (Ng 1978). 
 
As pointed out by Lennox et al. (2006), managers disclose value relevant infor-
mation to owners and investors to reduce the information asymmetry. A reduction 
in information asymmetry increases the liquidity in the firm’s stock and reduces 
the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Verrecchia (2001) uses a de-
finition “information asymmetry component of the cost of capital”, by which he 
means the discount that e.g. the firm provides to investors to accommodate the 
adverse selection problem, when there exists different degrees of informedness. A 
reduction in information asymmetry also reduces the opportunity to profit from 
informed trading (Diamond 1985). Information asymmetry can be reduced pri-
marily by increasing disclosure activity (Verrecchia 2001; Brown, Hillegeist and 
Lo 2004). 
 
Costs incurred from principals’ monitoring actions are one component of agency 
costs (Jensen et al. 1976). Monitoring costs in a firm accrue when there is a dif-
ference between owners’ and managers’ interests. Since less monitoring is re-
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quired when owners’ and managers’ interests are aligned, Jensen (1986) sug-
gested that agency costs are lower for firms with high levels of management own-
ership. Studies show that audit fees, as a part of monitoring costs, are higher for 
firms with lower management ownership (e.g. Gul et al. 2001; Nikkinen et al. 
2004). Similarly, Chow (1982) finds some support for the view that the level of 
agency problems is positively related to demand for auditing and later Fan et al. 
(2005) find that agency problems affect the likelihood of firms employing brand 
name auditors (Big 5 -auditors). 
 
Information asymmetries between the firm and the investors can also be mitigated 
if the firm has a richer information environment. Information environment refers 
to the amount and the quality of firm and market-specific information available 
for investors. Information for decision-making may be gathered from various ac-
counting and non-accounting sources. The primary sources of information are the 
regulated disclosures of the firm. One purpose of disclosure regulation is indeed 
the reduction of the information gap between the firm and its investors and be-
tween informed and uninformed investors (Healy et al. 2001).  
 
In addition to the firm disclosures, the richness of the information environment is 
affected by private information production and disclosure. There are at least two 
significant sources in addition to the firm that produce and disclose information: 
analysts and news agencies. The disclosure regulation imposes more strict disclo-
sure requirements on larger firms. And additionally, as public interest is greater in 
larger firms, the analysts and news agencies concentrate their information produc-
tion on these. As a consequence, large firms have on average a richer information 
environment. 
 
Recent evidence documents that the richer information environment of larger 
firms constrains managements’ abilities to behave opportunistically, e.g. in man-
aging abnormal accruals (Mitra et al. 2005). The profitability and the frequency of 
insider trades, both of which proxy for information asymmetry and private infor-
mation, are documented to have a negative relationship with analyst following 
and firm size, and the informativeness of accounting information reduces the fre-
quency of insider trades (Frankel and Li 2004; Ryan 2005). Piotroski and Roul-
stone (2004) suggest that informed trading and analysts forecasting activity all 
affect the amount of disclosure information that is impounded in the share prices, 
but the type of information that they impound depends on each party’s informa-
tion advantage. Insiders and institutions incorporate firm-specific information, 
while analysts convey industry-level information. All in all, this evidence indi-
cates that the richness of the information environment is effective in reducing 
information asymmetries and constraining management’s opportunistic behavior. 
 
Finally, information environment is also documented to affect the information 
content of SEC filings. Disclosure information such as SEC filings that are value 
relevant causes investors to revise their expectations concerning discount rates 
and future free cash flows. However, Callen et al. (2006) find that SEC filings 
18      Acta Wasaensia 
contain less value relevant information at the SEC filing date for firms with a 
higher proportion of long-term sophisticated investors. This is consistent with the 
perception that sophisticated investors are likely to produce their own and use 
information disclosed by other sources to assess the firm before the SEC filings 
become available. In other words, in a richer information environment sophisti-
cated investors are able to anticipate forthcoming disclosures. 
2.5 Agency costs of debt 
 
The benefits and costs of debt financing have been discussed in the literature for a 
long time. Jensen et al. (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith et al. (1979) suggest that 
the interests of shareholders and bondholders conflict over the firms investment 
and financing decisions. The typical conflict is that the bondholders apprehend 
that if not limited, the shareholders expropriate wealth from the bondholders by 
investing in projects that are riskier than the current projects. While shareholders 
capture most of the gains if such actions pay off, the bondholders bear most of the 
risks in case of failure (Jensen et al. 1976).  
 
Bondholders have the option to limit the opportunistic behavior when engaging 
themselves in a debt contract. This can be done by insisting on increased monitor-
ing (Jensen et al. 1976), writing restricting covenants (Smith et al. 1979), shorten-
ing the maturity time of debt (Myers 1977), demanding a higher interest rate 
(Bergman and Callen 1991) or demanding financial reporting conservatism 
(Ahmed et al. 2002). The costs of debt can be summarized to consist of two com-
ponents: (i) the loss in firm value due to suboptimal investment decisions and (ii) 
the contracting costs that the firm uses to mitigate the shareholder-bondholder 
conflicts (Billett, King and Mauer 2007).  
 
Shareholder-bondholder conflicts are likely to increase as the probability of debt 
payments diminishes. Bodie and Taggart (1978) show that underinvestment will 
increase during periods of financial distress because covenants will start increas-
ing the payments from new investments’ value to bondholders when default 
seems more likely. Beatty et al. (2008) provide evidence that as the probability of 
default increases lenders are more likely to demand financial reporting conservat-
ism and conservative contract modifications. Similarly, Billett et al. (2007) find 
that more restricting covenants are increasingly used to control shareholder-
bondholder conflicts in leveraged and growth firms, and less restricting covenants 
when the proportion of short-term debt is higher. 
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between management monitoring 
and agency costs of debt. Agency costs of debt are likely to be lower when man-
agement discipline and direct monitoring are higher. Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1982) suggest that the monitoring imposed by capital markets and contractual 
methods both may help discipline managers and avoid expropriation of share-
holder or bondholder wealth, and therefore align the interests of management and 
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shareholders/bondholders. Ertugrul et al. (2008) find that increasing the board 
members’ incentives for more effective monitoring will discipline managers, de-
crease agency problems and thus result in decreased bond yield spreads. Ander-
son, Mansi and Reeb (2003) show that ownership structure is associated with 
agency costs of debt. In detail, they find that founding family firms have such 
organizational structures, which generate strong incentives for commitment of 
management to the firm and the family to monitor the firm, and this also protects 
the interests of bondholders. 
 
Finally, there is considerable evidence that accounting information quality and 
quantity affects the debt financing conditions. Accounting information quality 
affects the information risk of bondholders and is therefore expected to affect debt 
financing. Sengupta (1998) finds a relationship between analyst-based evaluations 
of aggregate disclosure efforts and cost of debt. Francis et al. (2005) report that 
firms with lower accounting quality have higher interest expenses and lower debt 
ratings than firms with higher accounting quality. Bharath et al. (2008) find that 
the accounting quality affects the choice of debt market (private vs. public), with 
lower accounting quality firms preferring private debt (i.e. bank loans). Addition-
ally, Bharath et al. (2008) report that in private markets the accounting quality 
affects the price as well as the maturity and covenants, whereas in the public debt 
the price is more likely to be affected.  
2.6 Conflict of interests and the demand for auditing 
 
Contracts between principals and agents will not reduce the costs of conflicts un-
less the parties can determine whether the contract has been breached. Therefore 
there is a natural demand for monitoring (Watts et al. 1986). The literature sug-
gests that accounting plays an important role in contract terms and monitoring 
these terms. This establishes the demand for accounting. Reporting of accounting 
figures, i.e. financial reporting, represents an information system to the owner 
(Ng 1978).  
 
It should be noted, however, that financial reporting does not add any information 
to the manager, because management is assumed to be able to observe the firm’s 
performance through the internal management accounting information (Ng 1978). 
Accounting numbers are used e.g. in lending agreements between the firms and 
their financers. These agreements often include covenants which are tied to finan-
cial statement ratios. Also, management compensation and bonus plans are anoth-
er example where accounting numbers are used to measure management perfor-
mance. (Watts et al. 1986) 
 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that management produced financial re-
ports alone do not solve the agency problems that are due to information asymme-
try or conflict of interests. Because management is responsible for reporting on 
the financial condition of the firm, management is also in a position to adjust the 
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figures if the owner is not able to directly observe the actions. Thus there is al-
ways an information risk present when financial information is made available to 
the owners.  
 
Auditing plays an important role in monitoring contracts and reducing the infor-
mation risk (Watts et al. 1986). Without an external audit the accounting informa-
tion used for decision-making by several internal and external parties lacks credi-
bility. Therefore the most important requirement of the external audit is to in-
crease the credibility of financial statements generated from accounting informa-
tion (Lee 1972). Principals contract auditors to view the accounting numbers, 
procedures used in compensation and bonus plans and any breaches of contracts 
(Watts et al. 1986). The increased credibility of the financial information poten-
tially benefits both owners and management. 
 
The purpose of auditing, as Littleton (1933) pointed out in an early view, was “to 
verify the honesty of persons charged with fiscal rather than managerial responsi-
bilities”. At this time auditing was associated with monitoring government offi-
cials. Audits were designed to check upon accountability and stewardship (Little-
ton 1933).  Later, Flint (1988) described auditing as “a social control mechanism 
for securing accountability”. The view of auditing as a mechanism in securing 
stewardship and accountability of the agents has remained. However, today the 
audit function is seen more broadly and more structured. The American Account-
ing Association’s (AAA) Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts (1973) summa-
rized the criteria that create the demand for auditing: 
 
1. The potential or actual conflict of interest. This conflict may exist be-
tween the user and the preparer of the information. 
2. Consequence. The user may require information for decision-making 
purposes. Therefore the user needs to be confident of the quality of ac-
counting information. 
3. Complexity. The accounting information production process is so com-
plex that the user has to rely on someone else to examine its quality. 
4. Remoteness. Even if the user had the ability to analyze the quality of ac-
counting information, it is unlikely that the user would have access. 
 
The committee (American Accounting Association 1973) considered that these 
four conditions interact in such a way that as they increase in intensity they form 
the demand for auditing.  Conditions 2–4 are based on the theory of rational ex-
pectations. The concept of rational expectations assumes that people take into 
account all available information that influences the outcome of their decisions. 
Further, it expects people to utilize their information intelligently and therefore 
they do not systematically make mistakes (i.e. they learn from the past). This 
means that principals will not be consistently misled by agents. (Wallace 1980) 
The implication of rational expectations theory for agents is that principals will: 
 
1. expect agents’ self-interests to diverge from the principals’ interests 
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2. be able to estimate the effect of such divergence 
3. adjust prices (e.g. compensation offered) to reflect the related costs of the 
agents’ expected activities. 
 
The ability of principals to protect themselves through an adjustment of prices 
generates the agents’ demand for monitoring activities. The agents rather than the 
principals can be seen as the source of demand for monitoring. Principals are bas-
ically unconcerned, because they can protect themselves from the risk of loss by 
reducing compensation for the agent’s services. Agents demand monitoring in 
order to avoid the downward adjustment of their compensation. (Wallace 1980) 
 
The committee of the American Accounting Association (1973) concluded that it 
becomes increasingly important that an informed, independent conclusion is 
reached by the user as to the quality of the accounting information received. Fur-
thermore, it is increasingly difficult for the user of the information to reach an 
informed, independent conclusion without outside assistance (American Account-
ing Association 1973). 
 
The monitoring of an agent can assume a variety of forms: owner-manager in-
volvement, contingent compensation or bonus plans, periodic reports on perfor-
mance etc. (Wallace 1980). Beaver (1989) suggests that one means to align the 
interests of management and shareholders is to use profit-sharing agreements or 
stock options as incentive contracts. The primary means for continuous perfor-
mance reporting is a set of a firm's financial statements (Wallace 1980). Substan-
tial evidence exists that earnings announcements by firms result in stock price 
adjustments (Ball and Brown 1968) or that accounting information is related to 
the market value of a corporation's shares (Beaver 1968), and that accounting 
ratios can be used to estimate the probability of bankruptcy (Beaver 1966) and the 
risk of owning a firm's stock (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 1970). 
 
These facts suggest that reported earnings have information content (Foster 1978) 
and are useful in the assessment of an agent's performance. The use of accounting 
information in management compensation and bond indenture contracts (Smith, 
Clifford and Warner 1979) demonstrates the use of reported earnings in perfor-
mance evaluation. From the discussion on agency theory and the implications of 
rational expectations, incentives clearly exist for agents to provide financial 
statements to assist monitoring activities by principals (Wallace 2004).  
 
However, if the principals do not trust the numbers provided by an agent they will 
insist on compensation (through adjustment of the agent's wage) for the risk of 
loss they perceive. Evidence exists that restatements of accounting numbers pro-
vided result in stock price adjustments (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz 2004) 
and lower earnings response coefficient (Livnat and Tan 2004). This implies that 
when accounting numbers are found to be inaccurate, the investors’ trust in ac-
counting numbers will be impaired for future periods.  
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Therefore, in light of the above-mentioned factors the agent will, in addition to 
providing financial reports, agree to provide evidence that the reported numbers 
were carefully prepared and free from material errors. External auditing is the 
product which provides this assurance, taking into account the limitations of au-
diting on detecting material errors. (Wallace 1980 and 1987) 
 
The audit literature has acknowledged that agency costs, caused by information 
asymmetry and conflict of interest are positively related to the demand for high 
quality auditing. Francis and Wilson (1988) find that agency costs affect the 
choice of a higher quality brand name (“Big 8”) auditor.  Similarly, DeFond 
(1992) finds that changes in agency costs are associated with changes in audit 
quality. However, Nichols and Smith (1983) do not find a positive abnormal stock 
market reaction to firms’ announcements of switching to higher quality auditors. 
Both Francis et al. (1988) and DeFond (1992) explain that firms have different 
demands for audit quality based on the alignment of interests between the man-
agement and the owners. The divergence of interests consists of conflict of inter-
ests and information asymmetry and the degree of these determine the degree of 
auditing needed. Auditing is understood to make the management more credible 
to investors either in the absence of or in addition to other means to control agen-
cy conflicts.  
 
Blouin, Grein and Rountree (2007) study two determinants of auditor selection, 
switching costs and agency costs. Blouin et al. (2007) used the collapse of Arthur 
Andersen to examine the effects of the client firm losing the agency benefits inhe-
rent in the relationship with the auditor. Client firms are perceived to have lost 
their agency benefits due to the reduction in perceived audit quality of Arthur 
Andersen, which has been documented in several studies (e.g. Chaney and Piplich 
2002; Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou 2006). Blouin et al. (2007) found that firms 
with higher agency problems were more likely to start a new audit relationship 
instead of following the incumbent Arthur Andersen audit team to the audit firm 
that took over the operations of Arthur Andersen. Accordingly, this further con-
firms that auditing is an important means of reducing agency costs and therefore 
the firms’ agency problems are a key determinant in the auditor selection process.  
 
In some later studies, the effect of divergence of interests on the informativeness 
of earnings was first studied by Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995). They find that 
managerial ownership is positively related to informativeness of earnings on the 
stock markets and negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
The reasoning behind this is that as the demand for accounting-based manage-
ment constraints is higher when management ownership is lower, management is 
expected to respond to this in their self-interest. The study of Warfield et al. 
(1995) was extended by Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) as they show that at high-
er levels of management ownership the informativeness of earnings does not have 
a positive relationship with management ownership, but the relationship has re-
versed. This would suggest that the entrenchment effect becomes effective at high 
levels of management ownership.  
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However, Gul, Lynn and Tsui (2002) develop the study by Warfield et al. (1995) 
by looking at how audit quality affects the positive relationship between the in-
formativeness of earnings and management ownership and the negative associa-
tion between discretionary accruals and management ownership. The results of 
Gul et al. (2002) support the conclusion that agency problems have an effect on 
the demand for auditing. 
 
The audit fee literature has also extended the findings of Warfield et al. (1995) 
and Yeo et al. (2002). Gul, Chen and Tsui (2003) find that management owner-
ship weakens the positive relationship between discretionary accruals and audit 
fees; however, in firms with high accounting-based management compensation 
the negative effect of management ownership is found to be weaker. The audit fee 
literature proposes that there is a relationship between agency problems and audit 
fees (see Hay, Knechel and Wong 2006 for a review). The relationship is ex-
pected to be positive, because of the auditor’s increased exposure to liability.  
 
Consistent with this, Gul et al. (1998) finds first that for low growth firms the 
positive relationship between free cash flow and audit fees is weaker for firms 
with high debt. Later, Gul et al. (2001) added that like debt, management owner-
ship also affects the positive relationship between audit fees and free cash flow. 
Finally, Nikkinen et al. (2004) report that management ownership has a negative 
effect and free cash flow a positive effect on audit fees and thus the agency costs 
can be used to some extent in explaining audit fees. The studies by Gul et al. 
(1998, 2001) and Nikkinen et al. (2004) further support the theory that the agency 
costs of the firm have an effect on the demand and supply of audit services. 
2.7 The role of the audit 
 
Wallace (1980) suggests three parallel hypotheses for explaining the role of the 
audit in free and regulated markets: the monitoring hypothesis, the information 
hypothesis and the insurance hypothesis. Next these three roles will each be de-
scribed to provide an overview of the different roles auditing can take in different 
environments. 
2.7.1 The monitoring hypothesis 
 
The monitoring hypothesis assumes that when delegating decision-making power 
to one party, as suggested in agency theory, the agent is motivated to agree to be 
monitored if the benefits from such activities exceed the related costs. As men-
tioned before, this hypothesis is applicable to all co-operative relationships in any 
organization, not only relationships between owners and managers, but also in 
relationships between employers and employees, creditors and shareholders, dif-
ferent levels of management in firms and government and taxpayers. (Wallace 
1980 and 1987) 
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Beaver (1989) pointed out that the monitoring theory strives to solve problems 
due to moral hazard and information asymmetry between the agent and the prin-
cipal. Moral hazard is the problem of the agent possessing superior information 
and thus having the opportunity to use it self-interestedly at the expense of the 
principal (Beaver 1989). Arrow (1985) calls these two types of principal-agent 
problems hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information (information 
asymmetry). 
 
Public disclosures have been seen as one way of controlling the monitoring hypo-
thesis. They have been seen as restricting the superior information position of 
management. Further, an independent actor can be contracted to inspect the in-
formation environment. From this point of view, auditing is one form of control-
ling for the monitoring hypothesis. The audit reduces the agent’s chances to with-
hold material information from the shareholders (Beaver 1989).  
 
The relationship between the auditor and the board of directors is one factor that 
affects the monitoring of management. The auditor and the board of directors 
usually have a relationship, which is considered to increase the monitoring power 
of the owners. Furthermore, the independent audit committees are considered to 
be a mechanism that enhances the auditor’s independent position in negotiations 
and increases the effectiveness and quality of the audit engagement (Ng and Tan 
2003). Recent updates in control environment regulation for public firms have 
imposed higher demands on the independence and expertise of board members. 
Similarly, the auditors and the management are now mandated to issue internal 
control reports, which again increases and strengthens the monitoring role of the 
auditor over the management. 
 
Wallace (1980, 1987 and 2004) brings forward many factors implying that audit-
ing is a highly valued monitoring system among stockholders, creditors, and top 
management. For example, Chow (1982) finds that firms with a higher ratio of 
total debt to total assets or firms with more accounting based covenants are more 
likely to hire an auditor, presumably to address the agency relationship of man-
agement to creditors. Additionally, evidence suggests that the likelihood of volun-
tarily hiring an auditor increases with the number of employees. (Hay and Davis 
2004) 
2.7.2 The information hypothesis 
 
Financial reporting was earlier seen to be central to the monitoring purposes, but 
since the 1960’s the focus moved to needs and the provision of information to 
enable users to take economic decisions (Higson 2003). Therefore, an alternative 
or complement to the monitoring hypothesis is the information hypothesis. One 
argument regarding the demand for audited financial statements is that they pro-
vide information that is useful in investors’ decision-making. Investment decision 
models in the finance literature value a firm by calculating the net present value 
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of future cash flows. For example, future cash flows have been observed to be 
highly correlated with financial statement information. Therefore, the audit is 
valued by investors as a means of improving the quality of financial information. 
(Wallace 1980, 1987 and 2004) 
 
Some of the same information that is used in monitoring contracts is also useful in 
making investment decisions. The difference from monitoring purposes, however, 
is that installing means of monitoring usually requires explicit contracting, as is 
the case when the agent commits to providing audited financial statements. How-
ever, the information hypothesis emphasizes that financial information is needed 
by investors to determine market values, which are means of making rational in-
vestment decisions, even in the absence of an explicit contract with the agent. 
(Wallace 1980) 
 
Fama and Laffer (1971) discuss three major benefits of information: reduction of 
risk, improvement of decision-making and earnings of trading profits. Audited 
financial statements can be related to each benefit. Investors tend to be risk ad-
verse, so they will demand a higher return for higher levels of risk or they will 
pay a higher price in the form of a risk premium to reduce the level of uncertainty 
or risk (Fama et al. 1971). For a simple example let us assume that the risk pre-
mium represents an individual assessment of how much an audit will reduce un-
certainty concerning reported financial information. The audit can be regarded as 
cost-effective if the risk premium of each individual investor exceeds the cost of 
the audit to the firm. (Wallace 1980, 1987, 2004) 
 
An audit is also valued as a means of improving the financial data used by man-
agers in decision-making. An auditor can improve the quality of the input data by 
finding errors and by making employees more careful in preparing records. More 
accurate data will improve internal decision-making. External use of more accu-
rate data for credit and investment analysis, labor negotiations or regulation deci-
sions will also improve managers’ performance. (Wallace 1980, 1987, 2004) 
 
The third use of information refers to gains from trade by investors with private 
information. According to the efficient market hypothesis asset prices reflect all 
publicly available information. Hence, no abnormal returns can be gained by us-
ing publicly available information. The information benefit of profits from trading 
is only realized by investors with private access to new information. The Securi-
ties Act require that audited financial statements are made publicly available. At 
the public announcement of the audit results, the price of the securities will adjust 
to the information (e.g. Chen et al. 2000; Taffler et al. 2004) if the information is 
relevant and not already known or expected. It may also be that no price adjust-
ment results from the announcement of audit results, the same conclusions could 
have been reached by outsiders at an earlier date or the audit results could be re-
placed by available surrogate information. Therefore, the audit function can be 
evaluated with respect to the benefit of trading gains. In other words the an-
nounced audit findings may only confirm investors’ expectations and existing 
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market valuations. However, the absence of gains from trade on audit results does 
not imply lack of value for audited information. (Wallace 1980, 1987) 
 
The role of the audited data is confirmed by research results (Beaver et al. 1970) 
which demonstrate an improvement in the estimation of risk through the use of 
accounting information. The improved estimation of risk does not mean that ab-
normal earnings could be gained, but suggests that investors have more accurate 
information for evaluating investments (Wallace 1980 and 2004). The perceived 
credibility of accounting information has been observed to have an effect on in-
terest costs (Wallace 2002), underpricing of initial public offerings (Menon and 
Williams 1991; Hogan 1997; Willenborg 1999) and bankruptcy (Menon and Wil-
liams 1994). 
2.7.3 The insurance hypothesis 
 
The third hypothesis on how the demand for audits evolves relates to manage-
ment’s liability exposure (Wallace 1980). Under the Securities Act, the auditor 
and the auditee are jointly and severally liable to third parties for losses attributa-
ble to defective financial statements. The ability to shift financial responsibility 
for reported data to an auditor lowers the expected loss from litigation or related 
settlements to managers, creditors and other professionals involved in the securi-
ties market. As potential litigation costs increase the insurance demand from 
managers and professional participants for an audit can be expected to grow. 
(Wallace 1980, 1987, 2004) 
 
To the question why managers and other professionals look for insurance from 
auditors rather than an insurance company, four possible explanations have been 
proposed. First, the audit function is so firmly established in society that the deci-
sion of management not to hire an auditor would strongly imply negligence or 
fraud on the part of the managers of other professionals. Second, accounting firms 
have established in-house legal departments to defend them in professional liabili-
ty suits. Audits have been seen as possibly providing more efficient insurance 
coverage as a co-defendant, than the insurance company as a third party. Third, 
the auditor facing a litigation suit is concerned about his/her reputation. Similarly, 
managers are concerned about their own reputation and the firm’s reputation as a 
well-run firm. The insurance company on the contrary will make decisions on a 
litigation suit as a cost-benefit choice between out of court settlement of legal 
defense. Thus, the auditor and the manager share a common interest in properly 
considering the effect of the litigation on the reputation of the parties involved.  
 
Fourth, auditors have “deep pockets” relative to a bankrupt or failing firm that 
cannot pay. Based on court decisions to hold auditors liable for inaccurate finan-
cial reporting, auditors are apparently viewed as a means of socializing the risk. 
This means that auditors spread the cost of client’s business failures to other 
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clients through higher fees and to the society through higher prices and lower re-
turns on investment.  
 
O’Reilly, Leitch and Tuttle (2006) show that the going concern audit report in-
formation is assessed less negatively when the environment perceives the auditor 
to provide some insurance. Similarly, Lennox (1999) concludes that the larger 
auditors with “deeper pockets” are more prone to litigation despite the higher 
quality that they provide, and thus this is interpreted as confirming the existence 
of an insurance effect on the demand for auditing. Finally, Menon et al. (1994) 
also find evidence that auditors are seen by investors as guarantors of financial 
statement quality and of their investments. Furthermore, investors also appear to 
be willing to pay a premium for the right to recover losses from the auditor. 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical examination of the relevance and role of audit-
ing from an economic perspective. The first part examines the key issues behind 
the demand for audit services. The primary explanation here for the demand for 
auditing is that the relationship between management and shareholders is such 
that monitoring is needed. First of all, the agency relationship between manage-
ment and owners is affected by information asymmetry and conflict of interests 
and these make for agency problems. The costs deriving from the control of agen-
cy problems are agency costs.  
 
Management has the incentive to let their self-interest affect their decisions. For 
instance, in the absence of a proper monitoring mechanism, management has the 
opportunity to provide accounting figures that they can benefit from. However, 
owners are expected to be able to anticipate this and they will lower, for instance, 
the management’s remuneration. This implies that it is in fact in management’s 
interest to provide some means for owners to control for agency problems. In ad-
dition, in an environment where a firm is subject to intense public interest, more 
public information is produced and disclosed, which together with the informa-
tiveness of firm disclosures make up the information environment of the firm. 
According to the studies previously discussed, the richness of the information 
environment restricts management’s opportunistic behavior and decreases the 
value relevance of firm disclosures. 
 
The second type of agency costs, the agency costs of debt, stem from the conflict 
of interests between shareholders and bondholders. Lenders protect themselves 
from the risk that the debt conditions are not fulfilled. The protection may assume 
various forms: higher interest rates, increased monitoring, shorter maturity of the 
debt, restricting covenants. Based on the literature, the consequences of increased 
leverage are that management monitoring and discipline increase in one form or 
the other.  
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Audited financial statements are widely viewed as a mechanism to mitigate agen-
cy costs. The empirical evidence is consistent with this view. It indicates that the 
agency problems or agency costs in a firm affect the demand for auditing servic-
es. Firms with higher agency costs are more likely to appoint high quality or 
brand name auditors. They are also likely to pay a fee premium for the auditors’ 
increased risk of litigation. Furthermore, there is evidence that higher quality au-
diting in fact increases the informativeness of accounting information to investors 
and also by restricting the use of accruals the actual quality of financial state-
ments is regarded to improve as well. This is important for the audit profession, 
since one could expect that accounting information users and providers are ex-
pected to turn to more monitoring mechanisms that are perceived to be more reli-
able if auditing is not able to provide assurance and communicate the expected 
level of information quality. 
 
Finally, auditing has been seen to assume different roles in different firms. The 
suggested roles are monitoring role, information role and insurance role. These 
roles may be concurrent, i.e. auditing can assume several roles at a time. From the 
perspective of this dissertation, the most interesting roles are the information and 
insurance roles, because these can be affected by the information in the audit re-
port.  
 
The hypotheses of this study are later developed on the theory presented here. 
First, in this study it is important to understand the role of auditing from the in-
formation and insurance perspective, because this is relevant when evaluating the 
impact that the announcement of an audit report could have on the stock markets. 
The information role postulates that auditing improves the quality of financial 
information and provides additional information if required. The insurance role of 
auditing, on the contrary, could be assumed to be weaker if the auditor issues a 
qualified audit report, because this report reduces the likelihood of litigation 
losses of the auditor.  
 
Second, identifying the reasons underlying information asymmetries and agency 
costs is essential for this dissertation when developing the hypotheses. The analy-
sis in this chapter provides substantial evidence of how information asymmetry 
affects the level of monitoring demanded, i.e. auditing. Likewise, it is assumed 
later in this study that the relevance of information provided by the auditor is also 
effected first by the extent of information asymmetries and secondly by the alter-
native means of reducing information asymmetries, i.e. information environment 
or debt monitoring. This can be illustrated simply by the example of information 
asymmetry between management and owners. The greater the information asym-
metry is, the more important the information in the going concern audit report 
could be considered to be to the outsider. However, the information asymmetry 
can be reduced by either obtaining and assessing information from other sources 
or relying on management discipline induced by the agency costs of debt. 
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3 EARLIER RESEARCH ON OWNER AND USER 
REACTIONS TO AUDIT OPINIONS 
 
In this chapter, the main issues regarding the demand and supply of information 
are presented and key studies on the relevance of audit reports to financial state-
ment users are reviewed. The studies on audit report relevance can be divided into 
two categories according to the research approach: archival market reaction stu-
dies and experimental user perception studies. The main focus in this chapter is 
on the market reaction studies and most importantly on the event date issues that 
still seem to puzzle researchers. 
3.1 Demand and supply of financial information 
 
Financial accounting information, including audit reports, is useful if it helps the 
users in their decision making. Useful information has at least the following three 
characteristics: quality, relevance and timeliness. Naser, Nuseibeh and Al-
Hussaini (2003) found that credibility and timeliness are the most important fea-
tures of useful information.  
 
Quality of the information typically implies that the information has been gener-
ated in accordance with generally accepted principles, such as IAS in accounting 
or ISA in auditing, for example. Relevance of the information suggests that in-
formation should be useful in making a particular decision, as, for example, an 
investor and bank loan manager require different information for accurate deci-
sions. Timeliness of information indicates that the information is current and fu-
ture events are dealt with according to generally accepted principles. 
 
Financial accounting information has two major purposes. First, financial ac-
counting is a way to transfer information from managers to interested parties ex-
ternal to a firm, reducing the information asymmetry between internal and exter-
nal parties. Information asymmetry indicates that managers have access to infor-
mation that people outside the firm do not have. Financial accounting provides a 
way for managers to communicate private information to interested parties that do 
not otherwise have access to it. Having access to the financial information helps 
interested parties make more accurate assessments of the firm. (Guenther 2005) 
 
Second, financial accounting information is often used in contracts between the 
firm and other parties such as lenders, managers, business partners, government 
etc. Basing contracts on accounting information computed with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles helps reduce the cost of contracting by reducing risk. 
(Guenther 2005) 
 
Privately owned firms differ from publicly owned firms in their ownership, go-
vernance, financing, management and compensation structures. These differences 
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affect the demand and supply of financial information in privately and publicly 
owned firms. In publicly owned firms, the demand for financial reporting arises 
from reducing information asymmetry between managers and other parties, e.g. 
investors. Tax, dividend, compensation and payment policies affect the demand 
for financial reporting in privately owned firms. The ownership in privately 
owned firms is typically more concentrated and shareholders have a more active 
role in management. Therefore, it could be expected that private firms are more 
likely to communicate privately with shareholders, creditors, employees and other 
interested parties than are publicly owned firms. However, no empirical evidence 
on this is available. It is proposed that the demand for public financial reporting 
quality is reduced in private firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Conversely, high-
er quality financial reporting is demanded from publicly owned firms. 
 
Ball et al. (2005) expect higher demand for financial reporting quality in publicly 
owned firms to be a consequence of the higher legal obligations of managers and 
auditors and higher risk of litigation. In private firms reducing information 
asymmetry is not the primary goal. Tax, dividend and compensation policies are 
more important in private firms as the flexibility of accounting rules can be uti-
lized to benefit the smaller group of interested parties. Ball et al. (2005) show that 
insider access and high quality financial reporting are substitutes for reducing 
information asymmetry and they expect private and publicly owned firms to fol-
low a similar pattern. 
 
The objective of the financial statements audit is to enable the auditor to express 
an opinion as to whether an identified financial statement framework has been 
implemented in the preparation of financial statements (IFAC 2003). Audit en-
gagements are thus intended to increase the credibility of financial information. 
Audit opinions are public documents used by auditors as a method in communi-
cating the results of the work to the principal and other users of the report. 
 
Over the past three decades several studies have examined the informational val-
ue of audit opinions. The framework of this dissertation is based on earlier re-
search, which can be divided into two categories: (i) archival studies explaining 
the importance of audit opinions to investors through its impact on stock prices 
and (ii) experimental research concerning user responses to audit opinions. The 
main goal in both categories is to test the information value of an audit opinion to 
different interest groups. The studies differ in the research approach, data settings 
and methods.  
3.2 Market reactions to audit report announcements 
 
The first approach in studying the information content of audit opinions is the 
capital market approach. This line of research studies the relevance of information 
contained in audit opinions by analyzing the direct stock market reaction to audit 
opinion or indirectly the market reaction to audit opinion related announcements.  
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Considerable evidence supports the simultaneous or delayed correlation between 
earnings information and stock price changes (Ball et al. 1968; Bernard and Tho-
mas 1989; Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006). However, as Lev (1989) reports, earnings 
explain only a fraction of the change in returns on the earnings announcement 
date. Due to this, accounting research explored models with other financial in-
formation (Ou and Penman 1989; Livnat and Zarowin 1990; Sloan 1996). One 
such source of information is the audit report. Audit reports have the potential to 
change the market responsiveness to earnings by adding noise or reducing the 
persistency of reported earnings (Choi and Jeter 1992).  
 
The audit report can be expected to potentially affect stock prices mainly for two 
reasons. First, the audit report may contain information that affects either the es-
timation of the magnitude of future cash flows and/or the riskiness of future cash 
flows. Any information that can result in revisions of these components is rele-
vant to the stock prices. Second, the audit report can contain substantial informa-
tion about the viability of the firm, e.g. the going concern audit report. The report 
should at all times reflect the auditor’s access to inside information such as fore-
cast data and management plans, and, taking this into account, the auditor’s re-
porting decision also reveals some private information (Mutchler 1984). Howev-
er, Mutchler (1985) explains that e.g. the going concern audit report is a function 
of publicly available information, and suggests that such reports can be predicted.  
 
Melumad and Ziv (1997) proposed in their theoretical model of market reactions 
to qualified audit reports that the reaction to avoidable and unavoidable qualified 
audit reports is different. An avoidable audit report, which the management could 
have avoided by making a change in reporting, could result in either a positive or 
a negative reaction. Whereas an unavoidable qualified audit report, which the 
management could not have avoided, is expected to result in a negative reaction. 
 
The reaction of financial markets to audit report announcements has been exten-
sively studied in the accounting literature. The fundamental question addressed in 
these empirical studies is whether the audit reports affect investors’ pricing deci-
sions. A list of the most relevant studies for this dissertation is presented in Table 
1. 
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Table 1.  Studies on the relevance of audit reports in the stock markets. 
 
Authors Year Journal* Observed 
market 
Audit reports on financial statements: 
Baskin 1972 TAR U.S. 
Firth 1978 TAR U.K. 
Chow and Rice   1982 AJPT U.S. 
Banks and Kinney 1982 JAR U.S. 
Davis 1982 AJPT U.S. 
Elliot 1982 JAR U.S. 
Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen and 
Leftwich 1984 JAE U.S. 
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich 1986 JAE U.S. 
Fields and Wilkins 1991 AJPT U.S. 
Choi and Jeter 1992 JAE U.S. 
Loudder, Khurana, Sawyers, Cor-
dery, Johnson, Lowe and Wunderle 
1992 AJPT U.S. 
Mittelstaedt, Regier, Chewning and 
Pany 1992 AJPT U.S. 
Ameen, Chan and Guffey 1994 JBFA U.S. 
Fleak and Wilson 1994 JAAF U.S. 
Frost 1994 AJPT U.S. 
Chen and Church 1996 TAR U.S. 
Jones 1996 JAPP U.S. 
Carlson, Glenzen and Benefield 1998 QJBE U.S. 
Fargher and Wilkins 1998 JBFA U.S. 
Chen, Su and Zhao 2000 CAR China 
Holder-Webb and Wilkins 2000 JAR U.S. 
Soltani 2000 IJA France 
Schaub and Highfield 2003 JAM U.S. 
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Table 1.  Continued 
 
Authors Year Journal* Observed 
market 
Pucheta, Vico and Garcia 2004 EAR Spain 
Taffler, Lu and Kausar 2004 JAE U.K. 
Ogneva and Subramanyam 2007 JAE U.K./U.S./  Australia 
Herbohn, Ragunathan, Garsden 2007 AF Australia 
Kausar, Taffler and Tan 2009 JAR U.S. 
   
Audit reports on internal control weaknesses:   
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and 
LaFond 2009 JAR U.S. 
Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghu-
nandan 2007 TAR U.S. 
Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008 TAR U.S. 
Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare 2008 RAST U.S. 
* AF= Accounting and Finance, AJPT= Auditing: a Journal of Practice 
and Theory, CAR= Contemporary Accounting Research, EAR= European 
Accounting Review, IJA= International Journal of Auditing, JAAF= 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, JAE= Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, JAM= Journal of Asset Management, JAPP= Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy, JAR= Journal of Accounting Research, 
JBFA= Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, QJBE= Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, RAST= Review in Accounting Stu-
dies, TAR= The Accounting Review. 
 
 
 
Audit reports on financial statements 
 
The event date problem becomes evident when the event date selection in the lite-
rature is reviewed. The first observation is that several studies have used a choice 
of dates. This is illustrated by how e.g. Loudder et al. (1992) describe their sam-
ple selection: “The qualification disclosure date was defined as the earliest of (1) 
the publication date of a media story, if one was found, (2) the annual report date, 
or (3) the 10-K stamp date”. Multiple event dates have also been used by several 
other studies and this is clearly an indication of the difficulty to identify or deter-
mine the first day of trade on the information contained in the audit opinion. 
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In the U.S. studies the most frequently used announcement date is the form 10-K 
(10-K) filing date (see e.g. Chow et al. 1982, Ameen et al. 1994, Carlson et al. 
1998). Traded firms must file their annual reports with the SEC on the 10-K. The 
problem with this report and event date is that the 10-K provides in addition an 
overview of the firms’ business and financial condition. This means that a large 
amount of information is released on that particular day, of which the audit opi-
nion information is only a part.  
 
Another frequently applied announcement date is the media disclosure date (e.g. 
Dopuch et al. 1986, Loudder et al. 1992, Fleak et al. 1994). The choice of this 
event date may resolve may of the problems with concurrent other information 
releases associated with the 10-K date, because there is no concurrent announce-
ment from the firm at that point in time. The media disclosure date may also in 
many cases be earlier than the 10-K filing and, as stated earlier, it is essential to 
identify the first day trade takes place with the audit report information. The prob-
lem with the media disclosure date is that for research purposes there are so few 
observations. 
 
In an Australian setting Herbohn et al. (2007) study the market reactions on the 
date of the final annual report. They recognize that Australian firms were required 
first to release a preliminary annual report with the earnings information and later 
they publicize the final annual report. Herbohn et al. (2007) are thus able to re-
strict the influence of earnings information from the abnormal returns on the day 
of the final annual report. However, as they note, the final annual reports may still 
contain amendments to the earnings or other relevant non-earnings information 
and, furthermore, the preliminary report may already contain information that 
creates an expectation of a going concern audit report, which would reduce the 
reaction on the final annual report announcement date. 
 
Moreover, Loudder et al. (1992), Fleak et al. (1994), Ameen et al. (1994), Carlson 
et al. (1998) among others use the annual report announcement day in their analy-
sis. This event date can be regarded as the ultimate date when the audit report is 
announced (of course the audit report can later be withdrawn or amended), be-
cause the firms must publish their annual reports and the annual reports must con-
tain an audit report.  
 
Soltani (2000) in his French and Pucheta et al. (2004) in their Spanish study use 
an estimation of the date when the audit report is publicly announced. They both 
use the 15th day before the annual general meeting as the event date. As alterna-
tive event dates, Soltani (2000) also suggests the date of the auditor’s signature on 
the audit report and an average between the date of the auditor’s signature and 15 
days before the general meeting, but results are reported only using the first men-
tioned date. 
 
More recent studies have proposed means to circumvent the event date -problem. 
Fields et al. (1991) acknowledge that “The main difficulty in most of these prior 
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studies was the lack of precision in identifying the date upon which information, 
if any, was revealed to the markets. In their study, Fields et al. (1991) examine the 
share price reactions to public announcements of withdrawn qualifications. The 
withdrawn qualification can be used to measure the information content of audit 
reports in exactly the same way as the underlying audit report is used. The use of 
qualification withdrawals announcements in this line of research can further be 
motivated by the fact that the withdrawals are not anticipated and may therefore 
result in a reaction in the stock prices and that they are more timely and less noisy 
than e.g. 10-K announcement (Fargher et al. 1998). Fargher et al. (1998) examine 
the shifts in systematic risk around the publicly announced qualification with-
drawals. They hypothesized that the announcement of a qualification withdrawal 
would decrease the systematic risk of equity, i.e. the equity beta. 
 
Chen et al.  (1996) propose another alternative means to avoid the event date -
problem of audit report announcements. They study whether going concern audit 
reports are useful in predicting bankruptcy. They focus on the excess returns in 
the period surrounding bankruptcy filings and find that firms receiving going 
concern audit reports experience less negative excess returns around the bank-
ruptcy filing. A plausible interpretation is that going concern opinions have in-
formation value, at least in the case of bankruptcy. 
 
Finally, Taffler et al. (2004), Ogneva et al. (2007) and Herbohn et al. (2007) ap-
proach the question of the relevance of audit reports to the stock markets using a 
long-term perspective. This approach is less sensitive to the selection of the event 
date since it examines the stock returns in a 12-month period following the publi-
cation of the going concern audit report. Taffler et al. (2004) find a significant 
reaction in the U.K. following the going concern audit report. Ogneva et al. 
(2007) are unable to find a reaction on the U.S. and Australian markets, whereas 
Herbohn et al. (2007) find in Australia only a significant market reaction in the 
12-month period prior to the going concern report announcement and Kausar et 
al. (2009) demonstrate a significant 12 month stock market reaction to first-time 
going concern audit reports in the U.S. 
 
 
Audit reports on internal controls 
 
The passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) Section 302 and Section 404 
changed the requirements for making public disclosures regarding internal con-
trols. In the pre-SOX period there were no requirements for management or audi-
tors regarding disclosures of internal control effectiveness. Prior to SOX (2002) 
firms could voluntarily assess and report on the effectiveness of internal controls, 
but only few did so (see McMullen, Raghunandan and Rama (1996) for a review 
on pre-SOX reporting activity). 
 
Section 404 of the SOX (2002) requires that public firm annual filings (10-K) 
contain management’s assessment of the design and the effectiveness of the 
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firm’s internal controls. Moreover, it also requires the auditor to provide a sepa-
rate opinion on management’s assessment and the auditor’s evaluation of the in-
ternal controls. The auditors’ reports on internal control deficiencies are usually 
referred to as the auditors’ Section 404 disclosures. Closely related to these re-
ports where the Section 302 reports by the management. Before the implementa-
tion of SOX (2002) Section 404, Section 302 first required management to eva-
luate the internal controls over financial reporting and report results of their eval-
uation. Whereas Section 404 reports accompany annual reports, the Section 302 
reports could be filed separately. 
 
Research on both Section 302 and Section 404 disclosures shows that internal 
control weaknesses are associated with firms that are smaller, financially weaker, 
rapidly growing, more complex, and which have ongoing restructuring (Doyle, 
Ge and McVay 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). As expected, weaknesses in 
internal controls are also related to significantly decreased financial statement 
quality. Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007b) and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney 
and LaFond (2009) find that internal control weaknesses are associated with low-
er quality accruals. Weaknesses in internal controls can affect the quality of fi-
nancial statements by either allowing more intentional earnings management or 
unintentional errors. The evidence (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) suggests how-
ever, that weaknesses are more likely to lead to unintentional errors 
 
As the evidence of the effect of internal control weaknesses on financial reporting 
quality seems convincing, it is of interest to look closer at the market and capital 
effects of these disclosures. In general, the negative effect of internal control 
weaknesses on financial information quality increases the information risk and 
uncertainty of equity or debt holders. Therefore, investors should demand a high-
er risk premium. Regarding the Section 302 disclosures, there is evidence that 
there is a negative abnormal reaction to the announcement of internal control 
weaknesses (Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008). However, Beneish et 
al. (2008) report that the auditor quality and client size attenuates the reaction to 
Section 302 disclosures, and Hammersley et al. (2008) find that the reaction de-
pends on the characteristics of the weakness. This evidence suggests first that the 
richness of the information environment may affect the reaction, and secondly 
that specific types of weaknesses are more difficult to anticipate even in a richer 
environment. 
 
Section 404 reports are filed most commonly with the annual 10-K reports. The 
empirical evidence implies that auditors’ Section 404 internal control weakness 
disclosures are not associated with abnormal returns around the announcement 
(Ogneva et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008). Beneish et al. (2008) conclude that the 
information environment of firms that are required to report under Section 404 is 
richer and that this attenuates the surprise or that Section 404 reports may reflect a 
low materiality threshold for disclosure. In an additional analysis Beneish et al. 
(2008) study the cost of capital effects of internal control weakness disclosures. 
They report that Section 302 reports increase the cost of capital, whereas Section 
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404 reports do not. However, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and LaFond 
(2009) find a significant negative market reaction to Section 404 reports, and their 
cross-sectional test also indicates that the systematic risks are higher for firms 
disclosing internal control weaknesses. 
 
These studies suggest that disclosed Section 404 internal control weaknesses may 
represent risk that is meaningful to investors. This being so, it would be fair to 
assume that the audit fees are higher for firms with internal control weaknesses. 
The empirical evidence confirms that firms with weaknesses pay higher audit fees 
(Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard 2008). 
 
 
Trading activities of informed market participants 
 
The literature reviewed above revealed that the event date used in this research is 
the typically the 10-K report filing date. However, as studies on market reactions 
to other firm-specific information announcements reveal, the actual date of the 
event may also be a relevant point of time to measure the reactions. For instance, 
Knechel et al. (2007) and Carter et al. (1999) study the market reactions to 8-K 
report announcements around the date of the actual event. In the study of Knechel 
et al. (2007) the event date used was the date of the dismissal of the incumbent 
auditor, rather than the filing date of 8-K the report indicating that the incumbent 
auditor was dismissed and a new auditor appointed. 
 
Using the date of the actual event raises an important question. The question is 
why should there be a market reaction before some new information has been 
announced to the stock markets. Generally it is understood that stock prices in-
corporate all relevant publicly available information and firms are required to 
publicly announce all new and relevant information. This implies that before the 
public announcement only some market participants have access and an opportu-
nity to use this information. 
 
Informed market participants are by definition all those traders who are informed 
when an information event occurs at a firm. Tookes (2008) informed traders as 
corporate insiders, employees, analysts, and others who have access to informa-
tion before it is released to the market. Piotroski et al. (2004) includes, in addition 
to insiders and analytics, also institutional investors with significant ownership as 
informed market participants. Jayaraman (2008) defines informed traders as those 
who have acquired private information or who have access to private information 
due to his/her association with the firm. 
 
The information advantage of informed market participants is the greatest when 
the precision of public information is lower, information asymmetry between in-
siders and outsiders is greater, uncertainty about the value of the firm is higher, 
and the informed traders’ information is more accurate. Tookes (2008) proposes 
also that informed traders have the opportunity to extract higher excess returns in 
38      Acta Wasaensia 
small firms’ stock that are less competitive and have higher sensitivity to shocks. 
Huddart and Ke (2007) find evidence that abnormal returns after insiders’ trades 
are lower for firms with richer information environment. Similarly, Frankel et al. 
(2004), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Seyhun (1986), and Finnerty (1976) find that 
the profitability of insider trades is positively related to information environment, 
measured by analyst following or firm size. Jayaraman (2008) finds that informed 
trading is more active when public information is less informative.  
 
The literature examining informed or insider trading supports the selection of the 
event date in this dissertation. The content of the audit report is privately available 
when the auditor presents it to the firm and publicly available when it is filed pub-
licly announced as a part of the 10-K report. The financial literature, however, has 
found considerable evidence of informed trading. In particular, as briefly re-
viewed above, the literature concludes that informed trading is more likely to oc-
cur in smaller firms with less competitive stocks and firms with high information 
asymmetry or poor information environment. This evidence suggests that when 
using the audit report date as the event date, then the effects of information 
asymmetry and information environment need to be controlled for. In addition, 
informed market participants have a greater benefit from private information 
when uncertainty about the price of the stock is greater and the private informa-
tion is accurate. In the case of going concern audit reports or internal control 
weakness disclosures, the firms receiving these reports are typically smaller, fi-
nancially distressed or going through restructuring and due to these factors the 
uncertainty around these firms is likely to be high. Thus, the conclusion is that the 
conditions after the audit report date are favorable for informed market partici-
pants’ trading activities. 
3.3 Relevance of audit reports in users’ decision 
making 
 
The professional auditor is assigned by the annual general meeting. This means 
that the auditor works for and reports to the shareholders. However, the target 
group or user group of audit reports can be seen as much broader. External inves-
tors, bank loan officers, authorities, financial analysts, i.e. users of financial 
statements, can all be considered users of audit reports.  
 
The impact of audit reports on users has been studied over a long period in many 
papers (e.g. Libby 1979; Houghton 1983; Gul 1987; Bamber et al. 1997; LaSalle 
et al. 1997; Lin et al. 2003). This research trend is based on the question of how 
professionals in different positions perceive the information contained in the audit 
opinion to affect the reliability of the financial statement information and their 
decision-making.  
 
Most of the studies on the relevance of audit reports in user decision-making are 
experiments. In these studies the decision made by the user is monitored when 
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he/she is exposed to a specific type of audit report and a scenario of request for 
financing. Guiral-Contreras et al. (2007) divide these studies into three types. The 
first addresses how the level of auditor attestation affects loan officers’ decisions 
(Johnson et al. 1983, Wright et al. 2000). The second type studies how the audit 
report format affects the loan officers’ decision-making processes (Miller et al. 
1993). The third type focuses on differences in the relevance of qualified and un-
qualified audit reports (LaSalle et al 1997, Bessell et al. 2003). 
 
The experimental method used in this type of research is designed so that the ef-
fect of the auditors’ report on the loan officers’ decision-making process can be 
measured. The results from both earlier studies and more recent studies yield in-
conclusive results regarding the relevance of audit report information in lending 
decisions. According to the findings of Estes and Reimer (1977), Libby (1979), 
Abdel-Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986), Houghton (1983), Bessell et al. (2003) 
and Lin et al. (2003) the audit report does not have an effect on the loan officers’ 
decisions. However, Firth (1979), Gul (1987), Bamber et al. (1997), LaSalle et al. 
(1997), Durendez (2003) and Guiral-Contreras et al. (2007) show that the audit 
report indeed may have an effect on the loan decision. 
 
Some studies have addressed user groups other than loan officers. Bailey, Bylins-
ki and Shields (1983) experimented with knowledgeable and less knowledgeable 
audit report readers, whereas Robertson (1988) and Durendez (2003) studied fi-
nancial analysts dealing with financial statement information when making in-
vestment decisions.  
3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter examined studies on the relevance of audit reports. The first section 
outlined the demand and supply for financial information. The primary function 
of financial information announcements is for the management to communicate 
the firm’s financial position to the interest groups of the firm, in other words re-
duce the information asymmetry between management and outsiders. There is 
considerable empirical evidence reporting a stock market reaction to both man-
agement produced earnings and other financial information as well as information 
produced by others with the potential to affect the perceived credibility of finan-
cial information or announcements affecting the firm in some other way. 
 
Next the chapter analyzed the earlier research on market reactions to announce-
ments of audit opinions on financial statements. This is essential in order to un-
derstand the context and determine the contribution of this dissertation. Audit 
report information is expected to affect the share prices by conveying information 
that affects either the amount of future cash flows or the riskiness of future cash 
flows. This assumption depends, however, on the assumption that the audit report 
contains new information that is not already available from any other source.  
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The key finding in the analysis of the existing literature is that the selection of the 
event date is still considered a major challenge in determining the stock market 
reactions to audit report information. The key question is when the audit informa-
tion becomes available for the traders. The determination of the event date is im-
portant for the functioning of the empirical models used in these studies. The 
analysis of the existing literature shows that several different event dates have 
been applied, some of them relying on various announcement dates while some of 
them are estimations of when the information is expected to be available.  
 
Next, the literature on internal control efficiency disclosures was reviewed. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) requires public firms to disclose management 
and auditor assessments on the effectiveness of internal controls. The literature 
suggests that from the investors’ point of view internal control weaknesses in-
crease information risk due to inferior accounting information quality. In addition, 
market effects of material weaknesses in internal controls have also been re-
ported, e.g. abnormal stock market reactions and increased systematic risk. 
 
The audit literature indicated that normally the event date used has been the pub-
lic announcement date of the audit report. However, the finance literature re-
viewed in this chapter indicated that there is considerable evidence of trading ac-
tivities of participants who have access to relevant firm-specific information prior 
to its release. The activities of these participants has been found to depend on fac-
tors related to the information asymmetry of insiders and outsiders, and the in-
formation environment of the firm. 
 
Finally, in the last part of this chapter the literature on the claimed behavior of 
financial information users to qualified audit reports is presented. These studies 
are fairly conclusive in reporting that financial statement users perceive that the 
audit report contains valuable information for their decision-making. In particular, 
bank loan officers’ responses indicate that both the decision to grant a loan as 
well as the terms of the loan and additional information required is affected by the 
content of the audit report. 
 
Connecting the key observations from this chapter to the previous chapter it is 
appropriate to consider other theoretical explanations for why and in which cir-
cumstances the information in audit reports is relevant. First, as explained in the 
previous chapter, the purpose of financial statement auditing is to reduce the in-
formation asymmetry. From the perspective of the information role of auditing, 
the qualified audit report fulfils its purpose, because this role assumes that audit-
ing improves the quality of management produced financial information and, if 
necessary, the auditor supplements this information by qualifying the audit report. 
Therefore, the audit report can be a relevant source of information for investors. 
In addition, the audit report can also be relevant from the perspective of insurance 
role. A qualified audit report significantly reduces the auditor’s risk of litigation 
losses and thus reduces the investors’ chances of covering their losses in case of 
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bankruptcy. Also, from this perspective, the announcement of a qualified audit 
report could result in a share price reaction. 
 
The effect of firm specific characteristics affecting information asymmetry has 
not been analyzed in the context of stock market reactions to audit reports. The 
literature discussed found considerable evidence that agency problems are an im-
portant determinant of choice of auditor, quality of auditing demanded and audit 
fees paid, for example. This literature clearly indicates that the significance of 
auditing is affected by agency problems, and in this study it is assumed that the 
information asymmetry and conflict of interests also affect how important the 
audit report information is. 
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4 DATA ENVIRONMENT 
 
This section describes the regulation and practice around going concern audit re-
ports and auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. First, the backgrounds, 
contents and potential reasons for the audit reports are introduced. The second 
key issue in this chapter is the dating and filing of the audit report. This is impor-
tant in order to be able to find support for any selection of event date. Above all, 
as noted in the previous chapter the selection of event date is essential for the 
findings of the empirical study to be reliable. 
4.1 Reports on audited financial statements 
 
The audit report is the main visible product of the audit. It communicates the find-
ings to the financial statement users. Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004) define 
the audit report as the observable output from an unobservable process. The audi-
tor should plan the engagement in such a manner that he/she can obtain reasona-
ble assurance whether the financial statement is free from material misstatements. 
The audit report must contain an opinion on whether the firm’s financial state-
ment presents fairly, in material respects, the financial position of the firm. How-
ever, if such an opinion cannot be issued, the auditor should give the reasons in 
the report. The auditing profession has adopted a standard structure and wording 
for the audit report. The standard form is to help the financial statement users in 
determining the degree of responsibility taken by the auditor.  
 
In certain circumstances the auditor may be required to depart from the standard 
report and provide explanatory guidance. These circumstances are of such a na-
ture that they do not affect the auditor’s unqualified opinion. These include, ac-
cording to AU 508.11 (AICPA 1988b), when 1) the auditor’s opinion is based in 
part on another auditor’s report, 2) the auditor prevents the financial statement 
from being potentially misleading due to unusual circumstances, 3) there is sub-
stantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, 4) there is 
a material change in accounting principles, 5) certain circumstances relating to 
reports on comparative financial statements exist 6) selected quarterly financial 
data required by SEC have not been filed or reviewed, 7) regulation concerning 
supplementary information has been neglected or 8) other information in a docu-
ment containing audited financial statements is materially inconsistent with in-
formation appearing in the financial statements. 
 
In addition to the unqualified opinion and the opinion with explanatory language, 
the auditor may be confronted with circumstances that require a qualified opinion, 
adverse opinion or disclaimer of opinion. The auditor may issue a qualified opi-
nion because of a scope limitation or departure from GAAP. A disclaimer of an 
opinion means that the auditor does not express an opinion. This may be the case 
when there is an insufficient amount of evidence for forming an opinion. Finally, 
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in the adverse opinion the auditor states that the financial statements are not pre-
sented fairly in conformity with the GAAP. (AICPA 1988b) 
4.2 Going concern reporting 
 
According to the auditing standard AU 341.2 (AICPA 1988a), one of the audi-
tor’s main responsibilities is to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt that the 
firm will be able to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time. 
However, here the reasonable period should not be more than one year from the 
audit report date. The auditor should decide whether all conditions and events in 
aggregate indicate that there could be substantial doubt about the firm’s ability to 
continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time.  
 
According to the standard AU 341 (AICPA 1988a) the auditor should follow 
three steps when considering whether a going concern opinion should be issued. 
First, the auditor needs to evaluate whether planning procedures, evidence gather-
ing and completion of the audit on aggregate indicate that the going concern con-
ditions of the firm are under doubt. The evaluation process may, before forming a 
conclusion, also entail obtaining additional evidence about conditions and events 
that support or mitigate the auditor’s doubt.  
 
Second, the auditor should initially discuss the matter with management and de-
termine whether management has identified the events or conditions that consti-
tute a threat to the going concern assumption. When there are plans in place that 
management has implemented or considered implementing in order to mitigate 
the threats to the going concern assumption, the auditor should evaluate the like-
lihood of the success of such plans. If no such plans exist, the auditor should re-
quest management to make such an assessment. The auditor should also initiate 
communication with those charged with governance responsibilities. The discus-
sion should include identification of matters that constitute a material uncertainty, 
evaluation whether the use of the going concern assumption is appropriate in the 
preparation and presentation of the financial statements. 
 
Third, after evaluating the evidence and the management plans, the auditor should 
assess whether there is substantial doubt about the firm’s ability to continue as a 
going concern. If there is substantial doubt the auditor must first decide whether 
the firm’s disclosures have adequately discussed the reasons and consequences 
that jeopardize the going concern ability. If the disclosures with respect to the 
firm’s ability to continue as a going concern are adequate, then the auditor should 
include an explanatory paragraph in the audit report, otherwise conditions for 
issuing an “except for” or “adverse opinion” exist.  
 
The following is as an example of an explanatory paragraph, where the auditor 
Ernst & Young LLP has disclosed concerns related to going concern issues in the 
audit report of AMR Corporation (March, 31, 2003) 
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“The accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming the Com-
pany will continue as a going concern. As more fully described in Note 2, the 
Company's recent history of significant losses, negative cash flows from opera-
tions, uncertainty regarding the Company's ability to reduce its operating costs to 
offset the declines in its revenues, the potential failure of the Company to satisfy 
the liquidity requirements in certain of its credit agreements, and its diminishing 
financial resources, raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to contin-
ue as a going concern. Management's plans in regard to these matters are also 
described in Note 2. The financial statements do not include any adjustments to 
reflect the possible future effects on the recoverability and classification of assets 
or the amounts and classification of liabilities that may result from the outcome of 
this uncertainty.“  
 
As previously described, the auditor has a range of different reports in different 
situations. However, in listed US firms the financial statements are usually ac-
companied by a standard report with an unmodified opinion. The second type of 
report is the modified report with an explanatory paragraph for either going con-
cern uncertainties or consistency issues (e.g. adoption of a different accounting 
principle). According to Butler et al. (2004), the two abovementioned reasons 
account for about 98 percent of the non-standard audit reports issued in the U.S. 
from 1994 to 1999. Other types of audit reports are effectively restrained by regu-
lation. Based on SEC (1980) Regulation S-X “Rules of general application”, the 
consequence of an audit qualification due to GAAP violations is that the financial 
statement will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate. Due to this it is likely 
that public firms resolve the issues in the financial statements that the auditor 
considers to result in a qualified, disclaimed or adverse opinion. 
4.3 SOX 404 and auditors’ disclosures on internal 
control weaknesses over financial reporting 
 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) stipulates that the manage-
ment of public firms must include in its annual disclosure a report of the firm's 
internal control over financial reporting. The report of management must, accord-
ing to the Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004), contain at least a manage-
ment's assessment of the effectiveness of the internal controls. Additionally, Sec-
tion 404 (SOX 2002) specifies that the auditor’s report over financial reporting 
must also include the auditor’s opinion on management’s assessment of the effec-
tiveness of internal controls, as well as the auditor’s independent assessment of 
the effectiveness of internal controls. 
 
Before the implementation of Section 404, management was required to evaluate 
the effectiveness of disclosure controls and procedures, report the findings of their 
evaluation and indicate if there has been any change in internal controls. From 
management’s point of view the difference between Section 302 and Section 404 
disclosure is that under Section 302 the review of internal control was subject to 
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less regulation and the disclosure rules were less specific compared to those of 
Section 404.  
 
In detail, Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) requires that management in-
clude in its annual report its assessment of the effectiveness of the firm's internal 
control over financial reporting in addition to its audited financial statements as of 
the end of the most recent fiscal year. The report must include a statement on 
management’s responsibility over internal controls, identification of the internal 
control framework used and an assessment of the effectiveness of internal con-
trols. Management may not report that the firm's internal control over financial 
reporting is effective if there are one or more material weaknesses. Finally, man-
agement must mention that the auditor has evaluated management’s assessment 
and issued a report thereafter.  
 
The auditor’s evaluation of management’s internal control report should, accord-
ing to the Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004), first include an evaluation of 
management’s statement of responsibilities with regard to internal controls. In 
addition, the auditor must evaluate the appropriateness of the internal control 
framework used and then review management’s internal control efficiency as-
sessment and disclosure.  
 
To form a basis for expressing the report, the auditor must plan and perform the 
audit in such a manner that there is reasonable assurance about whether the firm 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting. The auditor also 
must also audit the firm's financial statements because, according to Auditing 
Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004), the information the auditor obtains during a fi-
nancial statement audit is relevant to the auditor's conclusion about the effective-
ness of the firm's internal control. The auditor should evaluate the significance of 
a deficiency in internal control by determining the potential that a deficiency, or a 
combination of deficiencies, could result in a misstatement in the financial disclo-
sures. 
 
Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) paragraphs 8–10 indentify three types of 
internal control deficiencies that differ in the probability that misstatements in the 
disclosures are not detected and prevented by the internal controls:  
 
-A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does 
not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing 
their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis. 
-A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of control 
deficiencies that adversely affects the firm's ability to initiate, authorize, 
record, process, or report external financial data reliably in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a re-
mote likelihood that a misstatement of the firm's annual or interim financial 
statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or de-
tected. 
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-A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of signifi-
cant deficiencies that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material 
misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be pre-
vented or detected. 
 
This wording is commonly used in both management’s and auditor’s disclosures 
on internal controls. The purpose of this is to classify the seriousness of the defi-
ciencies and to harmonize the terminology used in the disclosures. 
4.4 Dating and signing the audit report 
 
The audit report is always concluded with the manual or printed signature of the 
audit firm and the date of the report. Under AU 103 (AICPA 2005), the audit re-
port should be dated when sufficient evidence to support the report has been ob-
tained. To the user the audit report date indicates the last day up to which the au-
ditor has taken account of all significant events that have occurred after the date 
of the financial statements. The audit report date will typically be close to the date 
that the auditor delivers the audit report to the firm (AICPA 2007). 
 
Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) states that the when the auditor issues 
separate reports on internal controls and on financial statements, the date of both 
reports must be the same. This is because the view of the PCAOB is that the audi-
tor cannot audit internal control over financial reporting without also auditing the 
financial statements. 
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5 GOING CONCERN AUDIT REPORTS AND 
STOCK RETURNS 
 
After examining the theoretical framework for auditing and reviewing studies on 
the relevance of audit reports to stock markets, this section presents the first part 
of the empirical analysis of this dissertation. The purpose of this chapter is to em-
pirically investigate first whether there is a stock market reaction to the going 
concern audit report announcement and then whether firm specific characteristics 
affecting the information asymmetry are related to the stock reactions. Next the 
hypotheses to be tested are developed, then the data and methodology are intro-
duced and finally the results from the empirical analysis are presented. 
5.1 Hypothesis development 
 
A simultaneous or delayed relationship between earnings information and stock 
price changes has been documented in innumerable empirical studies since Ball et 
al. (1968) and Bernard et al. (1989). Moreover, it is equally obvious that, as Lev 
(1989) reports, earnings information explain only a fraction of the change in re-
turns on the earnings announcement date. Ryan and Taffler (2004) show that 
firms’ formal accounting releases account for less than 20 percent of economical-
ly significant stock price changes.  
 
The auditing of financial statements per se is not usually considered a source of 
information to the stock markets. The function of auditing is rather to ensure the 
reliability and sufficiency of the financial information that is issued by the firms. 
In some cases however, the audit report may contain relevant and new informa-
tion. This, for example, is when the auditor questions, after assessing both public 
and private information, the firm’s ability to continue as a going concern or when 
the auditor reports that the earnings information in the financial statement issued 
by the firm does not fairly present the financial position of the firm. Audit reports 
in these cases have the potential to change the market responsiveness to earnings 
or affect the estimation of future cash flows. 
5.1.1 Abnormal returns around auditors’ going concern audit report dates 
 
Crashwell (1985) concluded over 20 years ago that “because the evidence is con-
tradictory and inconsistent, it is not possible to make general statements about the 
information content of audit qualifications”. Mutchler (1985) shows that the 
going concern audit report disclosures are a function of publicly available infor-
mation, confirming the financial deterioration of the firm and therefore are pre-
dictable. Several studies have been presented since this conclusion, but nearly two 
decades later Pucheta et al. (2004) argue in their review that research has still not 
provided any absolutely conclusive results. Pucheta et al. (2004) also propose that 
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the market is able to anticipate the information disclosed in an audit report before 
it becomes public and thus the information is already discounted in the stock pric-
es when it arrives (Pucheta et al. 2004).  
 
However, taking into account the complexity of the signals that the financial in-
formation may communicate and the fact that the audit reports reflect the audi-
tors’ views after also considering all available private information, such as man-
agement plans and forecast data, the audit reports could be expected to contain 
information valuable to investors. In addition, the demand for auditing is based on 
the trust that auditors facilitate market transactions by providing an opinion on 
financial statements, which should help reduce the agency problems between the 
management and the investors (Titman and Trueman 1983) and thus the audit 
reports are considered to be informative. 
 
A wide range of studies have devoted considerable effort to trying to identify the 
dates when the investors had knowledge of the auditor’s report. Dodd et al. 
(1984) concentrate on analyzing the public announcement date of the audit quali-
fication. Based on their investigation they decided to focus on the announcement 
of the 10-K or annual report. Dopuch et al. (1986) find evidence of a significant 
negative stock market reaction to media disclosures of qualified audit reports, 
which was considered a timelier disclosure and because it attracted more attention 
it was also considered to have more severe effects. Chen et al. (1996) investigate 
the association between going concern audit reports and market reactions to bank-
ruptcy filings. The results indicated that going concern audit reports contain in-
formation that is useful in predicting bankruptcy. Carlson et al. (1998) use a 
matched pair -method to analyze differences in stock market performance of firms 
receiving a going concern audit report and firms with no going concern audit re-
ports. They found significant differences in mean stock returns for the two 
groups.  
 
Soltani (2000) reports significant negative abnormal returns for French firms 
around the estimated announcement dates of audit reports. Soltani (2000) defines 
the event date as the fifteenth day before the annual general meeting of each firm. 
Pucheta et al. (2004) use the earlier of the two dates: the fifteenth day before the 
annual general meeting or the date when the Spanish Stock Exchange Commis-
sion makes the financial statement and audit report available. They found that 
qualified audit reports have no information value for investors. 
 
To conclude, a going concern audit report may contain information that shifts 
owners’ perceptions of a firm’s risk and therefore decreases owners’ expectations 
of future cash flows and stock performance. By conveying incremental informa-
tion to the financial statement users, the issuance of a going concern audit report 
is likely to have a negative effect on that firm’s stock price.  
 
The choice of the event date here is based on suggestions in existing audit reports 
and accounting literature. In this study the empirical analysis is performed using 
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two alternative event dates. First, the audit report date (i.e. the date typed by the 
auditor on the audit report) is considered to be the first possible day when the au-
ditor’s assessment of the firm is known by anyone else than the auditor. As a con-
sequence, it is also considered to be the first possible trading day using this in-
formation. It is a timelier date than the dates used in earlier studies. In fact, ac-
cording to the analysis of the sample in this study, the audit report is dated on 
average 25 days before the 10-K report is filed with the SEC. Second, the latter 
part of the empirical analysis is a test for the robustness of the results and uses the 
standard 10-K report filing date as the event date. This date is most commonly 
used in studies because on this date the annual report is filed with the SEC and the 
information contained in it, including the audit report, is readily available for eve-
ryone. 
 
Although the audit report date has been discussed by Soltani (2000), no results 
have been reported regarding it. The selection of the audit report date is supported 
by findings from studies on the relevance of 8-K reports reporting e.g. auditor 
switches. Carter et al. (1999) investigate the stock price reaction to 8-K reports 
filed with the SEC. They found a reaction of about 9 percent one day before the 
event date but little response on the filing date. They also find that 8-K reports 
containing bad news are more likely to be filed with a longer delay. They con-
clude that using the 8-K report stamp date as the event date could be one reason 
why literature have failed to constantly detect a significant reaction to the 8-K 
report filings.  
 
In a recent study by Knechel et al. (2007) the authors find a significant stock mar-
ket reaction to firms switching to and from brand name auditors (i.e. Big 8/6/5/4-
auditors). In contrast to the early auditor switching studies (e.g. Fried and Schiff 
1981; Johnson and Lys 1990) which typically used the 8-K filing date as the event 
date, Knechel et al. (2007) use the date of the actual event as the event date, i.e. 
the date when the relationship with the predecessor officially ended and a succes-
sor was appointed. 
 
Based on the findings from the literature presented above, the following hypothe-
sis is tested around the audit report date, and as a robustness test the same hypo-
thesis is tested around the the 10-K report filing date: 
 
H1:  Going concern audit reports are associated with negative abnormal stock 
returns 
5.1.2 Do information asymmetry, information environment and agency costs 
of debt affect stock market reactions to audit reports? 
  
An essential purpose of auditing is to provide owners with the information re-
quired by the accounting standards in case the financial statement information is 
not sufficient or accurate. Therefore, the auditor’s report is an essential part of the 
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audit system, since the audit report is the instrument that auditors use to commu-
nicate the results of their work to the owners. 
 
The existing auditing and accounting literature suggests that the information 
asymmetry and factors affecting it have a strong influence on various aspects of 
accounting and auditing issues. Warfield et al. (1995) find that agency problems 
have a negative relationship with the informativeness of accounting. Moreover, 
agency costs affect the demand for audit quality and choice of the auditor (Francis 
et al. 1988; DeFond 1992; Blouin et al. 2007), and firms demand external auditing 
due to managements’ and owners’ conflict of interests (Chow 1982).  
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
Audit quality has been shown to affect the relationship between informativeness 
of earnings and management ownership and additionally management ownership 
is found to affect the relationship between discretionary accruals and audit fees 
(Gul et al. 2002). Furthermore, firms with a high level of conflict of interests are 
associated with higher audit fees (Gul et al. 1998, 2001; Nikkinen et al. 2004). 
Therefore, the conclusion from these studies is that the relevance of auditing is 
significantly affected by agency problems. 
 
The outside shareowners do not have access, resources or incentives to acquire 
relevant information to evaluate the quality of the firm’s financial information, 
whereas the management is in a position to do so. This creates an information 
asymmetry between management and outside owners. The more diffused the 
ownership is, the greater the information asymmetry is. Auditing, in particular the 
auditor’s report, reduces information asymmetry, because the auditor evaluates 
whether the financial reports are produced and reported according to existing reg-
ulation. For management the audit report is of less relevance in this sense, be-
cause using the information available to them, the same conclusions may be 
made. In firms with higher management ownership the information asymmetry is 
lower, because a higher proportion of the owners have access to insider informa-
tion and the interests of management is more aligned with the owners’ interests. 
As a consequence, the audit report is less important in firms with higher manage-
ment ownership, due to the aligned interests and because owners are likely to be 
better informed in these firms. 
 
As a consequence, it can be hypothesized that monitoring provided by the auditor, 
including the audit report information, is more relevant in firms with low man-
agement ownership and high information asymmetry. This is because in these 
firms the monitoring of management is more important for the owners and the 
owners are in a weaker position to monitor by themselves. Based on this logic, 
information asymmetry is negatively related to the market reaction to going con-
cern audit reports, indicating that as the managements’ and owners’ interests are 
more diffused (higher information asymmetry), the audit report information is 
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more relevant and more surprising, and the market reacts more negatively. Also, 
since it is possible that a stock market reaction around the audit report date is a 
result of activities of informed traders the effect of information asymmetry on 
informed trading needs to be recognized as well. The literature reviewed in Sec-
tion 3.2 is consistent that informed traders are more likely to be active when in-
formation asymmetry is high. Consequently, it is more likely that negative ab-
normal reactions occur for firms with high information asymmetry, i.e. the infor-
mation asymmetry is negatively related to the market reaction around the audit 
report date. The following hypothesis is tested around the audit report date, and as 
a test for robustness also around the 10-K filing date: 
 
H2: The information asymmetry between management and owners has a 
negative affect on the market reaction to going concern audit reports. 
 
 
Information environment 
 
As mentioned previously, it has been documented in several studies that unex-
pected qualified audit reports result in more notable stock reactions (e.g. Loudder 
et al. 1992). Furthermore, other studies have concluded that qualified audit reports 
can be predicted using financial and non-financial information (Dopuch et al. 
1987). It is expected that the accuracy of such predictions increases for firms with 
richer information environment, i.e. more analyst following or media coverage, 
simply because more information is available. As a consequence, the qualified 
audit reports could be assumed to be less unexpected for firms with richer infor-
mation environment, and thus result in a less notable market reaction.  
 
Firm size is considered to be one simple and relevant determinant of the richness 
of the information environment (Mitra et al. 2005). Smaller firms have lower vi-
sibility in the markets and a weaker information environment. As a result, in the 
absence of other non-management produced information, the relevance of the 
audit report information is of greater value to the investors of firms with weak 
information environment. Additionally, smaller listed firms are, besides receiving 
less attention from analytics and media, also potentially monitored less closely by 
the authorities. This could enable informed traders of firms with weaker informa-
tion environment to engage themselves in trades on inside information and gain 
profits or cut losses. 
 
Consequently, it is hypothesized that firms with a richer information environment 
experience a less negative market reaction around the going concern audit report 
date. As a robustness test the identical hypothesis is also tested around the 10-K 
filing date. 
 
H3: The information environment of the firm has a positive affect on the 
market reaction to going concern audit reports. 
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Agency costs of debt 
 
One relevant feature of corporate finance policy that affects the information 
asymmetry and management’s abilities to act in their own interests is the choice 
of debt level. Debt financing involves costs and benefits. One essential cost of 
debt is the potential conflicts between stockholders and bondholders. The litera-
ture suggests that interests may conflict over investment and financing decisions 
(Jensen et al. 1976; Myers 1977; Smith et al. 1979), but because bondholders rec-
ognize these issues in advance they strive to limit such opportunistic behavior that 
could negatively affect the debt payments. Bondholders can insist on increased 
monitoring (Jensen et al. 1976), restricting covenants (Smith et al. 1979; Billett et 
al. 2007), shorter maturity time (Myers 1977), higher interest rate (Bergman et al. 
1991) or reporting conservatism (Ahmed et al. 2002; Beatty et al. 2008).  
 
All these above mentioned demands by bondholders incur agency costs of debt to 
the firm. Substantial empirical evidence exists suggesting that agency costs of 
debt can be reduced by increasing management discipline and monitoring, and 
moreover increasing the quality of financial information (Agrawal et al. 1982; 
Sengupta 1998; Francis et al. 2005; Bharath et al. 2008; Ertugrul et al. 2008).  
 
Debt financing has a potential effect on the relevance of audit report information 
for two reasons. First, because management is under closer monitoring, it is also 
likely that management will be more restricted from initiating trades using insider 
information before the public announcement. Second, debt financing is likely to 
increase the amount of information and the quality of the information available on 
the market, and therefore increase the possibilities of investors to foresee going 
concern issues. It may also be that, due to covenant protection, the behavior of 
bondholders may give investors early warning signals about potential financial 
difficulties.  
 
As a consequence, the literature discussed above suggests that mechanisms set up 
due to the agency costs of debt may affect the relevance of audit report informa-
tion. Specifically, in firms with higher agency costs of debt, i.e. more debt moni-
toring, higher quality requirements for financial information, and more manage-
ment discipline, the going concern audit report is less surprising and the market 
reaction is consequently less negative. The following hypothesis is tested around 
the audit report date (as a robustness test also around the 10-K filing date): 
 
H4: Agency costs of debt have a positive affect on the market reaction to 
going concern audit reports. 
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5.2 Data 
 
The sample used in the empirical analyses consists of the Russell 3000 Index 
firms. The Russell 3000 includes the 3000 largest and most liquid firms listed in 
the U.S. and aims to capture the return of the overall market.  
 
A search in the Thomson Financial Worldscope database identified 636 firms that 
have received a non-standard audit report, coded “05 qualified” from financial 
years ending 2002–2007. This code contains all reports classified as departing 
from the standard unqualified opinion, i.e. unqualified opinions with explanatory 
paragraphs and qualified opinions. This data period has been chosen in order to 
include only audit reports dated after the uncovering of the events around Enron 
and Arthur Andersen, which may have affected the auditors reporting practices 
and, on the other hand, investors’ responsiveness to bad news. As a consequence, 
all audit reports in the sample are dated within the period February 2002 – Febru-
ary 2008.  
 
Following prior studies, two restrictions are imposed in defining the final sample. 
First, only first time going concern audit reports are included in the sample, be-
cause successive going concern audit reports may reduce the information content 
of the announcement (e.g. Jones 1996, Herbohn et al. 2007). By using first time 
going concern audit reports only, the markets’ ability to predict the forthcoming 
report is restricted. First time going concern audit reports are verified by manually 
examining the audit report from the previous year. Second, all financial institu-
tions (SIC codes 6000-6900) are excluded from the sample due to unique features 
in their regulation. 
 
After applying filters as mentioned above, a first time going concern audit report 
and stock price data are located for 237 firms from public sources. These 237 au-
dit reports are manually verified that they indeed are going concern reports. As 
previously pointed out, a first time going concern audit report is defined in this 
study as the audit report with the previous period audit report being unqualified. 
Table 2 illustrates the distribution of the going concern audit reports used in this 
sample across the year of the audit report date and across industries.  
 
Table 2 clearly shows the effect that the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal had 
on the frequency of going concern audit reports. Almost 40 percent of the first 
time going concern audit reports in this sample, are dated in year 2003 and over 
70 percent between 2002 and 2004. Furthermore, the majority of the going con-
cern reports are concentrated on two industries, manufacturing and services. 
However, comparing the proportions of industries in the sample versus the repre-
sentations in the Russell 3000, it is worth noting that the services industry (7000-
8900) is heavily overrepresented in the sample. 
 
The going concern audit reports containing the audit report dates are manually 
collected from the SEC Edgar database and the Thomson One Banker library. The 
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Thomson Financial Datastream database contains the information needed for es-
timating the dependent variable and the information of the agency variables as 
well as control variables are from Thomson Financial Worldscope. The number of 
firms with independent variables data available for the regression analysis is tabu-
lated in Table 3. 
 
Table 2.  Number of firms by SIC codes and years. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
 
The market reactions to the going concern audit report information are investi-
gated during the event period. The empirical analysis of this dissertation uses two 
alternative event dates: the audit report date and the 10-K report filing date. The 
event period begins one trading day before and ends one trading day after the 
event date. The results of event studies may be sensitive to the length of the event 
period. Accordingly, following earlier studies (e.g. Knechel et al. 2007; Chen et 
al. 2000; Holder-Webb et al. 2000; Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008) 
TABLE 2. 
Number of firms by SIC codes and years 
 
 
SIC Code 
Industry 
description 
% of 
firms 
in 
sample  
% of 
firms 
in 
Russell 
3000 
# of 
firms 
in 
2002 
# of 
firms 
in 
2003 
# of 
firms 
in 
2004 
# of 
firms 
in 
2005 
# of 
firms 
in 
2006 
# of 
firms 
in 
2007 
# of 
firms 
in 
2008 
0-1999 Agriculture, 
Mining and 
Construction 
6.75 6.92 1 9 3 1 1 0 1 
2000-3999 Manufact. 39.66 45.49 21 31 15 14 5 2 6 
4000-4999 Transport., 
Communic., 
Electric, Gas, 
and Sanitary 
services 
6.33 11.82 2 5 3 4 0 0 1 
5000-5999 Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
8.02 12..82 5 6 4 3 0 0 1 
7000-8999 Services 39.24 22.92 13 42 12 7 6 5 8 
 
The table presents the number of firms by standard industry classification (SIC) codes divided 
across year of first-time going concern audit report. The sample consists of 237 firms, Financial 
institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6900) are excluded from the sample. 
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this study uses a short event period. The one day standardized abnormal return 
periods used are SAR [0], SAR [-1] and SAR [1] and the cumulative standardized 
abnormal return periods are CSAR [-1,+1], CSAR [-1,0] and CSAR [0,+1]. The 
short event period is used to restrict the influence of possible concurrent informa-
tion releases. The audit report date is the day that is printed on the audit report 
and the 10-K report date is the date that SEC Edgar database reports that the 10-K 
has been filed.  
 
In order to estimate abnormal returns, an estimation period of 200 days preceding 
the event date is used. Therefore, stock price data must be available for both the 
event period and the preceding estimation period for the observation to be se-
lected for the analysis.  
 
Initially, abnormal returns are here defined as the market model adjusted daily 
abnormal returns (ARit), with the return of the Russell 3000 Index used as a proxy 
for the market return (Rm). Daily stock returns (Rit) are calculated as differences 
in logarithmic price indices using closing price data. 
 
(1) ( )mtiiitit RRAR βα +−=  
 
Where: 
itAR = Abnormal return for firm i at time t 
itR = Return for firm i at time t 
mtR = Return of the market at time t (Russell 3000) 
 
The parameters αi and βi in the market adjusted model are estimated for each firm 
using daily stock returns for the previous 200-day period.  
 
Daily standardized abnormal stock returns around the audit report date are deter-
mined for each event day by dividing each stock’s market model adjusted abnor-
mal returns by the standard deviation of the estimation period’s abnormal returns.  
(2)  
)( it
it
it
ARS
ARSAR
∧
=  
Where: 
itSAR = Abnormal return for firm i at time t 
itAR = Return for firm i at time t 
)( itARS
∧
= Standard deviation of estimation period abnormal returns for firm 
i at time t 
 
 
In addition to the standardized abnormal returns (SAR) on individual days in the 
event period, the cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSAR) are also in-
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vestigated. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the three different 
event windows in the event period, CSAR [-1,+1], CSAR [-1,0] and CSAR 
[0,+1]. 
 
(3) ∑
−=
=
d
edt
itit SARCSAR  
 
To test whether the mean standardized abnormal returns in the event window are 
statistically significantly different from the expected abnormal return, which is 
zero (Hypothesis 1), the test statistic proposed by Boehmer, Masumeci and Poul-
sen (1991) is applied. This test statistic is obtained by dividing the average of 
standardized abnormal returns of the sample firms by its cross-sectional standard 
deviation. 
 
(4)  
n
s
SAR
n
t
n
i
it∑
=
=
1
1
 
 
Where: 
SAR = mean standardized abnormal return 
s = standard deviation 
n = number of observations 
 
The Boehmer et al. (1991) test statistic has the advantage of giving relatively 
smaller weights to returns of firms with larger volatility and hence the test is more 
robust even if the event is associated with volatility changes. The Boehmer et al. 
(2001) test statistic relies on the assumption that the abnormal returns are cross-
sectionally uncorrelated. Since there is not a single common event day for all 
firms in the sample, but rather firms have individual event dates, the returns are 
most likely uncorrelated. 
 
To empirically test hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 the following regression model is 
estimated: 
 
(5) iiiiii eZDASIZEMOWNSAR +++++= 4321 ββββα   
 
Where: 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares 
SIZE = logarithm of total assets 
DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
Z = Altman’s Z-score (1-year lagged) re-estimated by Grice (1997) 
e = error term 
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Management ownership (MOWN) is the closely held shares percent. Management 
ownership measures the information asymmetry between the owners and the 
management. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets and is here used to proxy the 
richness of the information environment of the firm. Total debt to total assets ratio 
(DA) measures the agency costs of debt. A one-year lagged Altman’s (re-
estimated by Grice 1997) Z-score (Z) is used to control for the financial distress 
the financial report in the previous year has signaled to the markets, and thus the 
surprise of the going concern audit report (Citron, Taffler and Uang 2008). Addi-
tionally, the Z-score correlates strongly with the typical control measures of prof-
itability and liquidity, and therefore the Z-score also controls for the riskiness 
(e.g. risk of bankruptcy) of the investment, which is the most important factor for 
the owners when evaluating the audit report information. A Z-score below 1.10 is 
considered a “troubled firm” in the Altman’s model re-estimated by Grice (1997). 
 
To control for the influence of outliers all tests are also conducted after winsoriz-
ing the variables at two standard deviations from the mean (see e.g. Bernard and 
Thomas 1990). The winsorized statistics are reported in Panel B of each table.  
5.4 Results on the abnormal stock reaction around    
the audit report date 
 
This section presents the results from the empirical analysis. The early part of the 
section reports the findings on the abnormal returns around the going concern 
audit report date, whereas the latter part uses the 10-K report date as the event 
date. Here the hypothesis is that there is a negative abnormal stock reaction to 
going concern audit reports around the audit report date. The second part provides 
the results on the relationship between information asymmetry, information envi-
ronment, agency costs of debt and abnormal returns around the event date. Based 
on existing research it is hypothesized that information asymmetry has a positive 
relationship with abnormal returns to going concern audit reports and the proper-
ties of information environment and agency costs of debt are positively related to 
the relevance of disclosed information. 
5.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis and 
provides an overview of the sample. Panel A shows that the mean standardized 
abnormal returns are negative on two event days and in all three periods, only the 
SAR [0] is positive. However, the median is positive on SAR [0], SAR [-1,+1] 
and SAR [-1, 0]. The minimum, maximum and standard deviation suggests that 
the spread of the abnormal returns is high. The descriptive statistics for the inde-
pendent variables in this study illustrate that some of the firms in the sample are 
suffering from extreme financial distress, which is noted e.g. from the lagged Z-
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scores. Generally, the statistics in Panel A indicate that the extreme values in the 
variables need to be controlled for.  
 
Panel B presents statistics of the variables after winsorizing them at two standard 
deviations from the mean. Now, naturally, the spread of the observations has di-
minished. The mean SAR values are all negative except for the period CSAR [-
1,0]. When examining the descriptive statistics concerning the independent va-
riables used in the regressions it becomes apparent that the sample consists of 
firms in severe financial difficulties. Even after winsorizing the variables at two 
standard deviations from the mean, some variables still indicate serious financial 
difficulties. The mean and median values for management ownership are just be-
low 40 percent. Intuitively this seems high. However, as the mean size reveals, 
the sample firms are relatively small measured by total assets, and the size of a 
firm is usually negatively correlated with management ownership.  
 
In Table 4 a pairwise correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression 
analysis is shown, with CSAR [-1,+1] representing the standardized abnormal 
returns on different days and periods, i.e. the dependent variables.  In Panel A, as 
well as in the winsorized Panel B, the dependent variable CSAR [-1,+1] is posi-
tively correlated with DA. Accordingly, the firm leverage seems to affect the ab-
normal returns of a firm receiving a going concern audit report in the period 
around the audit report date. This could be interpreted as early evidence that 
agency costs of debt increase the monitoring of a firm’s financial position and 
thus reduce the surprise of the going concern information, or alternatively that 
leverage increases management discipline and, for example, restricts trading on 
private information. MOWN has a statistically significant negative correlation 
with SIZE, as is generally expected, firms with higher management ownership 
tend to be smaller in size. Furthermore, MOWN has a strong positive correlation 
with DA and a negative correlation with Z (Panel B). In this sample firms with 
higher management ownership have higher leverage, which is also logical. Since 
a firm has to obtain finance by some means and if the firm persists in holding on 
to the equity rights, the financing has to come from the issuance of debt. Higher 
DA of high MOWN firms is also likely to contribute to the higher financial dis-
tress (Z-value in panel B) of firms with high management ownership. SIZE of the 
firm is negatively correlated with DA and positively correlated with Z. Larger 
firms have less leverage and they generally experience less financial distress, 
measured by the Z-score. 
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Table 3.  Continued. 
 Acta Wasaensia     61 
  
Table 4.  Correlation matrix (Audit report date)a 
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 CSAR [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1     
MOWN -0.090 1    
SIZE 0.067 -0.197*** 1   
DA 0.191*** 0.299*** -0.264*** 1  
Z -0.051 -0.062 0.377 -0.255*** 1 
 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 CSAR [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1     
MOWN -0.065 1    
SIZE 0.094 -0.184*** 1   
DA 0.151** 0.286*** -0.197*** 1  
Z -0.098 -0.121* 0.459*** -0.330 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively 
a denotes the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows:  
CSAR=  Cumulative standardized 
abnormal return 
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year 
lagged) 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares  
SIZE = natural log of total assets  
DA = percent of total debt to total assets  
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Monthly book-to-market and size adjusted returns for a 12-month period around 
the event date 
 
This section of descriptive statistics presents the results from a monthly analysis 
of the stock returns around the event period. The objective is to give an overview 
of the performance of the stocks of the firms receiving a going concern audit re-
port. This overview gives some indication as to whether the audit report informa-
tion can be anticipated long before the audit report date or the 10-K date, or alter-
natively whether there is a strong abnormal reaction some time after the disclo-
sure of the report. 
 
Monthly abnormal returns are estimated using the Fama-French three factor mod-
el (1993).  
 
(6)  ittftmtftit ehHMLsSMBRRRR +++−+=− )(βα   
 
Where: 
itR = Return for firm i at time t 
ftR = Risk free rate (one-month Treasury bill rate) 
ftmt RR −  = Return of the market at time t minus the risk free rate 
sSMB = Return of a portfolio of small firm stocks minus the return of a port-
folio of large firm stocks 
hHML = Return of a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks minus the re-
turn of a portfolio of low book-to market stocks 
 
 The estimated intercept α in the Fama-French (1993) three factor model of Equa-
tion 6 is the abnormal return. The historical monthly values for these factors are 
from the data library of Kenneth R. French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/ 
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). The model takes into account the stock’s 
exposure to market risk, to size risk and value risk. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the three-factor model monthly abnormal returns for six 
months before the audit report date and six months after. The 10-K report date is 
disclosed either the same or the following month as the audit report is dated. The 
abnormal returns are marginally positive during the pre-audit report period until 
the preceding month (-1). They remain negative until the second month after the 
event. As of the third month after the event the abnormal returns are positive. This 
figure demonstrates that the abnormal returns are negative only around the event 
month, which may indicate that the audit report information is entering the mar-
kets around the time that it is issued and dated by the auditor, handed over to the 
firm, and later disclosed publicly. However, additional analysis (not tabulated) on 
the monthly three-factor model abnormal returns reveal that only the positive re-
turn of month [+4] is statistically significant (t-statistic=1.777). 
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Figure 1.  Monthly size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal stock returns 
for a 12-month period around the going concern audit report date. 
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5.4.2  Abnormal returns around the going concern audit report date 
 
Table 5 presents the results from the analysis of the standardized abnormal stock 
returns around the event date. Results are reported for the standardized abnormal 
stock returns (SAR) in periods [-1], [0], [+1] and cumulative standardized abnor-
mal stock returns (CSAR) for periods [-1, +1], [-1, 0] and [0, +1].  
 
In Panel A the mean abnormal returns are negative on all days except SAR[0], but 
all abnormal returns are statistically insignificant. The results for cumulative ab-
normal returns are negative on average, but also statistically insignificant. Due to 
the extreme observations and outlier problems pointed out earlier, it may be ap-
propriate to focus more on the results in Panel B. The results on the winsorized 
data in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A. Most of the periods (except CSAR 
[-1, 0] ) exhibit negative abnormal returns, but they are all statistically insignifi-
cant.  
 
This indicates that even after winsorizing the extreme SARs at two standard devi-
ations from the mean, no statistically significant abnormal stock reaction can be 
observed around the time the auditor dates the going concern audit report. More-
over, no support for H1 is found in this section. 
 
The lack of statistically significant results in the analysis of abnormal stock re-
turns around the audit report date may be due to several reasons. First, perhaps the 
most plausible explanation is that the going concern audit report information does 
not become public on the audit report date. There is no clear concept of how the 
audit report information would become public before the disclosure of the 10-K 
report. However, the use of this event date is motivated by the findings of Carter 
et al. (1999) and Knechel et al. (2007), that a market effect can be observed on the 
date of an actual event. These two studies mentioned above do not give any clear 
explanation for how the information of the events they have studied becomes pub-
lic on the date of the event rather than the date of the announcement of the event, 
but the obvious, although unstated, explanation is that informed market partici-
pants are taking advantage of their information advantage. 
 
Second, this result could also be attributable to the claim that going concern audit 
reports do not contain new or relevant information for investors. The same infor-
mation may possibly be extracted earlier from other public sources of quantitative 
or qualitative information. Third, there is also the possibility that going concern 
audit reports cause a market reaction on the audit report date only for specific 
types of firms, e.g. firms with different agency or information environments, or 
alternatively different levels of financial distress or leverage. Based on the litera-
ture reviewed in Sections 2.4.–2.6. and 3.2. it is suggested that firm specific fac-
tors may influence activities of informed traders or the extent to which investors 
may anticipate the going concern audit report. In the next section the objective is 
to study whether (i) information asymmetry between management and the own-
ers, (ii) information environment, (iii) agency costs of debt, or financial distress 
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communicated in the previous year’s financial statement have an effect on the 
abnormal reaction to going concern audit reports around the audit report date. 
Table 5.  Standardized abnormal stock returns around the event date (Audit 
report date)a 
 
 PANEL A. Original data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-statistic  
SAR [-1] -0.039 -0.445  
SAR [0] 0.001 0.018  
SAR [1] -0.019 -0.300  
CSAR [-1, 0] -0.037 -0.328  
CSAR [0,+1] -0.018 -0.174  
CSAR [-1,+1] -0.057 -0.426  
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period 
Mean 
abnormal 
return T-test  
SAR [-1] -0.036 -0.809  
SAR [0] -0.024 -0.404  
SAR [1] -0.047 -0.877  
CSAR [-1, 0] 0.004 0.052  
CSAR [0,+1] -0.056 -0.666  
CSAR [-1,+1] -0.027 -0.283  
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from 
the mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
a denotes the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
SAR= Standardized abnormal return  
CSAR= Cumulative standardized abnormal return  
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5.4.3 Information asymmetry, information environment and stock market 
reactions to going concern audit 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 present the results of the regression analysis. The purpose of 
the analysis in this section of the dissertation is to test the hypotheses whether (i) 
information asymmetry between management and the owners, (ii) information 
environment, or (iii) agency costs of debt are related to abnormal stock returns to 
going concern audit reports.  
 
In Table 6 the results are reported for the standardized abnormal stock returns 
(SAR) in periods [-1], [0], [+1] and in Table 7 the results for cumulative standar-
dized abnormal stock returns (CSAR) periods [-1, +1], [-1, 0] and [0, +1] are pre-
sented. For each period the regressions are run first with the variables measuring 
the agency and information asymmetry of the firm MOWN, SIZE and DA as the 
independent variables and then a second regression with the lagged Z-score, 
which measures how much information about the financial distress has been 
communicated to the market, i.e. how surprising the going concern audit report 
can be assumed to be. Furthermore, here too, both tables are divided into Panel A 
and Panel B, where the regressions in Panel A are run with the original data set 
and Panel B with the winsorized data set. 
 
The results in Panel A of Table 6 demonstrate that the leverage of a firm (DA) is 
positively and statistically significantly related to the abnormal returns in five out 
of six regressions. Furthermore, Panel A shows that on the day SAR [+1], in the 
regression without the Z-score, controlling for existing information on the finan-
cial distress of the firms, MOWN has a negative and statistically significant coef-
ficient. In the other event periods MOWN shows both positive and negative rela-
tionships, but these are statistically insignificant. The SIZE variable is positive 
but insignificant in all periods. The Z-score is negative in the period SAR [0], but 
positive in SAR [-1] and SAR [+1], all statistically insignificant. 
 
Consistent with the findings from the correlations, the main focus here, too, will 
be on Panel B. In Panel B of Table 6, after winsorizing the most extreme observa-
tions in the data at two standard deviations from the mean, the results remain for 
the most essential part the same as in Panel A. That is, DA is positive and statisti-
cally significant in three out of six periods. However, here it seems that the inclu-
sion of the Z-score weakens the effect of the DA, and only in the period SAR [-1] 
is the DA significant (at the 10 percent level) when Z is included. This finding 
can be interpreted that debt increases monitoring from the outside (e.g. financial 
institutions) and enriches the information environment of the firm in particular for 
those firms with less financial distress, and therefore the going concern audit re-
port is less a surprise. Furthermore, high leverage itself may also be a signal of 
financial distress. Alternatively, leverage increases management discipline in such 
a way as to restrict informed trading on the audit report information. 
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However the result in period SAR [0], column two is also interesting. First, the 
expected sign and statistical significance under the 1 percent level for the variable 
Z is observed. The explanation for this is that the more serious the financial dis-
tress (the lower the value of Z) the lagged Z-score shows, the less the audit report 
comes as a surprise. Next, the SIZE variable measuring the information environ-
ment of the firm is positive, as expected, and statistically significant in the same 
column of Panel B. The information environment is considered to be richer for 
large firms. This means that more information is disclosed voluntarily by the firm, 
more external providers of information and more external users of information, 
and thus going concern audit reports can be more easily predicted using public 
information. Moreover, using the audit report information in trading on the audit 
report date, i.e. before the report is filed publicly, is likely to be possible only in 
smaller firms that are not monitored so closely by e.g. the SEC, firms that operate 
“under the radar”.  
 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the relationships between cumulative standardized 
abnormal returns and the selected independent variables. The regression results in 
Panel A confirm first of all the general findings from Table 5. DA is here positive 
and statistically significant in all periods, with and without the Z-score. Next, the 
SIZE variable has the expected sign but is statistically insignificant in all columns 
of Panel A of Table 7. Z-score is negative in all three cumulative periods, but also 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Finally, a clear interpretation of the effect of MOWN on the abnormal returns is 
not obvious according to these results in Panel A. The coefficient is negative (sig-
nificant in period CSAR [-1,+1]) when Z-score is included in the regressions, but 
otherwise positive and significant. However, the results later in Panel B show that 
it may be caused by some extreme observations.  
 
Panel B of Table 7 shows regression results after winsorizing the most extreme 
observations at two standard deviations from the mean. As mentioned above, the 
results change particularly for the MOWN variable. Now all the coefficients are 
negative, but also insignificant. This indicates that the winsoring removed the 
inconsistencies with the signs that were present in Panel A.  
 
The relationship between CSAR and DA is still positive and significant in two 
periods out of three. Only in the period CSAR [0,+1] is the result insignificant. 
This furthermore confirms that leverage has a positive effect on the abnormal 
reaction to the going concern audit report at the audit report date.  
 
The results in columns two and four of Panel B of Table 7 are interesting. For 
both period CSAR [-1,+1] as well as CSAR [-1,0] the coefficients for SIZE, DA 
and Z are all statistically significant and they have the expected signs. SIZE has a 
positive effect on CSAR, demonstrating that a richer information environment 
reduces the negative information content of the audit report. DA also has a posi-
tive effect on CSAR, indicating that leverage either affects the information envi-
ronment in such a way that the surprise of the going concern audit report is small-
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er or, alternatively, that leverage disciplines the management so that the use of 
private information is more difficult. The Z-score is negative, which shows that 
the better the financial situation was the previous year, measured by the Z-score, 
the more negative the abnormal reaction was around the audit report date. 
 
In summary, Table 6 and Table 7 present relatively strong evidence of a positive 
relationship between leverage (DA) and abnormal returns around the event date. 
In addition there is also some statistically significant evidence particularly in Pan-
el B of Table 7 that the richness of the information environment (SIZE) and the 
surprise of the weak financial situation (Z) affect abnormal returns. Consequently, 
no evidence to support hypotheses H3 and H4 is found. 
 
The adjusted R2 scores in the models of this study are low, but consistent with 
those in earlier studies (e.g. Knechel et al 2007; Fleak et al. 1994; Chen et al. 
2000). The F-statistic is statistically significant in those winsorized (Panel B) re-
gressions with some support for hypotheses H3 and H4. 
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5.4.4 Additional tests using the 10-K report announcement dates 
 
The purpose of this section is to further examine the abnormal stock reactions to 
going concern audit reports. Because the event date used in the previous section 
can be perceived to be experimental, although similar event periods have pre-
viously been used in the literature, this section provides the equivalent analysis 
using the more conventional event period, the 10-K report disclosure date. In this 
sense, this section tests for the robustness of the findings of the previous section. 
 
However, it is important to recognize that, given that the reaction around the audit 
report date could be a result of trading on private information, it does not rule out 
a reaction around the 10-K disclosure date. The normal market efficiency assump-
tion posits that the stock prices immediately adjust to the new appropriate price 
level after the information announcement. But this does not apply if the reaction 
around the audit report date is a result of private information. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
used in the analysis. Panel A shows that the mean standardized abnormal returns 
are negative on two event days and in all three periods. Panel B with the winso-
rized observations reports similar findings; here, too, all others but SAR [0] are 
negative. The descriptive statistics for the independent variables are the same as 
in Table 3, and will not be discussed here. 
 
Table 9 shows a pairwise correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression 
analysis. Here, too, CSAR [-1,+1] represents the standardized abnormal returns 
on different days and periods, i.e. the dependent variables.  In Panel A and Panel 
B the dependent variable CSAR [-1,+1] is not significantly correlated with any of 
the independent variables. The correlations between the independent variables are 
as discussed in Table 4. 
 
Standardized abnormal stock returns around the event date 
 
Table 10 presents the results from the tests of standardized abnormal stock returns 
around the 10-K report disclosure date. The mean market model adjusted standar-
dized abnormal returns in each period are tested for whether they are different 
from zero. In Panel A all other periods but SAR [0] are negative, however they 
are all statistically insignificant. However, in the winsorized results in Panel B 
negative and significant results (under 1 percent level) in three periods around the 
10-K date, SAR [1], SAR [0,+1] and SAR [-1,+1], are reported. This result indi-
cates that an abnormal stock price reaction occurs around the date that the firm 
discloses its annual 10-K announcement containing the going concern audit re-
port. 
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PANEL A. Original data set 
 CSAR [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1     
MOWN 0.039 1    
SIZE 0.048 -0.197*** 1   
DA 0.000 0.299*** -0.264*** 1  
Z 0.012 -0.062 0.377*** -0.255*** 1 
 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 CSAR [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1     
MOWN 0.057 1    
SIZE 0.056 -0.184*** 1   
DA -0.024 0.286*** -0.197*** 1  
Z -0.002 -0.121* 0.459*** -0.330*** 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the 
mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
CSAR= Cumulative standardized 
abnormal return 
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year 
lagged) 
MOWN = percentage of closely held 
shares  
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets  
DA = percent of total debt to total assets  
Table 9.  Correlation matrix 
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As discussed earlier, however, the problem with the 10-K announcement date is 
that it is the annual report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and it contains a summary of a public firm’s performance. Therefore it 
may (and most likely does) contain other price relevant items that affect the re-
sults. Regardless of this, the 10-K report date is the most commonly used event 
date in this field of studies. Table 5 (audit report date) reports largely similar re-
sults, the important difference being, however, that in Table 9 the results in three 
periods are statistically significant. The explanation for this is that around the au-
dit report date the abnormal returns are presumably driven by trades of some par-
ties with private information, and therefore the size of the reaction may remain 
statistically insignificant. All in all, bearing in mind the above-mentioned prob-
lems in using the 10-K report date, the findings in Panel B of Table 10 suggest 
that there is a negative abnormal reaction to the going concern audit report around 
the 10-K report filing date.  
 
Regressions of the effect of information asymmetry and information environment 
on standardized abnormal returns 
 
Tables 11 and 12 present the results from the regressions of the relationship be-
tween information asymmetry, information environment, agency costs of debt, 
and the standardized abnormal returns around the 10-K date. Table 10 contains 
the results for the three days around the event, and Table 11 the results for the 
three periods around the event. Summarizing both tables, MOWN has a positive 
and significant relationship with abnormal returns on SAR [+1], SAR [-1,0] and 
SAR [0,+1], i.e. information asymmetry is negatively related to abnormal returns. 
As hypothesized, a positive relationship may be due to the reduced information 
asymmetry of firms with high management ownership, which affects the degree 
to which the going concern audit report comes as a surprise and therefore the neg-
ative reaction is weaker.  
 
Panels B of Tables 6 and 7 report that the coefficients (although insignificant) for 
MOWN are negative in most event periods around the audit report date, but here 
they are positive. This could indicate that around the audit report date the insiders 
of firms with more management ownership use their private information and this 
results in negative abnormal returns. Moreover, the evidence further suggests that 
the information environment and agency costs of debt may restrict these actions 
of the insiders. By contrast, the evidence from abnormal returns around the 10-K 
report filing date permits speculation that the surprise of the going concern audit 
report is smaller in firms with more management ownership because “manage-
ment owners” have already traded on this information when they received the 
report after the audit report date, and therefore it is not a surprise for them.  
 
In Panel B of Table 11 a relationship between SAR [0] and SIZE is also reported. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that a richer information environment reduc-
es the negative surprise of the audit report. Contrary to the assumptions, the re-
sults do not indicate that leverage or the level of financial distress has a relation-
ship with abnormal reactions around the 10-K disclosure date. 
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Table 10.  Standardized abnormal stock returns around the event date (10-K 
date)a 
 
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-statistic  
SAR [-1] -0.039 -0.445  
SAR [0] 0.001 0.018  
SAR [1] -0.019 -0.300  
CSAR [-1, 0] -0.037 -0.328  
CSAR [0,+1] -0.018 -0.174  
CSAR [-1,+1] -0.057 -0.426  
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-test  
SAR [-1] -0.092 -1.511  
SAR [0] 0.015 0.215  
SAR [1] -0.312*** -3.814  
CSAR [-1, 0] -0.074 -0.806  
CSAR [0,+1] -0.293*** -2.991  
CSAR [-1,+1] -0.384*** -3.309  
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the 
mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
a
 denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
SAR= Standardized abnormal return  
CSAR= Cumulative standardized abnormal return  
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Table 11.  Regressions of standardized abnormal stock returns and firm 
characteristics (10-K date)a  
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Table 12.  Regressions of cumulative standardized abnormal stock returns 
and firm characteristics (10-K date)a 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter investigates the abnormal stock returns of going concern audit report 
announcements. First, this chapter examined whether there is an abnormal stock 
reaction around two alternative event dates: the audit report date and as a robust-
ness test the 10-K report filing date. Second, this chapter analyzes further the ef-
fects of information asymmetry, information environment and agency costs of 
debt on the abnormal stock returns around the two event dates. 
 
Data from listed U.S. firms in the Russell 3000 Index is used in the hypothesis 
testing, because the U.S market is the only single stock market with a significant 
number of going concern audit reports issued to public firms. The empirical find-
ings of this chapter indicate that on average there is no statistically significant 
abnormal stock reaction to going concern audit reports around the audit report 
date, whereas there are significantly negative abnormal returns around the 10-K 
annual report filing date. This suggests that the going concern audit report an-
nouncement causes a stock price revaluation when it is filed with the annual re-
port. The proposed relationship in hypothesis H1 is thus supported in the tests for 
robustness, i.e. around the 10-K report date, but not in the primary tests. 
 
Next the relationship between the proxies for information asymmetry, information 
environment and agency costs of debt, and abnormal stock returns are analyzed. 
The results suggest that around the audit report date, the information environment 
and the agency costs of debt have a positive and significant effect on the abnor-
mal stock reaction. As a result, some support for hypothesis H3 and stronger sup-
port for H4 is found. In the robustness tests around the 10-K report date there is a 
negative relationship between information asymmetry and abnormal stock re-
turns. This indicates, as expected, that the less the information asymmetry is, the 
less the going concern audit report is a negative surprise. 
 
To sum up, these findings shed some light on the general question of this disserta-
tion: ‘is the going concern audit report information relevant to the investors?’ and 
‘do firm specific characteristics have an effect on the information content of the 
going concern audit report?’. 
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6 AUDITORS’ INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESS 
DISCLOSURES AND STOCK RETURNS 
 
The previous chapter examined the relevance of going concern audit reports to 
stock markets. This section is the second empirical part of this dissertation and 
examines the effects of auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures on the 
stock returns. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate first wheth-
er there is an abnormal stock market reaction around the audit report date and the 
10-K report date. Second, evidence is presented on whether firm specific charac-
teristics and existing information about the financial distress are related to abnor-
mal stock returns. Next the hypotheses tested are developed, then the data and 
methodology are introduced, and finally the results of the empirical analyses are 
presented. 
6.1 Hypotheses development  
6.1.1 Abnormal returns around auditors’ internal control weakness 
disclosures 
 
In this chapter the same hypotheses are tested as in Chapter 5. First, internal con-
trol weakness disclosures are considered to have the potential to change the mar-
ket responsiveness to earnings or affect the estimation of future cash flows. The 
purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 disclosure is to communicate to 
interested parties about the effectiveness of the internal control structure and pro-
cedures, and declare about material weaknesses that may increase financial state-
ment errors or managements’ ability to manage earnings. Such disclosures may 
give investors information about the earnings quality or management’s abilities to 
fulfil their governance responsibilities, and thus result in reassessments of the risk 
levels and stock price level. However, if relevant information concerning the fi-
nancial information quality is available before the auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures, then such reports are unlikely to be informative.  
 
As in the previous chapter, the analysis of going concern audit reports and stock 
markets, this section uses both the audit report date and the 10-K report date as 
event dates. Previously Beneish et al. (2008), for instance, use only the 10-K re-
port disclosure date. However, following the findings of Carter et al. (1999) and 
Knechel et al. (2007), described in more detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, the 
standard abnormal returns on both dates are estimated. 
 
Based on the findings from the literature presented, the following hypothesis is 
tested around the audit report date (and as a test for robustness also around the 10-
K filing date): 
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H5: Auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures are associated with nega-
tive abnormal stock returns 
6.1.2 Do information asymmetry, information environment and agency costs 
of debt affect stock market reactions to audit reports? 
  
The second part of the analysis of auditor’s internal control weakness disclosures 
and stock markets is related to firm characteristics. Following the literature re-
viewed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, it is suggested that information asymmetry, 
information environment and agency costs of debt have an effect on the stock 
market reaction to auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
Management shareholding is considered to proxy for the information asymmetry 
between management and owners. The larger the proportion of management 
shareholdings is the less information asymmetry and conflict of interests there is 
expected to be between managers and owners. Moreover, management ownership 
is also expected to have an effect on the importance or the degree to which dis-
closed financial information can come as a surprise to the owners. In firms with 
higher management ownership the conflict of interests are likely to be smaller and 
as a consequence the relevance of monitoring, e.g. auditing, is smaller. The exist-
ing audit and accounting literature suggests that agency factors, i.e. factors affect-
ing the relationship between management and owners, have a strong influence on 
the informativeness of accounting disclosures (Warfield et al. 1995), the demand 
for audit quality and choice of the auditor (Francis et al. 1988; DeFond 1992; 
Blouin et al 2007), and the demand for external auditing (Chow 1982).  
 
Following the literature discussed above and in the hypothesis development of 
hypothesis 2 in Chapter 5, the auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures in-
formation are expected to incur a more negative market reaction around the audit 
report date for firms with high information asymmetry (robustness test around the 
10-K filing date): 
 
H6: Information asymmetry between the management and the owners has a 
negative affect on the market reaction to auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures. 
 
 
Information environment 
 
Auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures may be more challenging for the 
markets to foresee using accounting and non-accounting information than going 
concern audit reports. Going concern reports may often be a result of long-term 
financial deterioration, which is possible to predict using other sources of infor-
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mation. The auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure, however, is of a more 
qualitative nature compared to the going concern report. The qualitativeness also 
affects its predictability, because the outside parties of a firm do not generally 
have access to such qualitative information that could imply weaknesses in inter-
nal controls. Doyle et al. (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) document that 
investment in internal control systems and control risk factors are related to orga-
nizational complexity and organizational change. Information on these identified 
factors may help investors anticipate auditors’ internal control weakness disclo-
sures. 
 
It is, however, expected that the accuracy of predictions on internal control weak-
ness disclosures is better for firms with richer information environment, for ex-
ample more analyst following or media coverage, simply because more informa-
tion is available. Firm size is one relevant determinant of the richness of the in-
formation environment (Mitra et al. 2005). Smaller firms have lower visibility on 
the markets and a weaker information environment. Managers of such firms may 
have better opportunities to manage earnings or engage in other non-value max-
imizing activities, because of less attention from analysts and media. Additional-
ly, the actions of management may potentially be monitored less closely by au-
thorities as well. In firms where the information produced is limited, visibility and 
outside monitoring low, and externally produced information more rare, the re-
levance and degree of surprise of the auditors’ internal control weakness disclo-
sures is greater. A weak information environment may also clear the way for in-
siders and informed actors in engaging themselves in trades on inside information 
and hereby gain profits or cut losses. As a consequence, the following hypothesis 
is tested around the audit report date (robustness test around the 10-K filing date): 
 
H7: The information environment of the firm has a positive affect on the 
market reaction to auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. 
 
 
Agency costs of debt 
 
The third feature of the firm which in this dissertation is considered to affect the 
relevance of the auditors’ disclosures is the agency costs of debt. Extensive litera-
ture supports the claim that the potential conflict of interests between sharehold-
ers and bondholders has an affect on investment and financing decisions (Jensen 
et al. 1976; Myers 1977; Smith et al. 1979), as well as the level of management 
discipline (Agrawal et al. 1982; Sengupta 1998; Ahmed et al. 2002, Francis et al. 
2005; Beatty et al. 2008; Bharath et al. 2008; Ertugrul et al. 2008). 
 
Two reasons are evinced here as to why the agency costs of debt have an affect on 
the relevance of the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure. First, due to 
the increased monitoring, management opportunism and actions performed out of 
self-interest are restricted. Second, debt financing is expected to increase the 
quantity and quality of information disclosed, and therefore the information risk 
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of the investors is lower. As a result, the information content of annual and quar-
terly filings are of less relevance to the investors (Callen et al. 2006). 
 
Accordingly, it is expected that the consequences of higher agency costs of debt, 
reduce the negative surprise of the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure 
around the audit report date (robustness test around the 10-K filing date). 
 
H8: Agency costs of debt have a positive effect on the market reaction to au-
ditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. 
6.2 Data 
 
The sample is composed of the Russell 3000 Index firms. Russell 3000 comprises 
the 3000 largest and most liquid firms listed in the U.S. and aims to capture the 
return of the overall market. Following prior studies, the identical restrictions are 
used as in Chapter 5: (i) only first time internal control weakness disclosures are 
included in the sample, because successive internal control weakness disclosures 
may increase the possibilities to predict the audit outcome in advance and thus 
reduce the surprise (e.g. Jones 1996, Herbohn et al. 2007). First time reports are 
verified by manually examining the audit report from the previous year. Second-
ly, all financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6900) are excluded from the sample 
due to some unique features in their regulation. 
 
A firm search in the Audit Analytics database identified 384 non-financial firms 
that have received a first-time auditor’s internal control report stating that the con-
trols are not effective. The auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures used in 
this study are dated between February 11, 2005 and December 12, 2007. The de-
mand for SOX Section 404 disclosures became effective for accelerated filers 
(market value of equity $75 million or more) for fiscal years ending after Novem-
ber 15, 2004. The audit report of the previous year and the audit report and 10-K 
report dates could be verified for 354 firms. Of the 354 firms stock price data for 
estimation of the abnormal returns is located from Datastream for 342 firms.  
 
Table 13 illustrates the distribution of the going concern audit reports used in the 
empirical analysis across the time period and across industries. This table clearly 
illustrates that the great majority of the internal control weakness disclosures are 
dated to the first year after Section 404 implementation. Additionally, Table 13 
indicates that the majority (nearly 70 percent) of the going concern reports are 
concentrated on two industries, manufacturing and services. However, comparing 
the representations of the industries in the sample and in the population (Russell 
3000), the table reveals that wholesale and retail trade (5000-5900) and services 
(7000-8900) are overrepresented in the sample, whereas the others, manufactur-
ing in particular, are underrepresented. 
 
The Thomson Financial Datastream database contains the information needed for 
estimating the dependent variable and the information on the independent va-
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riables are from Thomson Financial Worldscope. The number of firms with inde-
pendent variables data used in the regression analysis is presented in Table 14 
(pp. 111–112). 
Table 13.  Number of firms by SIC codes and years. 
  
SIC Code Industry description 
% of 
sample 
firms 
% of 
firms 
in 
Russell 
3000 2005 2006 2007 
0-1999 Agriculture, Minig and 
Construction 
5.26 6.92 17 1  
2000-3999 Manufacturing 29.82 45.49 87 13 2 
4000-4999 Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary services 
8.77 11.82 26 4  
5000-5999 Wholesale and Retail trade 16.67 12.82 53 4  
7000-8999 Services 39.47 22.92 114 20 1 
 
The table presents the number of firms by standard industry classification (SIC) 
codes divided across year of first-time internal control deficiency audit report. 
The sample consists of 342 firms, Financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6900) are excluded from the sample. 
 
 
6.3 Methodology 
 
To study the information content of auditors’ internal control weakness disclo-
sures this section analyzes abnormal stock returns around the audit report date and 
as a robustness test around the 10-K report filing date.  
 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices adjust rapidly to new 
and relevant information. This study uses standardized abnormal stock returns to 
measure the market reaction. Daily standardized abnormal stock returns around 
the audit report date are determined for each event day by dividing each stock’s 
market model adjusted abnormal returns by the standard deviation of the estima-
tion period’s abnormal returns. Daily stock returns are calculated as differences in 
logarithmic price indices using closing price data.  
 
Different event periods are used to study the market reactions to the auditors’ in-
ternal control weakness disclosures. Because the results may be sensitive to the 
length of the event period, e.g. due to other confounding events announced, a 
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short event window analysis around the event is applied (see e.g. Holder-Webb et 
al. 2000; Chen et al. 2000; Knechel et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley 
et al. 2008). First, three one-day standardized abnormal return periods are calcu-
lated (SAR [0], SAR [-1] and SAR [1]) to measure the daily reaction and second, 
three cumulative abnormal periods (CSAR [-1,+1], CSAR [-1,0] and CSAR 
[0,+1]) are considered to assess the effect during two to three days. The short 
event period is used to restrict the influence of possible concurrent information 
releases. The standardized abnormal returns and the cumulative standardized ab-
normal returns are estimated as described in Equations (1), (2) and (3) of Section 
5.3. (pp. 56–57). 
 
The standard t-statistic is applied to test H5, whether the mean standardized ab-
normal returns in the event window are statistically significantly different from 
the expected abnormal return, which is zero. The t-statistic is described in equa-
tion (4) of Section 5.3. (p. 57) 
 
To empirically test hypotheses H6, H7 and H8, the following regression model is 
estimated: 
 
(7) iiiiiii eCOFLICEZDASIZEMOWNSAR ++++++= _44321 βββββα   
 
Where: 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares 
SIZE = logarithm of total assets 
DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
Z = Altman’s Z-score (1-year lagged) re-estimated by Grice (1997) 
ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control effectiveness reports from the 
management and the auditor 
e = error term 
 
The regression model in Equation (7) is similar to Equation (5) in Section 5.3. (p. 
57). The independent variables are as defined on pages 58. To control for an im-
portant factor relevant for this section a dummy variable controlling for manage-
ment reporting on internal control effectiveness (ICE_CONFL) is included in the 
model. ICE_CONFL equals one if the firm’s management has filed a report on 
the internal controls for the same fiscal year without disclosing any material 
weaknesses. Conflicting management and audit reports are expected to increase 
the negative surprise of the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure. 
 
To control for the influence of outliers all tests are conducted also after winsoriz-
ing the variables at two standard deviations from the mean (see e.g. Bernard and 
Thomas 1990). The winsorized statistics are reported in Panel B of each table.  
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6.4 Results  
 
This section reports the results from the empirical analysis. First, the descriptive 
statistics, correlations and monthly abnormal returns for a 12-month period are 
presented. Second, results for the abnormal returns to the auditors’ internal con-
trol weakness reports around the audit report date (and around the 10-K date in 
Section 6.4.4.) are presented. Third, the empirical analysis of this section is con-
cluded with the regression analysis on the relationship between abnormal returns 
to internal control weakness disclosures and the firm-specific variables of interest. 
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 14 tabulates the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent va-
riables. Most interestingly, the average abnormal returns are positive for all pe-
riods except SAR [-1]. This is contrary to expectations, because negative abnor-
mal returns are hypothesized.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables indicate that the firms have 
a management ownership averaging about 23 percent, which is, for example, far 
less than that of the firms receiving a going concern audit report (38.951 percent). 
The average natural logarithm of total assets is 6.940, which approximates to 
$1,032 million in total assets. Average leverage is about 23.5 percent, compared 
to over 64 percent for the firms with initial going concern audit reports. The fi-
nancial distress score indicates that the firms are on average troubled, but much 
less so than the going concern firms. As mentioned above, the sample contains 59 
firms where management did not disclose any internal control weaknesses whe-
reas a weakness was indeed disclosed in the auditors’ internal control weakness 
reports. 
 
Panel B of Table 14 presents the descriptive statistics after winsorizing the obser-
vations at two standard deviations from the mean. The statistics in Panel B are 
essentially the same as in Panel A. Extreme observations do not seem to be as big 
a problem as in the going concern audit report analysis.  
 
The correlation matrix in Table 15 Panel A and Panel B tabulates the correlations 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The abnormal re-
turn is not significantly correlated with any of the independent variables. SIZE is 
correlated with three variables. Larger firms seem to have statistically significant-
ly more leverage, less financial distress and higher probability of management 
disclosing conflicting findings on the internal control effectiveness.  
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Table 14.  Descriptive statistics of variables (Audit report date)a 
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Table 14.  Continued 
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Table 15.  Correlation matrix 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 
CSAR 
 [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1      
MOWN 0.023 1     
SIZE -0.021 -0.104 1    
DA 0.012 0.086 0.372*** 1   
Z 0.034 -0.005 0.149** -0.003 1  
ICE_CONFL -0.064 0.090 0.201*** 0.048 0.035 1 
 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 
CSAR 
 [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1      
MOWN 0.020 1     
SIZE -0.031 -0.113 1    
DA -0.008 0.072 0.391*** 1   
Z 0.002 -0.030 0.300*** -0.051 1  
ICE_CONFL -0.107 0.077 0.194*** 0.056 0.007 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
CSAR= Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Return [-1,+1]  
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares 
 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) 
ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control effectiveness reports from the 
management and the auditor 
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Monthly book-to-market and size adjusted returns for a 12-month period around 
the event date 
 
The following descriptive figure presents the results from a monthly analysis of 
the stock returns around the event period. The objective is to give an overview of 
the performance of the stocks of the firms receiving an auditor’s internal control 
weakness disclosure. This figure gives an indication whether the internal control 
weakness is relevant and whether it can be anticipated long before the audit report 
date or the 10-K date, or alternatively whether there is a strong abnormal reaction 
some time after the disclosure of the report. 
 
Monthly abnormal returns are estimated using the Fama-French (1993) three fac-
tor model as described in Equation (6) of Section 5.4 (p. 63). The model takes 
into account the stock’s exposure to market risk, to size risk and to value risk. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the three-factor model abnormal returns for six months before 
the auditor’s internal control weakness report date and six months after. The audi-
tor’s internal control weakness disclosure is also filed with the 10-K report. The 
10-K report is commonly disclosed either the same or the subsequent month as 
the audit report is dated.  
 
The abnormal returns are positive during the entire 12-month period. Moreover, 
the positive abnormal returns seem to be unaffected by the internal control weak-
ness disclosures. It is difficult to draw any general conclusions from Figure 2 
about the market reactions to auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures. 
 
6.4.2  Abnormal returns around the auditors’ internal control weakness 
disclosure dates 
 
The first empirical test in this chapter deals with the abnormal stock returns 
around the auditor’s internal control weakness report date. Table 16 presents the 
standardized abnormal returns. In Panel A and Panel B the abnormal returns of 
two periods, SAR [0] and CSAR [0,+1], are positive and statistically significant. 
This is contrary to expectations. 
 
A proposed explanation for the positive reaction is that the auditor’s internal con-
trol weakness disclosure has been anticipated by (informed) investors. Because 
the auditor is mandated by Auditing Standard No.2 to evaluate and report on 
management’s internal control effectiveness disclosure, the case is always that 
management assessment predates the audit report. In the sample there are 59 
firms where management has not observed or reported any deficiencies in internal 
controls. 
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Figure 2.   Monthly size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal stock returns 
for a 12-month period around the auditors’ internal control weakness 
disclosures. 
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The empirical evidence in Table 16 suggests that, overall in the sample manage-
ment reporting on internal control weaknesses mitigates the surprise of the audi-
tor’s report. The auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure may in fact act as 
a relief and a positive signal if the management assessment had generated uncer-
tainties where, for example, a going concern audit report was possible. Further-
more, assuming that the abnormal reaction around the audit report date is a result 
of informed trading, the explanation for the results could be that the informed 
traders were aware of the concerns on the markets that the auditor might ultimate-
ly report going concern uncertainties, for example. In this light, the informed 
traders could earn excess returns by using the audit report information on the date 
of the report. 
 
As mentioned previously, there are 59 cases in the sample where management has 
indicated effective internal controls, whereas the auditor concluded by contrast 
that there were indeed weaknesses in the internal controls. It is likely that the 
negative surprise of the audit report is strong in these cases, because the audit 
report may come as a surprise to the management as well. The further analysis 
(not tabulated) of the firms in the sample with conflicting management and audi-
tor disclosures on internal control weaknesses, reveals that the abnormal returns 
for these 59 firms are negative in all periods, but statistically insignificant. To 
conclude, no support is found for hypothesis H5. 
6.4.3 Information asymmetry, information environment, agency costs of debt, 
and stock market reactions to auditors’ internal control weakness 
disclosures 
 
To further analyze the abnormal stock returns around the audit report date, Table 
17 and Table 18 present the results from the regression analysis. The purpose is to 
examine whether and how information asymmetry and information environment, 
agency costs of debt, and additionally financial distress and managements’ inter-
nal weakness disclosures affect the abnormal returns around the audit report date. 
 
The results in Tables 17 and 18 suggest that none of the variables of interest in 
this study explain the variation in the abnormal stock returns around the auditor’s 
internal control weakness report date. The findings reveal only that Z is positive 
and statistically significant in Panel A of Table 17, indicating that a firm with 
greater financial distress (lower Z-score) has more negative abnormal returns on 
day SAR [+1]. However, this result is not confirmed in Panel B of the same table 
or in Table 18. Thus no conclusions can be drawn from this. The coefficients of 
ICE_CONFL have a negative, but insignificant, sign in all regressions, as ex-
pected. This would suggest that when the outcome of auditor’s internal control 
report conflicts with management’s equivalent report, the abnormal reaction is 
more negative.  
 
To summarize, the conclusion of these two tables is that information asymmetry, 
information environment and agency costs of debt are not statistically significant-
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ly related to abnormal returns. Therefore, no support is found for hypotheses H6, 
H7 or H8. 
 
Table 16.  Standardized abnormal stock returns around the event date (Audit 
report date)a 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-statistic  
SAR [-1] -0.008 -0.148  
SAR [0] 0.100** 2.080  
SAR [1] 0.033 0.533  
CSAR [-1, 0] 0.089 1.315  
CSAR [0,+1] 0.129* 1.729  
CSAR [-1,+1] 0.126 1.394  
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-test  
SAR [-1] -0.024 -0.524  
SAR [0] 0.085* 1.937  
SAR [1] 0.049 0.967  
CSAR [-1, 0] 0.070 1.152  
CSAR [0,+1] 0.131** 2.063  
CSAR [-1,+1] 0.117 1.481  
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the 
mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
SAR= Standardized abnormal return  
CSAR= Cumulative standardized abnormal return  
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Table 17.  Regressions of standardized abnormal stock returns and firm 
 characteristics (Audit report date)a 
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Table 17. Continued 
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Table 17. Continued 
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Table 18.  Regressions of cumulative standardized abnormal stock returns 
and firm characteristics (Audit report date)a  
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Table 18.  Continued 
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Table 18.  Continued 
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6.4.4 Additional tests using the 10-K report announcement dates 
 
In Section 6.4.3., the empirical tests analyze the relationship between auditor’s 
internal control weakness disclosures and abnormal stock returns around the audit 
report date. However, because using the audit report date as the event date can be 
considered experimental, the empirical analysis of this chapter is complemented 
in this section by running the identical tests with the 10-K report date as the event 
date. These tests provide evidence on the robustness of the results reported in the 
previous section. 
 
Although several accounting and auditing studies have successfully applied the 
date of the actual event (i.e. audit report date), the 10-K filing date has to be con-
sidered to be the benchmark or the standard. Additionally, because the empirical 
findings in the previous section are inconclusive, it is essential also to study the 
abnormal returns around the 10-K date.  
 
Next, the descriptive statistics are presented, then the analysis on the abnormal 
stock returns around the event date, and finally the results from the regressions on 
the relationship between firm characteristics and abnormal returns are tabulated 
and discussed. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics of the standardized abnormal returns around the 10-K 
report date in Table 19 are essentially identical to those of Table 14 (audit report 
date). The only more apparent difference is that here the abnormal returns for 
SAR [-1] are also positive. In Panel A and Panel B of Table 20, the correlation 
matrix illustrates that there is a significant negative relationship between the ab-
normal returns and the content of management’s internal control report. In those 
cases where management’s report was clean, the auditor’s internal control weak-
ness disclosure has a negative effect on the abnormal returns. This is as expected. 
Because, at this stage, when the internal control weakness disclosure is filed with 
the SEC, the investors simultaneously find management’s report claiming that 
internal controls are efficient and the auditor’s report claiming weaknesses in in-
ternal controls. This is expected to cast doubt on management’s skills and trust-
worthiness, which in turn would be expected to affect the stock returns. 
 
Table 20 also reports that there is a correlation between SIZE and DA, Z, MOWN 
and ICE_CONFL, indicating that larger firms are prone to have more leverage, 
more conflicting management and audit reports and less financial distress and 
management ownership. 
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Table 19.  Descriptive statistics of variables (10-K date)a 
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Table 19.  Continued. 
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Table 20.  Correlation matrix (10-K date)a 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 CSAR [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1      
MOWN 0.069 1     
SIZE -0.075 -0.080 1    
DA 0.030 0.088 0.407*** 1   
Z -0.003 0.002 0.158** -0.002 1  
ICE_CONFL -0.208*** 0.090 0.201*** 0.048 0.035 1 
 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 CSAR [-1, +1] MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
CSAR [-1, +1] 1      
MOWN 0.053 1     
SIZE -0.105 -0.121* 1    
DA 0.003 0.047 0.428*** 1   
Z -0.020 -0.033 0.304*** -0.072 1  
ICE_CONFL -0.215*** 0.077 0.194*** 0.056 0.007 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
CSAR= Cumulative standardized abnormal return  
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) 
ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control effectiveness reports from the management and 
the auditor 
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Standardized abnormal returns around the 10-K report date 
 
Table 21 presents the standardized abnormal returns around the 10-K report date. 
In both Panel A and Panel B all mean abnormal returns are positive and in most 
periods statistically significant. This seems paradoxical because audit reports on 
internal control weaknesses are expected to be “bad news” and therefore incur 
negative abnormal returns.  
 
The statistically significant positive returns around the 10-K date suggest that the 
auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure may contain a positive signal. One 
obvious situation when the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure could 
be good news is the case when the markets expected even worse news. Also, as 
pointed out in other studies, one has to be cautious when making conclusions 
about the abnormal returns around the 10-K filing date, because the 10-K report 
also includes other annual report items as well which could affect the stock re-
turns. 
 
In a supplementary analysis not tabulated, the results indicate that the abnormal 
returns for the 59 firms in the sample with a “clean” management report are nega-
tive and statistically significant under the 5 percent level in periods SAR [0], SAR 
[-1,+1] and SAR [0,+1]. Consequently, the conclusion is that the abnormal returns 
to the auditor’s Section 404 report are (i) negative when it discloses uncertainties 
that the management did not previously disclose, and (ii) positive if the auditor’s 
report confirms the information that management previously disclosed. All in all, 
there is no convincing evidence that the stock returns are negatively associated 
with the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosures in the entire sample. 
However, in the small subsample consisting of those firms with conflicting re-
ports from the management and the auditor, the abnormal reaction is negative.  
 
 
Information asymmetry, information environment and  
stock market reactions internal control deficiency reports 
 
Finally, this last section of the chapter investigates whether the characteristics of 
the firm affect the abnormal returns around the filing of a 10-K report containing 
an auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure. In particular, the characteristics 
of interest here are related to information asymmetry, information environment 
and the agency costs of debt. 
 
In H6 the hypothesis states that information asymmetry between management and 
owners should be negatively related to the abnormal returns around the audit re-
port disclosure. This is because due to reduced conflicts of interest and improved 
information flow between management and owners, the audit report should con-
tain fewer surprises. Similarly, H7 states that for firms with a richer information 
environment, the abnormal returns are less negative because the information dis-
closed could be gathered from other sources. Additionally, the regression analysis 
tests whether agency costs of debt measuring management discipline has an affect 
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on the abnormal returns around the Section 404 audit report. Previously disclosed 
financial distress and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal 
controls are used as control variables. 
Table 21.  Standardized abnormal stock returns around the event date (10-K 
date)a 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-statistic  
SAR [-1] 0.082* 1.791  
SAR [0] 0.088 1.645  
SAR [1] 0.067 1.109  
CSAR [-1, 0] 0.165** 2.513  
CSAR [0,+1] 0.150** 1.952  
CSAR [-1,+1] 0.237*** 2.638  
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period 
Mean abnormal 
return T-test  
SAR [-1] 0.078* 1.861  
SAR [0] 0.085* 1.716  
SAR [1] 0.063 1.213  
CSAR [-1, 0] 0.163*** 2.614  
CSAR [0,+1] 0.151** 2.171  
CSAR [-1,+1] 0.234*** 2.803  
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the 
mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
SAR= Standardized abnormal return  
CSAR= Cumulative standardized abnormal return  
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Table 22 and Table 23 present the results of the regression analysis. Panel A 
again contains the regressions using the original data set and Panel B after winso-
rizing the observations at two standard deviations from the mean. Two separate 
regressions are tabulated for each event period. The first column represents the 
regression without the variables on previous disclosures (Z and 302), and the 
second column includes the two mentioned variables. 
 
In Table 22 Panel A and Panel B the results indicate that there is no support for 
hypothesis H6 around the 10-K report date. The regression coefficients have posi-
tive signs indicating that the negative surprise of the auditors Section 404 report is 
smaller in firms with more management ownership (less information asymmetry), 
but they are insignificant in all periods.  
 
The relationship between information environment and abnormal returns in Panel 
B is negative and statistically significant in the period SAR [0]. This suggests that 
the negative surprise is greater for firms with richer information environment. In 
the development of hypothesis H7 the general assumption was that the abnormal 
reaction should be less negative for firms with richer information environment, 
because there is more information available on which to base accurate predictions 
and foresee emerging problems. This result implies, however, that there may not 
be any information available even in the richest information environments that 
reveal emerging problems of internal controls. The properties of internal control 
weaknesses may be such that the available information does not help in predicting 
them. Therefore, because larger and information richer firms are considered to be 
more stable, diligent, predictable and to have a higher quality information, the 
auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure is a greater upset to investors of 
these firms than to those firms with weaker information environment. 
 
The leverage and previously disclosed financial distress do not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on the abnormal returns. Finally, Table 22 clearly 
confirms the findings discussed in the previous section, that the existence of a 
conflicting management’s internal control report has a strong negative relation-
ship with the abnormal returns. The relationship is statistically significant under 
the 1 percent level on the event day SAR [0]. 
 
The results in Table 23 confirm the effect of management’s internal control report 
on the abnormal returns. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 
all periods. Furthermore, the table also provides some support for the relationship 
between abnormal returns and information environment. Finally, in Panel B 
CSAR [-1,0] there is some evidence that firms with more financial distress, i.e. 
lower Z-score, have more negative abnormal returns. This is suggested to be due 
to the uncertainties that the financially weaker firms may suffer from more fun-
damental difficulties in addition to the internal control weaknesses. 
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Table 22.  Regressions of standardized abnormal stock returns and firm 
characteristics (10-K date)a  
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Table 22.  Continued. 
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Table 22.  Continued. 
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Table 23.  Regressions of cumulative standardized abnormal stock returns 
and firm characteristics (10-K date)a 
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Table 23.  Continued 
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Table 23.  Continued 
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6.5  Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter investigates the effect of auditor’s internal control weakness disclo-
sures on abnormal stock returns. The purpose of the analysis is to study whether 
this type of audit report is relevant to investors. First, this dissertation focuses on 
the abnormal stock reaction to auditor’s internal control weakness disclosures 
around the audit report date. Second, to further analyze the effects of firm specific 
characteristics, regression analysis is used to seek evidence of a relationship be-
tween the abnormal stock returns around the auditor’s disclosure and proxies for 
information asymmetry, information environment and agency costs of debt. Final-
ly, tests for robustness are provided applying the 10-K report filing date as the 
event date. 
 
Overall, the results in Chapter 6 indicate that the auditor’s internal control weak-
ness disclosures do not have the expected negative effect on stock returns. 
Around both alternative event dates the abnormal returns for the entire sample are 
positive. This could be an indication that the audit report information is on aver-
age irrelevant to investors. The further investigation using a regression analysis 
shows, however, that around the 10-K report date the information environment 
has, contrary to expectations, a negative relationship with abnormal returns. This 
suggests that the information environment is unable to predict the negative out-
come of the audit report and therefore the abnormal returns are more negative for 
those firms with richer information environment. Moreover, this chapter clearly 
shows that around the 10-K report date conflicting management and auditor as-
sessments of the effectiveness of internal controls are associated with a significant 
negative affect on the abnormal returns. This suggests that the stock price reacts 
negatively if the management is incapable of detecting the internal control weak-
nesses. All in all, none of the hypothesis developed were confirmed around the 
audit report date. 
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7  GOING CONCERN AUDIT REPORTS AND 
CHANGES IN VOLATILITY AND SYSTEMATIC 
RISK 
 
This section analyzes further the properties of the stock market reactions to going 
concern audit reports. The purpose of this section is to empirically investigate the 
changes in volatility and systematic risk of the stock after the going concern audit 
report announcement. In detail, the first part of this chapter studies the mean 
change in volatility and systematic risk after the audit report, and the second part 
the relationship between risk changes and firm specific characteristics are studied. 
Next, the hypotheses to be empirically tested are developed, then the data and 
methodology are introduced, and finally the results from the empirical analysis 
are presented. 
7.1 Hypothesis development 
 
Chapter 5 focused on examining the short window abnormal stock price reaction 
to going concern audit reports. To extend the analysis of the relevance of going 
concern audit reports to stock markets, this section analyzes the effect of the 
going concern audit report has on the volatility of the stock returns and systematic 
risk of the stock. Several studies have focused on the market effect of accounting 
related announcements’ by examining e.g. the levels of systematic risk subse-
quent to an announcement.  
 
Healy and Palepu (1990) for example, find that equity offers are followed by a 
significant increase in systematic risk. They interpret the result that equity offers 
information affects the risk levels rather than the future cash flows of the firm. 
Price reactions, as measured in the previous section of this dissertation, can be a 
function of adjustments in expected magnitude of future cash flows or the ex-
pected risk of future cash flows (Fargher et al. 1998). If initial going concern au-
dit reports correctly identify and communicate underlying uncertainties in a firm, 
then it could be expected that there will be a change in volatility and systematic 
risk of the stock return. 
7.1.1 Uncertainty and risk changes around going concern audit report 
announcements 
 
A going concern audit report has the potential to add uncertainty to the stock 
markets, as earlier mentioned. The increased uncertainty on the stock market is 
due to implications of the reasons leading to a going concern audit report. Rea-
sons for a going concern audit report such as severe financial distress, litigation or 
increased probability of failure that the firm faces, may complicate the estimation 
of future cash flows of the firm. This uncertainty concerning the future cash flows 
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will increase the risk of the firm, in other words it increases the chance that the 
future cash flows will be different from what is currently expected. 
 
Kim et al. (1991) propose that both price and volume changes of a stock at the 
time of a public announcement are positively associated with the precision of the 
information and negatively with the precision of the preannouncement public and 
private information. Most earlier studies, as well as the earlier section of this 
study, use stock price reactions to measure whether audit report announcements 
convey information to the stock market. However, as Fargher et al. (1998) point 
out, stock prices reflect both expected future cash flows and expected risk of fu-
ture cash flows. By recognizing that a going concern audit report may affect the 
risk of the firm, it is important also to measure whether a change in risk can be 
observed. In this study, standard deviation and beta are used to measure the 
change in risk after a going concern audit report. 
 
Standard deviation is a commonly used statistical measure of volatility. It meas-
ures how far the observed values are dispersed around the mean. Standard devia-
tion can thus also be used as the volatility of the stock returns. Standard deviation 
of the stock returns summarizes the uncertainty in the market over a certain pe-
riod or the spread of possible outcomes and therefore is a measure of risk. If a 
going concern audit report increases the uncertainty and spread of possible out-
comes related to the firm’s future cash flows, the standard deviation of the returns 
should grow as a result of the report.  
 
Beta measures how sensitive the stock of a firm is to market movement. It is an 
estimate of the stock’s systematic risk. Beta is defined as the covariance between 
stock return of a firm and the market return, divided by the variance of the market 
return. In the presence of a firm-specific event, such as a going concern audit re-
port, it is assumed that the firm’s stock return is affected, while the variance of 
the market return remains unaffected. To the extent that the going concern audit 
report and the underlying problems causing the report increase the volatility 
(standard deviation) of the firm’s stock returns relative to the stock market re-
turns, the systematic risk (beta) of the firm’s stock will increase (Fargher et al. 
1998). 
 
Fargher et al. (1998) study the systematic risk changes around qualified audit opi-
nion announcements and audit qualification withdrawal announcements. Howev-
er, they find no evidence of an increase in systematic risk around qualification 
announcements. The authors conject that this was due to other forms of disclo-
sures in the period studied. Next they studied the risk changes around audit quali-
fication withdrawal announcements. In a withdrawal announcement the auditor 
revises the audit opinion from a qualified opinion to an unqualified opinion, 
therefore it should be good news. It is anticipated by Fargher et al. (1998) that the 
withdrawal announcement date would have less noise than the event date used in 
the qualification announcement analysis. They hypothesize that subsequent to a 
qualification withdrawal, the systematic risk changes in the opposite direction 
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than after the initial audit qualification. They found the reduction in systematic 
risk to be significant after the withdrawal.  
 
Relative to the study by Fargher et al. (1998), this study takes advantage of the 
findings by Carter et al. (1999) and Knechel et al (2007) that the actual date of the 
event (here the going concern audit report date) would be an earlier date to study 
the reaction on the stock markets to the going concern opinion. As thoroughly 
discussed in previous chapters, the literature has struggled to define the correct 
event date when audit reports become publicly available. However, the hypothes-
es of this study are also tested in robustness tests using the 10-K report filing date, 
which is the standard in this field of audit research.  
 
To summarize, an increase in volatility and systematic risk is expected to be 
found after the going concern audit report announcement 
 
H9: Going concern audit reports are associated with an increase in volatility 
and the systematic risk. 
7.1.2  Information asymmetry, information environment, agency costs of debt, 
and risk changes around going concern audit report announcements 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
Based on the literature presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and the hypothesis de-
velopment in Chapter 5 it is expected in this study that the level of information 
asymmetry between management and owners will affect the impact of the going 
concern audit reports to the stock markets. This expectation is supported by the 
literature on agency effects on the demand for auditing and audit fees. More spe-
cifically, in firms with low information asymmetry the conflict of interests is ex-
pected to be lower. Hence, in firms with lower information asymmetry, the going 
concern audit report should cause fewer re-estimations of the future of the firm 
and the risk level. Also, when the information asymmetry is lower, the informa-
tion contained in the going concern audit report could be less of a surprise, be-
cause the same information is more likely to be known already. Finally, in an 
agency relationship with lower conflicts of interest, the going concern audit report 
is likewise expected to be less relevant. 
 
In terms of uncertainty and risk changes, the expectations above would imply that 
the information contained in the going concern audit report, causes a smaller 
change in volatility and systematic risk in firms with lower information asymme-
try (higher management ownership). This is because owners are more aware of 
the underlying uncertainties due to lower information asymmetry and their inter-
ests are more aligned with those of management.  
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H10: The information asymmetry between management and owners has a 
positive affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk after the 
going concern audit reports. 
 
 
Information environment 
 
Similar assumptions can be made for the effect of the information environment. 
Information environment refers to the richness of accounting and non-accounting 
information available from different sources. There are different sources of in-
formation that directly affect the richness of the information environment, for 
example the firm’s financial and non-financial disclosures, news coverage of the 
media and analyst forecasts.  
 
The key assumption is that owners of firms with richer information environments 
are less likely to revise their expectations of the firm’s future earnings or risk. 
This is due to two reasons: (i) investors have more information available to make 
more accurate predictions and thus the uncertainty remains lower even after dis-
closures that were not expected, (ii) firms specific information disclosures can be 
anticipated using available information and therefore the surprise of the disclosure 
is preempted and the stock market effect around the disclosure is reduced. 
  
As a consequence, the change in volatility and systematic risk subsequent to a 
going concern audit report is expected to be lower in firms with a rich information 
environment. 
 
H11: The information environment of the firm has a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic risk after the going concern audit 
reports. 
 
 
Agency costs of debt 
 
Earlier studies indicate clearly that the level of debt has an affect on manage-
ment’s abilities to act in their own interests. This is largely because of conflict of 
interests between shareholders and bondholders. In a similar manner to the share-
holders, bondholders, too, protect themselves against the risk of the firm failing to 
pay the debt. The literature suggests that bondholders may make demands that 
result in increased monitoring of management (Jensen et al. 1976), signing re-
stricting covenants that change the terms of the debt contract in defined circums-
tances (Smith et al. 1979; Billett et al. 2007), insist on shorter maturity time if 
there are uncertainties about the future of the firm (Myers 1977), charge higher 
interest rate to account for the higher risk (Bergman et al. 1991) or demand more 
conservative reporting to reduce the information risk (Ahmed et al. 2002; Beatty 
et al. 2008).  
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These actions and demands insisted by bondholders cause the firm agency costs 
of debt. Substantial empirical evidence exists suggesting that agency costs of debt 
can be reduced by increasing management discipline and monitoring, and moreo-
ver increasing the quality of financial information (Agrawal et al. 1982; Sengupta 
1998; Francis et al. 2005; Bharath et al. 2008; Ertugrul et al. 2008).  
 
Debt financing is expected to be related to the relevance of audit report informa-
tion because management is more restricted from acting in self-interest as a result 
of closer monitoring by bondholders, and the possibilities of investors to foresee 
going concern issues is likely to increase as a result of the amount of information 
and the quality of the information available on the market. Finally, because bond-
holders may have protected themselves through covenants their behavior as a re-
sult of covenant violations may give investors early warning signals about poten-
tial financial difficulties. 
 
Accordingly, it can be expected in light of the literature above and in Chapter 2, 
that mechanisms set up as a consequence of agency costs of debt may affect the 
relevance of audit report information, and it is likely that risk changes after going 
concern audit reports are smaller for firms with rich information environments. 
 
H12: Agency costs of debt of a firm have a negative affect on the change in 
volatility and systematic risk after the going concern audit reports. 
7.2 Data 
 
In the analysis of risk changes after going concern audit reports the same data is 
used as in Section 5. The sample consists of 237 Russell 3000 Index firms, all 
with a first time going concern audit report publicly available in SEC Edgar data-
base or Thomson One Banker. All audit reports are from financial years ending 
2002–2007, and they have been dated after the events around Enron and Arthur 
Andersen were uncovered (February 2002 – February 2008). The distribution of 
the observations across years and industries is given in Chapter 5, Table 2.  
 
In addition to the stock price data needed to estimate the changes in volatility and 
risk, the regression analysis of this chapter requires data on the independent va-
riables information asymmetry, information environment, leverage and disclosed 
financial distress. The stock price data are from Thomson Financial Datastream 
and independent variable data from Thomson Financial Worldscope. 
7.3 Methodology 
 
This section examines whether a going concern audit report affects the change in 
volatility and systematic risk of the firm’s stock return. The econometrics litera-
ture recognized standard deviation as a statistical measure of spread. In this study 
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it measures the spread and uncertainty of expected future outcomes, i.e. the vola-
tility of the returns. In stable circumstances where the uncertainty is small, the 
estimates of future cash flows are more aligned between actors. On the other hand 
in unstable conditions, where uncertainty increases, future outcomes are more 
difficult to predict and the volatility in stock returns is expected to increase.  
 
To empirically test whether the return volatility and systematic risk of the stock 
changed after a going concern audit report, the standard deviation and beta are 
estimated for each firm before and after the going concern audit report date. The 
pre-going concern audit report period is [-130, -10] and the post-going concern 
audit report period is [10, 130], with the event date day [0] being either the audit 
report date or the 10-K report filing date. The change in standard deviation and 
beta for each firm is the difference between the pre- and post –period estimations. 
 
The standard deviation is calculated as follows: 
 
(8) 
1
)(
1
2
−
−
=
∑
=
n
RR
n
t
itit
σ    
 
Where, 
 Rit = return of stock i in period t 
itR  = mean of values Rit 
 n   = sample size 
 
and the change in standard deviation is defined as, 
 
(9)  [ ] [ ]10,130130,10 −−−=∆ σσσ  
 
where [10, 130] and [-130,-10] indicate estimation periods, the audit report date 
being the event date [0]. 
 
The beta is defined as follows: 
(10) 2
m
im
i σ
σβ = ,  
where 
imσ = covariance between stock i’s return and the market return 
(Russell 3000 index)  
=
2
mσ variance of the market return (Russell 3000 index) 
 
and the change in beta is defined as,  
 
(11) [ ] [ ]10,130130,10 −−−=∆ βββ  
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where as before [10, 130] and [-130,-10] indicate estimation periods, with the 
audit report date being the event date [0]. 
 
For testing H10, H11 and H12 a similar regression model is used as in Chapter 5. 
Here, the changes in STDEV and BETA are used as the dependent variables: 
 
(12) iiiiii eZDASIZEMOWNSTDEV +++++=∆ 4321 ββββα  
   
 
(13) iiiiii eZDASIZEMOWNBETA +++++=∆ 4321 ββββα  
  
 
Where: 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares 
SIZE = logarithm of total assets 
DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) re-estimated by Grice (1997) 
e = error term 
 
 
The independent variables are as defined in Section 5.3. (p. 58).  
 
The influence of outliers is controlled for by winsorizing all variables at two stan-
dard deviations from the mean (see e.g. Bernard et al. 1990). All tests are con-
ducted and reported using winsorized and unwinsorized data.  
7.4 Results 
 
This section presents the results from the empirical analysis on changes in volatil-
ity and systematic risk after the going concern audit report date. First, descriptive 
statistics are presented. Second, results on the average change in volatility and 
systematic risk. Third, results are provided from the regression analysis on the 
relationship between information asymmetry, information environment, agency 
costs of debt, and changes in risk. Finally, additional analysis provides the results 
from empirical tests using the 10-K filing date as the event date. 
7.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 24 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in analyzing the evi-
dence for hypotheses H9, H10, H11 and H12. Again, Panel A contains the unwinso-
rized statistics while in Panel B the variables are winsorized at two standard devi-
ations from the mean. Panel A and B means and medians all show an increase in 
volatility and systematic risk. This would indicate a higher volatility and higher 
systematic risk after the going concern audit report as expected. When examining 
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the statistics of the independent variables used in the regression it is clear that the 
firms in the sample are financially severely distressed. Means and medians for 
free cash flow per assets are negative likewise returns, earnings and book values. 
The standard deviations and ranges for some control variables highlight the need 
to control for extreme values. Therefore more attention is paid to the winsorized 
data in Panel B. 
 
Table 25 presents the pairwise correlation matrix of the variables used in the re-
gression analysis. The dependent variable STDEV is not significantly correlated 
with any of the independent variables in Panel A or Panel B. BETA, on the other 
hand, in Panel B is significantly negatively correlated with MOWN and positively 
with SIZE. The correlations between the independent variables are similar to 
those described in Section 5.3. In Panel B, SIZE is negatively correlated with 
MOWN. Furthermore, SIZE correlates with DA and Z as expected. This indicates 
that larger firms have less management ownership, less leverage (DA), and less 
reported financial distress. 
 
 
Systematic risk and volatility for a 240-day period around the event date 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the development of the volatility and systematic risk in a 
240-day period around the going concern audit report date. In Figure 3, the stan-
dard deviation of the stock returns from the preceding 120 days is calculated for 
each day. The figure clearly suggests that there is an ascending trend in the vola-
tility of the returns in the entire period, but also that there is a clear increase after 
the event date. The increase in the volatility over the 240-day period may be 
caused by several factors beside the going concern audit report. It is also highly 
likely and almost certain that the firms disclose information (not controlled for in 
this figure) during the period that may affect the volatility of returns. Interesting-
ly, however, the figure illustrates a definite increase in the volatility just a few 
days before and after the event day, which could be a result of the going concern 
audit report. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the daily systematic risk for a 240-day period. The betas here 
are estimated using a 120-day estimation period. In order to illustrate the devel-
opment of the beta from day to day in Figure 4, absolute values of daily betas are 
used to calculate the means. Absolute values have to be used because the sample 
consists of a significant number of firms with severe financial difficulties. Be-
cause of these difficulties several firms have negative betas, and for the purpose 
of this figure an increase in the negative beta is interpreted as an increase in sys-
tematic risk. For this reason, Figure 4 should be interpreted with caution. Howev-
er, as in Figure 3, there seems to be a clear increase in the systematic risk just 
before the event date. This increase could be a result of the audit report. 
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Table 24.  Descriptive statistics of variables (Audit report date)a 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
Mean 0.007 0.334 38.481 2.465 64.518 -11.638 
Median 0.000 0.074 35.401 2.230 23.006 -3.631 
Maximum 0.782 2.771 97.103 10.506 3189.561 8.012 
Minimum -0.371 -2.032 0.000 -10.054 0.000 -257.393 
Std. Dev. 0.084 0.765 24.789 2.628 233.029 28.011 
Skewness 4.653 0.196 0.426 -0.037 11.017 -5.375 
Kurtosis 44.254 4.017 2.316 5.022 141.898 39.390 
n 237 237 226 234 235 197 
       
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
Mean 0.003 0.331 38.928 2.501 45.624 -10.134 
Median 0.000 0.077 35.992 2.230 23.006 -3.631 
Maximum 0.180 2.058 92.117 7.950 337.244 0.348 
Minimum -0.126 -1.714 0.968 -1.813 0.000 -84.687 
Std. Dev. 0.046 0.731 25.079 2.394 68.866 18.752 
Skewness 0.701 0.107 0.422 0.403 2.729 -2.961 
Kurtosis 5.205 3.356 2.271 2.810 10.967 11.132 
n 237 237 228 234 235 197 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Δ BETA = change in stock beta  
Δ STDEV = change in standard deviation  
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares  
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets  
DA = percent of total debt to total assets  
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged)  
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Table 25.  Correlation matrix (Audit report date)a  
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
Δ STDEV 1      
Δ BETA -0.134* 1     
MOWN 0.057 -0.181** 1    
SIZE -0.093 0.106 -0.187*** 1   
DA 0.023 0.003 0.296*** -0.213 1  
Z 0.021 -0.067 -0.061 0.377*** -0.256*** 1 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
Δ STDEV 1      
Δ BETA -0.158** 1     
MOWN 0.070 -0.210*** 1    
SIZE -0.073 0.124* -0.230*** 1   
DA 0.052 -0.056 0.295*** -0.178** 1  
Z 0.021 0.004 -0.120* 0.459*** -0.331*** 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Δ BETA = change in stock beta  
Δ STDEV = change in standard deviation  
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets  
DA = percent of total debt to total assets  
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged)  
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Figure 3.  Volatility of stock returns for a 240-day period around the going 
concern audit report date. 
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Figure 4.  Systematic risk of stock for a 240-day period around the going con-
cern audit report date. 
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7.4.2 Change in volatility and systematic risk after the going concern audit 
report date 
 
Table 26 reports the results in the change in return volatility and systematic risk 
after a going concern audit report. The statistics in both Panel A and Panel B 
show that there has been a statistically significant increase in the systematic risk 
after the going concern audit report. Panel A contains the unwinsorized observa-
tions whereas in Panel B the potential effect of outliers has been reduced by win-
sorizing the data at two standard deviations from the mean.  
 
This finding suggests that after the going concern audit report, the stock returns of 
the sample firms react more to the movement of the overall market. This implies 
that the going concern audit report has increased the uncertainty of the stock 
compared to the market. The results regarding the change in volatility reveal that 
on average volatility has increased, but the change is not statistically significant. 
Therefore no conclusions about the impact of the going concern audit report on 
the volatility can be drawn. Hypothesis H9 is supported, specifically in terms of 
the change in systematic risk. 
Table 26.  Change in volatility and systematic risk after going concern audit 
report (Audit report date)a 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period Mean change T-statistic  
Δ Standard deviation 0.007 1.312  
Δ Beta 0.463*** 6.986  
    
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period Mean change T-test  
Δ Standard deviation 0.003 0.943  
Δ Beta 0.468*** 7.259  
    
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from 
the mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
a denotes  the event date used 
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7.4.3 Information asymmetry, information environment, agency costs of debt, 
and the change in volatility and systematic risk 
 
Table 27 illustrates the relationship between the information asymmetry, informa-
tion environment, agency cost of debt, and the change in volatility and systematic 
risk by regressing change in STDEV and BETA on the independent variables 
MOWN, SIZE, DA and Z. The estimation results in Panel A give weak indica-
tions that the information asymmetry could explain changes in volatility. Howev-
er, this relationship is statistically insignificant when the previously reported fi-
nancial distress is controlled for. 
 
The change in beta does not seem to be significantly related to the first three va-
riables of interest, but the Z-score seems to have the expected effect. The more 
financial distress the financial statement has signaled in the previous year, the less 
the systematic risk increases after the audit report date. This indicates that the risk 
effect of the going concern audit report information could be preempted by the 
financial information already available on the market.  
 
In panel B none of the independent variables are statistically significantly related 
to STDEV. Additionally, the relationship between BETA and Z is here statistical-
ly insignificant, whereas SIZE appears to have a weak positive relationship with 
BETA in the column with Z included, and MOWN a negatively significant rela-
tionship with BETA. The positive relationship between BETA and SIZE suggests 
that firms with richer information environments have a larger increase in BETA.  
Similarly, the negative effect of MOWN on BETA indicates that as information 
asymmetry increases also BETA increases. 
 
As in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the adjusted R2’s are also low here. However, this 
is consistent with existing research (e.g. Knechel et al. 2007; Fleak et al. 1994; 
Chen et al. 2000). The reported F-statistics are insignificant in all models, which 
implies that the possibility that the regression coefficients are different from zero 
cannot be rejected. This casts doubt on the existence of the findings described 
above. As a conclusion, no convincing evidence is found for hypotheses H10, H11 
and H12. 
7.4.4 Change in volatility and systematic risk around the 10-K report date 
 
This section complements the analysis conducted in the previous section. Here the 
event date of the analysis is the 10-K report filing date instead of the audit report 
date. The 10-K report filing date has traditionally been used in research. Whereas 
it is suggested that around the audit report date the abnormal returns are due to 
informed trading, the 10-K report filing date is clearly the date when the audit 
report is made available to the investors. The problem with this date is that the 
audit report is filed together with the annual report and therefore the observed 
abnormal returns may be affected by the accompanying information. 
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Table 27.  Regressions of changes in volatility and systematic risk, and firm 
characteristics (Audit Report date)a  
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Table 27.  Continued 
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Table 27.  Continued 
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Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 28 tabulates the descriptive statistics of the change in standard deviation 
and beta, and the independent variables used in the regression analysis. In Panel 
A the changes in volatility and systematic risk are both negative, indicating that 
the riskiness has decreased after the 10-K report. However, in Panel B, when the 
extreme observations are winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean, 
the change in ∆STDEV remains negative but ∆BETA is positive.  
Table 28.  Descriptive statistics of variables (10-K date)a 
TABLE 28. 
Descriptive statistics of variables 
(10-k date)a 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
Mean -0.004 -0.004 38.481 2.465 64.518 -11.638 
Median -0.002 -0.002 35.401 2.230 23.006 -3.631 
Maximum 0.005 0.048 97.103 10.506 3189.561 8.012 
Minimum -0.009 -0.093 0.000 -10.054 0.000 -257.393 
Std. Dev. 0.004 0.021 24.789 2.628 233.029 28.011 
Skewness 0.019 -0.492 0.426 -0.037 11.017 -5.375 
Kurtosis 1.850 5.104 2.316 5.022 141.898 39.390 
n 237 237 226 234 235 197 
       
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
Mean -0.004 0.014 38.928 2.501 45.624 -10.134 
Median -0.002 0.009 35.992 2.230 23.006 -3.631 
Maximum 0.005 0.048 92.117 7.950 337.244 0.348 
Minimum -0.009 0.000 0.968 -1.813 0.000 -84.687 
Std. Dev. 0.004 0.012 25.079 2.394 68.866 18.752 
Skewness -0.033 0.751 0.422 0.403 2.729 -2.961 
Kurtosis 1.751 2.253 2.271 2.810 10.967 11.132 
n 237 237 228 234 235 197 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Δ BETA = change in stock beta  
Δ STDEV = change in standard deviation  
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares  
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets  
DA = percent of total debt to total assets  
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged)  
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The correlation matrix in Table 29 shows that there are no significant correlations 
between the ∆STDEV and the independent variables. In contrast, MOWN is sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with ∆BETA. The correlations between the inde-
pendent variables are similar to those in Table 25 explained previously. 
Table 29.  Correlation matrix (10-K date)a 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN LNTA DA Z 
Δ STDEV 1      
Δ BETA 0.378*** 1     
MOWN -0.083 -0.079 1    
SIZE 0.087 -0.041 -0.187*** 1   
DA -0.063 -0.031 0.296*** -0.213*** 1  
Z -0.018 -0.029 -0.061 0.377*** -0.256*** 1 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN LNTA DA Z 
Δ STDEV 1      
Δ BETA -0.236*** 1     
MOWN -0.088 -0.122* 1    
SIZE 0.124 -0.055 -0.230*** 1   
DA 0.012 -0.097 0.295*** -0.178** 1  
Z 0.018 0.100 -0.120* 0.459*** -0.331*** 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Δ BETA = change in stock beta  
Δ STDEV = change in standard deviation  
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets  
DA = percent of total debt to total assets  
Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged)  
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Changes in volatility and systematic risk after the 10-K report date 
 
Table 30 presents the univariate results for the change in volatility and systematic 
risk. In the original data set Panel A the ∆STDEV and ∆BETA are both statisti-
cally significantly negative around the date when the 10-K report is filed with the 
SEC. The reduction in the volatility and systematic risk is a surprise if it is as-
sumed that the going concern audit report is disclosed for the first time at that 
date and if the report is expected to be relevant to the investors. 
 
In the winsorized results of Table 30 Panel B the systematic risk has, however, 
increased (t-stat = 17.032), while the volatility has decreased. The increase in 
systematic risk proposes that stocks’ sensitivity to overall market movements has 
increased.  
 
The reduction of systematic risk and volatility after the 10-K report date could be 
explained primarily by the announcement of the annual financial report. Financial 
information disclosures help to align the estimations of the investors thereby re-
ducing uncertainty. The results in Panel B suggest that the systematic risk in-
creases after the 10-K report announcement, but the volatility caused by the 
spread of estimations on the future is reduced. 
Table 30.  Change in volatility and systematic risk after the going concern 
audit report (10-K date)a 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period Mean change T-statistic  
Δ Standard deviation -0.004*** -13.484  
Δ Beta -0.004*** -2.995  
    
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period Mean change T-test  
Δ Standard deviation -0.004*** -13.722  
Δ Beta 0.014*** 17.032  
    
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively 
a denotes  the event date used  
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Information asymmetry, information environment and changes in systematic risk 
and volatility 
Table 31 complements the analysis on changes in systematic risk and volatility 
around the 10-K report filing date of firms disclosing a going concern audit re-
port. Specifically, the changes in systematic risk and volatility are regressed on 
the firm’s information asymmetry, information environment, agency costs of debt 
and previously disclosed information concerning financial distress. The purpose is 
to examine whether some of these attributes affect the relevance of the going con-
cern audit report.  
As in the previous sections, information asymmetry is expected to increase the 
relevance of information disclosed, whereas richness of the information environ-
ment, leverage and previously disclosed information concerning financial distress 
are likely to decrease the change systematic risk and volatility. 
The results from the regression analyses in Table 31 indicate only some weak 
evidence that only the information asymmetry between management and owners 
has an effect on the change volatility after the 10-K report filing date. However, 
when financial distress is controlled for this relationship is statistically insignifi-
cant. In Panel B of Table 31 the change in beta is significantly higher when the 
reported financial distress is lower. This is as expected, since the going concern 
audit report is less expected for those firms with better financial situation and 
therefore the going concern problems come as a bigger surprise. 
Overall, these results suggest that around the 10-K report filing date the systemat-
ic risk increases and volatility decreases when extreme observations are dealt 
with. Furthermore, the results provide some evidence that the disclosed level of 
financial distress affects the change in systematic risk around the 10-K report, but 
the other variables expected to affect the relevance of audit report information 
prove insignificant. 
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Table 31.  Regressions of changes in volatility and systematic risk, and firm 
characteristics (10-K date)a  
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Table 31. Continued 
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Table 31. Continued. 
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7.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter investigates the effect of auditors’ going concern audit reports on the 
systematic risk and volatility. The purpose of the analysis is to study whether the 
announcement of the going concern audit report affects the investors’ assessments 
of the riskiness of the firm and whether the report affects the spread of investors’ 
future estimates. First, this chapter focuses on the volatility and systematic risk 
changes after the audit report date, whereas the last section analyzes risk changes 
after the 10-K filing date. Second, to further analyze the effects of firm specific 
characteristics, regression analysis is used to seek for evidence of a relationship 
between the change in volatility and systematic risk, and proxies for information 
asymmetry, information environment and agency costs of debt. 
 
Overall, the results in Chapter 7 indicate that the auditors’ going concern reports 
have the expected positive effect on the systematic risk. Around both alternative 
event dates the change in systematic risk is positive and significant. This indicates 
that the going concern audit report significantly increases the riskiness of the 
firm. Support for hypothesis H9 is found. 
 
Further investigation using a regression analysis shows that firm specific charac-
teristics of information asymmetry, information environment or agency costs of 
debt do not affect the changes in volatility and systematic risk. However, previous 
disclosures on financial distress have a negative affect on the systematic risk. No 
support for hypotheses H10, H11 or H12 is found. 
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8  AUDITORS’ INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESS 
DISCLOSURES AND CHANGES IN SYSTEMATIC 
RISK AND VOLATILITY 
 
The theoretical analysis of this dissertation suggests that auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures have the potential to affect the price of the underlying stock. 
Chapter 6 of the dissertation empirically analyzed whether abnormal returns exist 
around the audit report is signed or filed to the SEC. The purpose of this chapter 
is to further analyze this issue. In detail, the effects of auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures on the volatility of the stock returns and the systematic risk 
are investigated. Since a stock price change can be a result of adjustments in ex-
pected future cash flows or adjustments in the riskiness of the firm, this chapter 
provides empirical evidence whether the riskiness of the firm has indeed changed. 
8.1 Hypothesis development 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) Section 404 requires that management 
maintain adequate internal controls over financial reporting and provide an audi-
tor’s attestation of its effectiveness in the annual report. The purpose of auditors’ 
internal control weakness disclosures is to give an objective attestation of the ef-
fectiveness of internal control structures and procedures, and to inform financial 
statement users about material weaknesses.  
 
Internal control weakness disclosures may address specific accounting issues or 
broader control issues that the auditor has identified as material weaknesses. In-
ternal control weaknesses can affect the quality of accounting and financial in-
formation and increase the information risk of financial statement users.  
8.1.1  Uncertainty and risk changes around internal control weakness 
disclosures 
 
Weaknesses in internal controls may also signal how management is fulfilling its 
governance responsibilities. Credit rating agencies, for instance, have noted that 
internal control weaknesses should be considered in the credit rating process 
(Moody’s Investor Service 2004; Fitch Ratings 2005). Additionally, Francis et al. 
(2004, 2005) have documented that information risk is positively related to the 
cost of equity. If auditors’ internal control weakness reports help investors in 
identifying and communicating such uncertainties in a firm that affect the future 
expectations of a firm, then it is expected that there is a change in the volatility of 
the stock returns and the systematic risk of the stock around the time when the 
weaknesses are communicated to the markets. 
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In particular, there are two factors that may have an impact on the relationship 
between internal control weakness disclosures and changes in riskiness. First, the 
most important factor is whether the effectiveness of internal controls is relevant 
information for the investors or not, i.e. whether it affects the risk levels of the 
firm. Second, given that the information is relevant and does indeed affect the risk 
levels, the next question is whether the disclosure of the auditor’s attestation is a 
valuable source for that information. Are the investors able to benefit from other 
accounting or non-accounting sources of information to reach the same conclu-
sion?  
 
In this chapter of the dissertation the change in volatility (standard deviation of 
the returns) and systematic risk (beta) are used to measure whether an adjustment 
in the risk levels of the firms has occurred. Standard deviation is a general meas-
ure of volatility, and here it measures how the observed returns are scattered 
around the mean. The standard deviation incorporates information about the un-
certainty in the markets concerning the possible outcomes. The higher the stan-
dard deviation is, the more uncertainties are considered to exist about the future of 
the firm.  
 
The CAPM beta measures the sensitivity of the stock to market movements. It is 
an estimate of the systematic risk of the stock and in capital market research it can 
be used for testing the announcement effect. Beta is an important factor of event 
studies because it isolates the firm-specific effect from the market movements 
(Hong and Sarkar 2007).  
 
There are no published papers in auditing exploring the effects of auditors’ inter-
nal control weakness disclosures on volatility or systematic risk. Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2009) show that firms with internal control weaknesses have higher syste-
matic risk. However, they do not study whether this has increased as a result of 
the auditors’ 404 disclosures. Recent studies have focused on the effects of man-
agement’s Section 302 internal control reports and auditors’ Section 404 reports 
on the cost of capital (Ogneva et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008) and abnormal 
stock returns (Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008). Ogneva et al. (2007) 
find that internal control weaknesses are not directly associated with higher cost 
of capital, while Beneish et al. (2008) find that they are. Additionally, both Bene-
ish et al. (2008) and Hammersley et al. (2008) find a significant abnormal stock 
reaction to disclosures on internal control weaknesses. Fargher et al. (1998) study 
the systematic risk changes around all types of qualified audit opinion announce-
ments and withdrawals. They find significantly lower systematic risk levels after 
withdrawal announcements, indicating that audit reports do indeed have an im-
pact on the levels of systematic risk. 
 
In light of the literature reviewed in this dissertation, internal control weaknesses 
can be expected to affect the quality of accounting information, and therefore af-
fect the information risk of the investors. As a consequence of the impaired in-
formation quality and increased information risk, it can be hypothesized that the 
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volatility returns and the systematic risk of the stock increase after the auditor’s 
internal control weakness disclosures. 
 
H13: Auditors’ internal control weakness disclosures are associated with an 
increase in volatility and systematic risk. 
8.1.2  Information asymmetry, information environment, agency costs of debt, 
and risk changes around internal control weakness disclosures 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
In light of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and the hypothesis de-
velopment in Chapter 5 it is expected that the level of information asymmetry 
between management and owners will affect the relationship between auditors’ 
internal control weakness disclosures and the riskiness of the firm. In detail, firms 
with low information asymmetry are expected to have fewer agency problems and 
less conflict of interests. Therefore, in firms with lower information asymmetry, 
the internal control weaknesses and internal control weakness disclosures are eas-
ier to foresee and consequently the future and the risk level of the firm are less 
unpredictable.  
 
In terms of uncertainty and risk changes, the expectations above would imply that 
the information contained in the internal control weakness disclosure, causes a 
smaller change in volatility and systematic risk in firms with higher management 
ownership (lower information asymmetry). This is because the owners are more 
aware of the underlying issues of the auditor’s conclusion due to lower informa-
tion asymmetry and their interests are more aligned with those of the manage-
ment.  
 
H14: The information asymmetry between management and owners has a 
positive affect on the change in volatility and systematic risk after audi-
tors’ internal control weakness disclosures. 
 
 
Information environment 
 
Similar expectation can be made for the effect of the information environment. 
Information environment refers to the richness of accounting and non-accounting 
information available to investors from different sources. To begin with, the firms 
themselves may differ substantially in the amount of information that they pub-
lish, and additionally, there are different actors that produce information eva-
luated by the capital markets. For example, a large number of news agencies fol-
low and report information that may either directly or indirectly, combined with 
some other information, affect investment decisions. Additionally, financial ana-
lysts and rating agencies announce, for instance, forecasts, industry reports, earn-
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ings estimates and risk analyses, all of which affect the information environment 
and the investors’ abilities to accurately estimate the future cash flows of the 
firms.  
 
The key assumption in this dissertation is that owners of firms with richer infor-
mation environments are less likely to revise their expectations of the firm’s fu-
ture earnings or risk after the firm discloses e.g. an audit report. This is due to two 
reasons: (i) investors have more information available to make more accurate 
predictions and thus the uncertainty remains lower even after unexpected disclo-
sures, (ii) firm specific information disclosures can be anticipated using available 
information and therefore the surprise of the disclosure is preempted and the stock 
market effect around the disclosure is reduced. For example, Callen et al. (2006) 
document that SEC filings are less relevant to investors with more information 
available. In a similar vein, Mitra et al. (2005) report that firms with a richer in-
formation environment exercise less accounting discretion and therefore have 
higher quality information and investors have less information risk. 
  
As a result, the change in volatility and systematic risk subsequent to the auditors’ 
internal control weakness disclosure is expected to be lower for firms with richer 
information environment. 
 
H15:  The information environment of the firm has a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic risk after the auditors’ internal con-
trol weakness disclosures. 
 
 
Agency costs of debt 
 
As with information environment and information asymmetry, it is expected that 
the agency costs of debt could have an affect on conflict of interests, the quality 
and quantity of information available, and therefore on the risk affects of audi-
tors’ internal control weakness disclosures. 
 
The review of the literature in previous chapters reveals that bondholders protect 
themselves against potential losses. The means of protection include insisting on 
increased control or monitoring of the management, increased amount or quality 
of disclosed information or demanding a higher interest rate, shorter maturity time 
and restricting covenants. In this dissertation it is hypothesized that these de-
mands from the bondholder have an affect on the management discipline and in-
formation quality. From the investors’ point of view, the information risk should 
be significantly lower when management discipline and information quality is 
higher, and as a consequence the uncertainty surrounding investment decision 
making should be lower.  
 
In this dissertation it is hypothesized that, agency costs of debt are negatively re-
lated to the change in volatility and systematic risk after the auditors’ internal 
control weakness disclosures. 
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H16:  The agency costs of debt of the firm have a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic risk after the auditors’ internal con-
trol weakness disclosures. 
8.2 Data 
 
In the analysis of risk changes around internal control weakness audit reports the 
same data is used as in Chapter 6. The sample consists of 354 Russell 3000 Index 
firms, all with a first time auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure publicly 
available in Audit Analytics. All audit reports are from years ending 2005–2007.  
 
Volatility of the stock returns and systematic risk are estimated using daily clos-
ing price data from Datastream for 354 firms and for the Russell 3000 index. In 
addition to the stock price data needed to estimate the changes in volatility and 
risk, the regression analysis of this chapter requires data on the independent va-
riables information asymmetry, information environment, leverage and disclosed 
financial distress. This data is from Thomson Financial Worldscope. Information 
about the content of the management’s internal control efficiency report is ga-
thered from the Audit Analytics database. Table 13 of Section 6.2. (p.106) clari-
fies the distribution of the sample audit reports across time and industries. 
8.3 Methodology 
 
This chapter of the dissertation examines whether the auditor’s internal control 
weakness disclosure affects the change in volatility of the firm’s stock return or 
the systematic risk. The econometrics literature recognizes standard deviation as a 
statistical measure of spread. In this study it measures the spread of expected fu-
ture outcomes, i.e. the volatility of the returns. In stable conditions where the un-
certainty is small, the estimates of expected future cash flows are more aligned 
between actors. On the other hand in unstable conditions, where uncertainty in-
creases, future outcomes are more difficult to predict and the volatility in stock 
returns is expected to increase.  
 
To empirically test whether the return volatility and systematic risk of the stock 
changed after a going concern audit report, the standard deviation and beta are 
estimated for each firm before and after the going concern audit report date. The 
pre-going concern audit report period is [-130, -10] and the post-going concern 
audit report period is [10, 130], the audit report date being day [0]. The change in 
standard deviation and beta for each firm is the difference between the pre- and 
post –period estimations. 
 
The standard deviation and the change in standard deviation are estimated as in 
Equations (8) and (9) of Section 7.3. (p. 130). Likewise, the beta and the change 
in beta are defined as in Equations (10) and (11) of Section 7.3. (p. 130). Finally, 
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for testing H6 and H7 a regression model similar to Equation (7) of Section 6.3 (p. 
95) is applied. Here, the change in STDEV and BETA are used as the dependent 
variables, whereas in Section 6 the dependent variable is the standardized abnor-
mal return: 
 
(14) iiiiiii eCONFLICEZDASIZEMOWNSTDEV ++++++=∆ _54321 βββββα  
 
(15) iiiiii eCONFLICEZDASIZEMOWNBETA ++++++=∆ _54321 βββββα  
 
where the independent variables are as defined on in Section 5.3 on page 58 and 
Section 6.3. on page 95. The influence of outliers is controlled for by winsorizing 
all variables at two standard deviations from the mean (see e.g. Bernard et al. 
1990). All tests are conducted and reported using winsorized and unwinsorized 
data. 
8.4 Results  
 
The results from the empirical analyses are now presented. The purpose is to ex-
amine whether the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure affects the riski-
ness of the firm. In detail, the first section focuses on changes in the volatility and 
systematic risk levels after the weakness disclosure. The second section provides 
a more thoroughgoing analysis of whether firm specific features, such as informa-
tion asymmetry, information environment, agency cost of debt, financial distress 
or management’s reporting on internal controls affect the changes in the riskiness 
of the firm after the auditor’s weakness disclosure.  
 
The results are reported using two alternative event dates. In the first part the au-
dit report date is considered the first date of trade on the auditor’s internal control 
weakness disclosure. Then, the second part applies the filing date of the 10-K 
annual report as the event date. The 10-K report date is traditionally used, because 
it is the most obvious date when the information is made public. The problem 
with this date lies in the large amount of simultaneous information that the annual 
report contains. However, as reviewed in previous chapters, several studies have 
advocated the use of the date of the actual event, here the audit report date, be-
cause it is normally the date when the auditor hands over the report to the man-
agement of the firm, and thus the first possible date that trade can take place on 
the basis of information contained in the auditor’s report. 
8.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 32 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in analyzing hypo-
theses H13, H14, H15 and H16. Panel A contains the statistics using the original data 
set while in Panel B the variables are winsorized at two standard deviations from 
the mean. Panel A and B means and medians all show an increase in volatility and 
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systematic risk. This would indicate that the auditor’s internal control weakness 
disclosure has increased the volatility and systematic risk. The statistics for the 
independent variables used in the regression show that the firms in the sample are 
on average financially distressed, measured with the Z-score, but to a far less ex-
tent than the going concern firms in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. The mean manage-
ment ownership is about 20 percent, but the spread is relatively big, from less 
than one percent to over 90 percent. Leverage is about 20 percent on average, and 
after winsorizing the extreme values the maximum DA is below 100 percent. Fi-
nally, in 16.7 percent of the cases (59 observations) the management and audit 
report on internal controls are contradictory, and the dummy receives the value 
one. 
 
Table 33 tabulates the correlations between the dependent and independent va-
riables used in this empirical analysis.  Interestingly, the change in volatility is 
significantly negatively correlated with SIZE and Z. This implies that the uncer-
tainty, measured by the volatility, is less affected in firms with a richer informa-
tion environment and more stable financial condition. In addition, larger firms 
(SIZE) in the sample have less management ownership (MOWN), higher leverage 
(DA), more stable financial position (Z) and more often conflicting management 
and audit reports on internal controls (ICE_CONFL). The last observation is 
somewhat surprising. Generally, the management of larger firms would be ex-
pected to be better able to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls. One 
explanation could be that the weaknesses are more obvious in smaller firms that 
are growing faster and going through restructuring, whereas in the larger and 
more stable firms the identification of weaknesses is more demanding for the 
management as well. 
 
Systematic risk and volatility for a 240-day period around the internal control 
weakness disclosure 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the movement of the volatility and systematic risk 
the around the internal control weakness disclosure. These figures use, as in the 
previous chapter, an estimation period of 120 days for calculating the standard 
deviation and beta for each day in the 240-day period around the disclosure.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates a decrease in the volatility in the period preceding the internal 
control weakness report. About 30 days before the audit report is issued the de-
crease ends and the standard deviation stabilizes. Figure 6 shows that the syste-
matic risk of the sample firms has been decreasing in the pre-event period as well. 
The decreasing trend ends around the date on which the auditor issued the internal 
control weakness disclosure. After the disclosure the systematic risk remains rela-
tively stable for 90 days, thereafter increasing. The change in the decreasing trend 
in the pre-event period could be due to the auditor’s disclosure. Interestingly, the 
systematic risk does not start increasing shortly after the disclosure, but rather 
only 3 months later, therefore it is most likely due to some other reason in addi-
tion to or regardless of the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure. 
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Table 32. Descriptive statistics of variables (Audit report date)a 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
Mean 0.007 0.023 23.058 6.940 23.511 -0.460 0.167 
Median 0.002 0.001 18.642 6.737 18.465 0.111 0.000 
Maximum 0.126 2.270 91.913 13.625 135.462 6.902 1.000 
Minimum -0.023 -2.007 0.022 2.672 0.000 -48.643 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.017 0.536 19.820 1.687 24.060 3.471 0.373 
Skewness 2.171 -0.123 1.177 0.854 1.286 -9.740 1.789 
Kurtosis 12.323 4.448 4.178 4.631 4.808 123.598 4.200 
n 354 354 347 352 351 320 354 
        
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
Mean 0.007 0.025 22.845 6.907 23.174 -0.189 0.167 
Median 0.002 0.003 18.642 6.737 18.465 0.111 0.000 
Maximum 0.096 1.333 75.645 10.339 87.087 1.253 1.000 
Minimum -0.023 -1.578 0.329 4.241 0.000 -4.931 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.015 0.493 19.158 1.518 22.941 1.207 0.373 
Skewness 1.526 -0.139 1.018 0.420 1.005 -2.328 1.789 
Kurtosis 7.087 3.285 3.514 2.506 3.375 8.907 4.200 
n 354 354 347 352 351 320 354 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Δ BETA = change in stock beta Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) 
Δ STDEV = change in standard deviation DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control 
effectiveness reports from the management and 
the auditor 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
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Table 33.  Correlation matrix  (Audit Report date)a 
 
 
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
Δ STDEV 1       
Δ BETA 0.107** 1      
MOWN 0.049 -0.046 1     
SIZE -0.177*** 0.028 -0.104* 1    
DA -0.048 0.050 0.086 0.372*** 1   
Z -0.199*** -0.078 -0.005 0.149*** -0.003 1  
ICE_ CONFL -0.021 -0.080 0.090* 0.201*** 0.048 0.035 1 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 Δ STDEV Δ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
Δ STDEV 1       
Δ BETA 0.101* 1      
MOWN -0.007 -0.030 1     
SIZE -0.131** 0.045 -0.113** 1    
DA -0.038 0.067 0.072 0.391*** 1   
Z -0.090* 0.038 -0.030 0.300*** -0.051 1  
ICE_ CONFL -0.007 -0.081 0.077 0.194*** 0.056 0.007 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Δ BETA = change in stock beta DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
Δ STDEV = change in standard deviation Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control 
effectiveness reports from the management 
and the auditor 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
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Figure 5.  Volatility of stock returns for a 240-day period around the internal 
control weakness disclosure date. 
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
2
6
-1
20
-1
10
-1
00
-9
0
-8
0
-7
0
-6
0
-5
0
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
20
30
40
50
60
70
8
0
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
D
a
y
Standard deviation
 Acta Wasaensia     157 
  
 
Figure 6.  Systematic risk of the stock for a 240-day period around the internal 
control weakness disclosure date. 
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8.4.2  Change in volatility and systematic risk after the internal control 
weakness disclosure date 
 
Table 34 presents the results from the analysis of the changes in systematic risk 
and volatility after the auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure. The mean 
changes in both measures are positive, indicating that the riskiness or uncertainty 
has increased. The change in volatility is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (t-stat in Panel B =8.675). This increase in volatility is as expected accord-
ing to the literature and thus provides evidence supporting hypothesis H13. The 
result can be interpreted to indicate that the internal control weakness disclosure 
has increased the uncertainty related to the price of the stock. Additional tests (not 
tabulated) on only those 295 firms that do not have conflicting Section 302 and 
Section 404 reports reveal results similar to those in Table 34, that the change in 
volatility is positive (mean change = 0.007) and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level (t-stat for the winsorized observations = 7.750). These additional 
findings show that the volatility increase in Table 34 is not driven by the 59 cases 
with conflicting internal control reports. 
Table 34.  Change in volatility and systematic risk after internal control 
weakness disclosure (Audit report date)a 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period Mean change T-statistic  
Δ Standard deviation 0.007*** 8.390  
Δ Beta 0.023 0.819  
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period Mean change T-test  
Δ Standard deviation 0.007*** 8.675  
Δ Beta 0.025 0.970  
    
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from 
the mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
a denotes  the event date used 
 Acta Wasaensia     159 
  
8.4.3 Information asymmetry, information environment, agency cost of debt, 
and the change in volatility and systematic risk 
 
Table 35 reports the results from the analysis on the relationship between change 
in volatility and systematic risk, and information asymmetry, information envi-
ronment and agency cost of debt. Additionally, the effects of reported financial 
distress and management reporting on internal controls are controlled for. 
 
The first two columns of Panel A and Panel B illustrate how the variables studied 
affect the change in volatility. The results confirm that the information environ-
ment of the firm is statistically significantly related to the change in volatility. 
This finding also holds after controlling for the management report and the finan-
cial distress reported in the previous year. In detail, firms with richer information 
environment have significantly smaller changes in volatility. This suggests that 
the internal control weaknesses are not identifiable for firms with richer informa-
tion environments and therefore this information is already taken into account 
when the auditor’s internal control weakness is disclosed. Alternatively, the richer 
information environment may not be able to identify the internal control weak-
nesses, but the availability of diverse information cushions them against an in-
crease in uncertainty. 
 
In this sample the information asymmetry and agency cost of debt or financial 
distress and management reports for that matter, do not have a significant affect 
on the change in the volatility of the firm.  Since the variable ICE_CONFL was 
significantly negatively related to the abnormal returns around the auditor’s inter-
nal control weakness disclosure, it is slightly surprising that contradictory man-
agement and auditor disclosures on internal control efficiency do not increase 
uncertainty. The regression regarding the change in systematic risk reveals that 
none of the variables studied have an affect.  This is on the other hand also the 
case in the analysis on the abnormal returns. 
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Table 35.  Regressions of changes in volatility and systematic risk, and firm 
characteristics (Audit Report date)a  
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Table 35.  Continued 
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Table 35.  Continued  
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8.4.4 Change in volatility and systematic risk around the 10-K report date 
 
To complete the analysis of the volatility and systematic risk changes around the 
auditor’s internal control weakness reports, an alternative event date is tested 
here. As described in the previous chapters of this dissertation, the date of public 
disclosure of audit reports is not a straightforward issue. When examining short-
term market impacts of financial disclosures, the determination of the appropriate 
event date is a key concern. Markets are expected to quickly incorporate all new 
and relevant information and therefore, if measured at the wrong point in time, 
the results of the analysis may be affected.  
 
This section of the dissertation is not as sensitive to the event date as, for exam-
ple, the empirical analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, because +/- 9 days around 
the event date is not included in the estimation of pre- and post-period volatility 
and systematic risk. However, because the 10-K filing date may be, and in most 
cases is, more than 9 days after the audit report date, it is of interest in this disser-
tation also to examine the risk effects of internal control weaknesses around the 
10-K report filing date. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 36 presents the descriptive statistics for the change in volatility, the change 
in systematic risk and the independent variables used in the regressions. Panel A 
presents the statistics from the original data set and Panel B from the winsorized 
data. MOWN, SIZE, DA, Z and ICE_CONFL have been discussed in the Section 
8.4.1. 
 
The mean and median change in volatility is negative, but close to zero, suggest-
ing that there is only a modest decrease in volatility after the 10-K report with the 
auditor’s internal control weakness disclosure is filed. The change in systematic 
risk is also on average negative and modest. This implies that the announcement 
of the audit report together with the annual report does not seem to increase the 
riskiness of the firms. 
 
The correlations in Panel A of Table 37 reveal that the change in systematic risk 
is negatively related to Z. This indicates that the weak financial standing that the 
firm has announced earlier moderates the increase in systematic risk. Panel B in-
dicates that the correlation between the change in volatility and Z in Panel A was 
driven by extreme values. In Panel B the change in volatility is positively corre-
lated with SIZE, DA and Z. This suggests that the auditor’s internal control 
weakness disclosure increases volatility more in firms with rich information envi-
ronment, more agency costs of debt and stronger financial position. The correla-
tions between the independent variables are as explained in Section 8.4.1. 
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Table 36.  Descriptive statistics of variables (10-K date)a 
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 ∆ STDEV ∆ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
Mean -0.000 -0.002 23.058 6.940 23.511 -0.460 0.167 
Median -0.000 -0.002 18.642 6.737 18.465 0.111 0.000 
Maximum 0.127 1.911 91.913 13.625 135.462 6.902 1.000 
Minimum -0.062 -1.814 0.022 2.672 0.000 -48.643 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.011 0.423 19.820 1.687 24.060 3.471 0.373 
Skewness 4.450 0.214 1.177 0.854 1.286 -9.740 1.789 
Kurtosis 54.736 6.014 4.178 4.631 4.808 
123.59
8 4.200 
n 354 354 347 352 351 320 354 
        
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 ∆ STDEV ∆ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
Mean -0.001 -0.001 22.845 6.907 23.174 -0.189 0.167 
Median -0.001 -0.002 18.642 6.737 18.465 0.111 0.000 
Maximum 0.031 1.181 75.645 10.339 87.087 1.253 1.000 
Minimum -0.027 -1.017 0.329 4.241 0.000 -4.931 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.361 19.158 1.518 22.941 1.207 0.373 
Skewness -0.093 0.223 1.018 0.420 1.005 -2.328 1.789 
Kurtosis 5.918 3.552 3.514 2.506 3.375 8.907 4.200 
n 354 354 347 352 351 320 354 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a
 denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
∆ BETA = change in stock beta Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) 
∆ STDEV = change in standard 
deviation DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
MOWN = percentage of closely held 
shares SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control effectiveness reports from the 
management  
and the auditor 
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Table 37.  Correlation matrix  (10-K date)a  
 
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
 ∆ STDEV ∆ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
∆ STDEV 1       
∆ BETA 0.040 1      
MOWN 0.081 0.027 1     
SIZE 0.043 -0.016 -0.104* 1    
DA 0.048 0.059 0.086* 0.372*** 1   
Z -0.181*** -0.130** -0.005 0.149*** -0.003 1  
ICE_ CONFL 0.008 0.021 0.090 0.201*** 0.048 0.035 1 
 
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
 ∆ STDEV ∆ BETA MOWN SIZE DA Z 
ICE_ 
CONFL 
∆ STDEV 1       
∆ BETA -0.031 1      
MOWN -0.023 0.016 1     
SIZE 0.192*** -0.034 -0.113** 1    
DA 0.111** 0.018 0.072 0.391*** 1   
Z 0.136** 
-
0.122** -0.030 0.300*** -0.051 1  
ICE_ CONFL 0.016 0.007 0.077 0.194*** 0.056 0.007 1 
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from the mean 
a
 denotes  the event date used 
The variables are defined as follows: 
∆ BETA = change in stock beta SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
∆ STDEV = change in standard deviation DA = percent of total debt to total assets 
MOWN = percentage of closely held shares Z = Altman Z-score (1-year lagged) 
ICE_CONFL = conflict in the internal control effectiveness reports from the management and the auditor 
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Change in volatility and systematic risk after the 10-K report 
 
Table 38 presents the mean changes in volatility and systematic risk after the fil-
ing of the 10-K report containing the auditor’s internal control weakness disclo-
sure. The mean change in volatility is negative in both Panel A and Panel B. 
However, only in panel B, after the extreme observations have been dealt with, is 
the decrease in volatility statistically different from zero. The mean change in 
systematic risk is negative in both the original as well as the winsorized data set, 
but the change is statistically insignificant. 
Table 38.  Change in volatility and systematic risk after the auditor’s inter-
nal control weakness disclosure (10-K date)a 
 
 
 
 
PANEL A. Original data set 
Period Mean change T-statistic  
∆ Standard deviation -0.000 -0.659  
∆ Beta -0.002 -0.107  
    
PANEL B. Winsorized data set 
Period Mean change T-test  
∆ Standard deviation -0.001*** -2.650  
∆ Beta -0.001 -0.023  
    
Notes: 
PANEL B. Observations winsorized at two standard deviations from 
the mean 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively 
a
 denotes  the event date used 
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The statistically significant (t-stat = -2.650) decrease in volatility is unexpected if 
the 10-K report is considered to be the first day of trade on the audit report infor-
mation, and if the audit report information is relevant. The evidence in the pre-
vious section indicates that the volatility increased significantly after the audit 
report date, which could indicate that the auditor’s internal control weakness dis-
closure has affected the volatility before the 10-K filing date. Given the evidence 
on the analysis using the audit report date the decrease in volatility around the 10-
K filing date is not surprising, because the uncertainty impact of the internal con-
trol weakness is already incorporated in the volatility. Furthermore, one signifi-
cant factor explaining the decrease in volatility after the 10-K filing date is the 
disclosure of annual report information. Annual reports reduce the information 
asymmetry between investors and enrich the information environment and thus it 
has the potential to remove some of the uncertainties in the stock markets. 
 
 
Information asymmetry, information environment, agency cost of debt and  
the change in volatility and systematic risk 
 
Table 39 presents the results from the regression analysis. The purpose of the re-
gression is to find out which factors affect the change in volatility and systematic 
risk after the filing date of the 10-K report with the auditor’s internal control 
weakness disclosure. 
 
The change in volatility in Panel A is unrelated to the independent variables. 
However, in Panel B, with the extreme observations winsorized, the results show 
that leverage is positively related to the change in volatility after controlling for 
disclosed financial distress and disclosed management report on internal controls. 
When previous disclosures (Z and ICE_CONFL) are not included in the regres-
sion, then information environment is positively related to the change in volatili-
ty. 
 
The change in systematic risk is to a large extent unaffected by the independent 
variables. In Panel A the disclosed financial distress (Z) is significantly (t-statistic 
= -1.802) related to the change in systematic risk. However, this finding appears 
to be driven by some extreme observations, because in Panel B the relationship is 
insignificant.  
 
Overall, the selected independent variables are unable to significantly explain the 
variation of the change in systematic risk. In contrast, the change in volatility ap-
pears to be related to some of the variables, in particular to leverage. 
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Table 39.  Regressions of changes in volatility and systematic risk, and firm 
characteristics (10-K date)a  
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8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter reports the results from the empirical analysis of changes in volatility 
and systematic risk after auditor’s internal control weakness disclosures. First, the 
analysis provides some evidence on the change in volatility after the audit report 
date. The volatility increases significantly after the internal control weakness re-
port has been dated, as hypothesized in H13. This finding indicates that the uncer-
tainty of the firm’s stock increases significantly after the audit report. 
 
Next the chapter analyzes the relationship between information asymmetry, in-
formation environment, agency costs of debt and changes in risk. The results sup-
port only the hypothesis H15, that there is a negative relationship between infor-
mation environment and change in volatility after auditor’s internal control weak-
ness report date. The finding suggests, as expected, that in a richer information 
environment the internal control weaknesses do not induce as big an increase in 
risk to the markets as in weak information environments. No support for hypothe-
sis H14 or H16 is found. 
 
On the contrary, the findings suggest that the systematic risk of the firms receiv-
ing an internal control weakness disclosure is not significantly affected. The em-
pirical tests document neither a significant average change nor any association 
between systematic risk and information asymmetry, information environment, 
leverage, financial distress or management’s reporting on internal controls.  
 
To conclude the analysis, the latter part of this chapter provides a robustness test 
of volatility and systematic risk changes after the 10-K report filing date. The 
results suggest that the filing of the internal control weakness disclosure with the 
10-K report does not increase the volatility or the systematic risk, but rather a 
decrease in the volatility is documented. This reduction is probably due to the 
disclosure of additional firm-specific information in the annual filing which 
enriches the information environment and while reducing the uncertainty in the 
markets the estimates of the investors are aligned. Finally, there is some evidence 
in Panel B of Table 39 that the agency costs of debt are positively related to the 
change in volatility. However, the evidence above suggests that the change in 
volatility after the 10-K report is rather a result of the other information contained 
in the annual filing than the internal control weakness information. 
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9  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The relevance of audit report information on the stock markets has been studied 
in several papers since the late 1970’s. Three decades later the evidence continues 
to be to some extent inconclusive. The main explanation for the contradictory 
findings seems to be differences in statistical methods and measurements used. 
Still, the question receives continuous attention in the audit and financial account-
ing research. This proves that the underlying question is relevant from the aca-
demic as well as the practical point of view. 
 
The fundamental question has several aspects. First, does the audit report contain 
any relevant information? Second, is the audit report a unique and timely source 
for this information, or is the equivalent or substitute information available from 
some other source. Third, does the information cause a revision in stock prices 
and when does this occur?  
 
Most of the literature so far has studied the abnormal reaction or post announce-
ment drift to the publication of a modified audit report or indirectly the abnormal 
reactions to some other announcement, while controlling for the type of informa-
tion contained in the audit report that the firm previously received. This disserta-
tion approaches the questions above by studying two types of audit reports: the 
going concern audit report and the internal control weakness disclosure. Limiting 
the sample further to first time qualified audit reports, serves to further limit the 
ability of the markets’ to predict the content of the report.  
 
The going concern audit report implies severe financial or operational difficulties 
and questions the firm’s ability to survive. This report type, if any, could have a 
measurable effect on the stock.  Meanwhile, auditor’s internal control weakness 
disclosures have been mandated only recently in response to accounting and au-
diting scandals. The purpose of these disclosures is to reduce information asym-
metries and conflicts of interests between insiders and outsiders. Due to their 
more qualitative nature (compared e.g. to the going concern audit report), internal 
control weaknesses are expected to be more difficult to predict using available 
information combined with their relationships to accounting quality and manage-
ment discipline, these reports are expected to be relevant to investors. 
 
Earlier studies have used several alternative periods to measure the stock market 
reaction, both the estimated announcement dates and the actual announcement 
dates of the annual reports, short periods and long periods. This study is the first 
to report results using the audit report date, i.e. the date on which the auditor 
signed the report, as the event date. However, due to the experimental nature of 
this date, all tests have also been performed using the conventional 10-K report 
filing date.  
 
The selection of the audit report date is supported by two considerations. First, the 
audit report date is probably the first possible date on which the audit report is 
available to anyone but the auditor. In this study, for example, the going concern 
 Acta Wasaensia     173 
  
audit report is dated on average 25 days before the 10-K report is filed. Second, 
studies on other audit related information announcements, e.g. auditor switches in 
the 8-K reports (Knechel et al. 2007), have reported significant market reactions 
using the date of the actual event (dismissal of the incumbent auditor - contracting 
of the new auditor). The problem with using the dates of the actual events, here 
the audit report date, is that it is not clear how this information becomes available 
to the non-informed trader. For this reason, it is assumed in this study that the 
reactions around the audit report date are a result of trading on private informa-
tion. The literature on informed trading (e.g. Jayaraman 2008; Tookes 2008; 
Huddart et al. 2007; Frankel et al. 2004) report evidence of more informed trading 
on small firms, when information asymmetry is greater and information environ-
ment is poorer, and finally when the informed actors are in possession of precise 
information. 
 
This dissertation suggests additionally that the market reaction to audit report in-
formation may be affected by firm specific characteristics. The literature suggests 
that the need for monitoring, e.g. auditing, is greater in firms with a high level of 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest. Following audit demand and audit 
fee studies that have focused on these issues, this study analyzes whether firms 
with different degrees of information asymmetry, information environment and 
agency costs of debt are associated with a different kind of stock market reaction. 
Chapter 2 reviews extensive literature in financial accounting and auditing that 
supports these expectations. 
 
Finally, financial accounting research has found that significant and new informa-
tion has the potential to either increase or reduce the uncertainty and risk asso-
ciated with the firm subsequent to the information revelation. This study ad-
dresses this issue first by looking at whether the volatility and systematic risk 
change after the going concern audit report has been dated. The empirical exami-
nation in this dissertation is concluded by analyzing whether agency problems are 
related to changes in the volatility of returns and systematic risk.  
 
The theoretical analysis in this dissertation builds on the economic framework of 
auditing proposed by agency theory. From this perspective, auditing is an essen-
tial foundation in monitoring the fulfilling of contracts between the management 
and the ownership. The agency relationship between managers and owners is as-
sociated with conflict of interests and information asymmetry and in theory audit-
ing should help to manage these problems. Moreover, information environment, 
i.e. the firm’s exposure to scrutiny by the authorities or analyst and media atten-
tion, and bondholder requirements, may affect the conflict of interests. Conse-
quently, the magnitude or severity of the agency problems is expected to affect 
the demand for audit services and on the other hand this defines what kind of a 
role auditing is expected to play in monitoring the firm.  
 
Abnormal returns, change in volatility and change in systematic risk are here used 
to measure whether the information in the going concern audit report and the au-
ditors’ internal control weakness disclosures affect the stock markets. There is 
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considerable evidence to support a correlation between stock price changes and 
earnings information (Ball et al. 1968; Bernard et al. 1989; Jegadeesh et al. 2006) 
and other financial information (Ou et al. 1989; Livnat et al. 1990; Sloan 1996). 
In this study, the audit report is considered to be a source of information and audit 
reports are thought to have the potential to change market responsiveness to earn-
ings by adding noise or reducing the persistency of reported earnings (Choi et al. 
1992).  
 
Using data from Russell 3000 index firms listed in the U.S. this dissertation fo-
cuses on the relevance of audit opinion information using stock market reactions. 
U.S data is used for obvious reasons. It is the only market that has a sufficient 
number of going concern or internal control weakness audit reports. For example, 
in a recent paper by Citron et al. (2008) the authors use U.K. data from 1994 to 
2000 and with similar criteria as those in this study find 102 first-time going con-
cern audit reports. Ogneva et al. (2007) found 97 going concern opinions from the 
Australian market during 1995-2004. Finally, the sample used by Pucheta et al. 
(2004) consisted of 119 qualified audit reports in the period 1992–1995, but only 
15 of these were classified as going concern. Additionally, auditor’s internal con-
trol weakness disclosures are required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) 
and are therefore available only for firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges. 
 
All audit reports in the sample are dated after the events around Enron and Arthur 
Andersen. These events may have affected the auditors’ reporting decisions and 
also investors’ responsiveness to bad news. Thus only audit reports after those 
events are used. 
 
Standardized abnormal stock returns around the alternative event dates are de-
fined in this study as the standardized market model adjusted daily abnormal re-
turns. The two event dates are the audit report date, i.e. the date printed on the 
audit report, and the 10-K report filing date. Standardized abnormal returns are 
analyzed in three different periods: [-1], [0] and [+1]. Also, standardized cumula-
tive abnormal returns are analyzed in three periods: [-1,+1], [-1, 0] and [0,+1]. 
The change in standard deviation and the change in beta are used to measure the 
changes in volatility and systematic risk. The change is calculated from periods [-
130, 10] and [10, 130], the audit report date or the 10-K filing date being the day 
[0]. 
 
Table 40 presents the hypotheses tested and the main findings of this study. Hy-
potheses H1–H4 deal with the abnormal reaction to going concern audit reports, 
H5–H8 with the abnormal reaction to internal control weakness disclosures, H9–
H12 with the change in volatility and systematic risk after going concern audit 
reports, and finally hypothesis H13–H6 with the change in volatility and systematic 
risk after internal control weakness disclosures. The main findings from the ro-
bustness tests using the 10-K report filing date are summarized in Table 41. 
 Acta Wasaensia     175 
  
Table 40.  The hypotheses and findings of this study 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1: Going concern audit reports 
are associated with negative ab-
normal stock returns 
This study finds no support for H1. There is 
no evidence of negative and statistically sig-
nificant standardized abnormal returns 
around the audit report date (Table 5). 
H2: The information asymmetry 
between management and owners 
has a negative affect on the mar-
ket reaction to going concern au-
dit reports. 
This study finds no support for H2. There is 
no evidence that information asymmetry is 
negatively and statistically significantly re-
lated to standardized abnormal returns 
around the audit report date (Table 6–7). 
H3: The information environment 
of the firm has a positive affect on 
the market reaction to going con-
cern audit reports. 
This study finds support for H3. There is 
evidence that information environment is 
positively and significantly related to stan-
dardized abnormal returns around the audit 
report date (Table 6–7). 
H4: Agency costs of debt have a 
positive affect on the market reac-
tion to going concern audit re-
ports. 
This study finds support for H4.  There is 
evidence that agency costs of debt are posi-
tively and significantly related to standard-
ized abnormal returns around the audit re-
port date (Table 6–7). 
H5: Auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures are asso-
ciated with negative abnormal 
stock returns 
This study finds no support for H5.  
There is no evidence of significant negative 
standardized abnormal returns around the 
audit report date. On the contrary, Table 16 
reports positive abnormal returns. 
H6: Information asymmetry be-
tween the management and the 
owners has a negative affect on 
the market reaction to auditors’ 
internal control weakness disclo-
sures. 
This study finds no support for H6.   
There is no evidence that information 
asymmetry is related to standardized abnor-
mal returns around the audit report date 
(Table 17–18). 
H7: The information environment 
of the firm has a positive affect on 
the market reaction to auditors’ 
internal control weakness disclo-
sures. 
This study finds no support for H7.   
There is no evidence that information envi-
ronment is related to standardized abnormal 
returns around the audit report date (Table 
17–18). 
H8: Agency costs of debt have a 
positive effect on the market reac-
tion to auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures. 
This study finds no support for H7.   
There is no evidence that agency costs of 
debt are related to standardized abnormal 
returns around the audit report date (Table 
17–18). 
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Table 40.  Continued 
 
Hypothesis Finding 
H9: Going concern audit reports 
are associated with an increase in 
volatility and the systematic risk. 
This study finds support for H9.  
There is evidence of significant increase in 
systematic risk after the going concern au-
dit report date (Table 26).  
H10: The information asymmetry 
between management and owners 
has a positive affect on the change 
in volatility and systematic risk 
after the going concern audit re-
ports. 
This study finds no support for H10.  There 
is no evidence that information asymmetry 
is related to the change in volatility and 
systematic risk after the audit report date 
(Table 27). 
H11: The information environment 
of the firm has a negative affect on 
the change in volatility and syste-
matic risk after the going concern 
audit reports. 
This study finds no support for H11. There 
is no evidence that information environ-
ment is negatively related to the change in 
systematic risk after the audit report date. 
On the contrary, Table 27 indicates some 
support that they are positively related. 
H12: Agency costs of debt of a firm 
have a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic 
risk after the going concern audit 
reports. 
This study finds no support for H12.  There 
is no evidence that agency costs of debt are 
related to the change in volatility and sys-
tematic risk after the audit report date (Ta-
ble 27). 
H13: Auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures are asso-
ciated with an increase in volatility 
and systematic risk. 
This study finds support for H13.  There is 
evidence that the volatility increases sig-
nificantly after the audit report date (Table 
34). 
H14: The information asymmetry 
between management and owners 
has a positive affect on the change 
in volatility and systematic risk 
after auditors’ internal control 
weakness disclosures. 
This study finds no support for H14.  There 
is no evidence that information asymmetry 
is related to the change in volatility and 
systematic risk after the audit report date 
(Table 35). 
H15: The information environment 
of the firm has a negative affect on 
the change in volatility and syste-
matic risk after the auditors’ inter-
nal control weakness disclosures. 
This study finds support for H15.   
There is evidence that information envi-
ronment is negatively related to the change 
in volatility after the audit report date (Ta-
ble 35). 
H16: The agency costs of debt of 
the firm have a negative affect on 
the change in volatility and syste-
matic risk after the auditors’ inter-
nal control weakness disclosures. 
This study finds no support for H16.  There 
is no evidence that agency costs of debt are 
related to the change in systematic risk after 
the audit report date (Table 35). 
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Table 41.  Summary of the robustness tests. 
 
Test Finding 
Going concern audit reports are 
associated with negative abnormal 
stock returns 
There is evidence of negative and statisti-
cally significant standardized abnormal re-
turns around the 10-K report filing date (Ta-
ble 10). 
The information asymmetry be-
tween management and owners 
has a negative affect on the mar-
ket reaction to going concern au-
dit reports. 
There is evidence that information asymme-
try is negatively and statistically signifi-
cantly related to standardized abnormal re-
turns around the 10-K report filing date. 
(Table 11–12) 
The information environment of 
the firm has a positive affect on 
the market reaction to going con-
cern audit reports. 
There is some evidence that information 
environment is positively and significantly 
related to standardized abnormal returns 
around the 10-K report filing date (Table 
11). 
Agency costs of debt have a posi-
tive affect on the market reaction 
to going concern audit reports. 
There is no evidence that agency costs of 
debt are positively and significantly related 
to standardized abnormal returns around the 
10-K report filing date (Table 11–12). 
Auditors’ internal control weak-
ness disclosures are associated 
with negative abnormal stock re-
turns 
There is no evidence of significant negative 
standardized abnormal returns around the 
10-K report filing date.  On the contrary, 
Table 21 reports positive abnormal returns 
around this event date. 
Information asymmetry between 
the management and the owners 
has a negative affect on the mar-
ket reaction to auditors’ internal 
control weakness disclosures. 
There is no evidence that information 
asymmetry is related to standardized abnor-
mal returns around the 10-K report filing 
date.  (Table 22–23). 
The information environment of 
the firm has a positive affect on 
the market reaction to auditors’ 
internal control weakness disclo-
sures. 
There is no evidence that information envi-
ronment is positively related to standardized 
abnormal returns around the 10-K report 
filing date. Contrary to expectations Tables 
22–23 show a negative relationship. 
Agency costs of debt have a posi-
tive effect on the market reaction 
to auditors’ internal control weak-
ness disclosures. 
There is no evidence that agency costs of 
debt are related to standardized abnormal 
returns around the 10-K report filing date.  
(Table 22–23). 
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Table 41.  Continued 
 
Test Finding 
Going concern audit reports are 
associated with an increase in vola-
tility and the systematic risk. 
There is evidence of significant increase in 
systematic risk after the going concern 10-K 
report filing date (Table 30). Contrary to 
expectations the volatility decreases. 
The information asymmetry be-
tween management and owners has 
a positive affect on the change in 
volatility and systematic risk after 
the going concern audit reports. 
There is no evidence that information 
asymmetry is related to the change in vola-
tility and systematic risk after the 10-K re-
port filing date. (Table 31). 
The information environment of the 
firm has a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic 
risk after the going concern audit 
reports. 
There is no evidence that information envi-
ronment is negatively related to the change 
in volatility and systematic risk after the 10-
K report filing date (Table 31). 
Agency costs of debt of a firm have 
a negative affect on the change in 
volatility and systematic risk after 
the going concern audit reports. 
There is no evidence that agency costs of 
debt are related to the change in volatility 
and systematic risk after the 10-K report 
filing date (Table 31). 
Auditors’ internal control weakness 
disclosures are associated with an 
increase in volatility and systematic 
risk. 
There is no evidence that volatility and sys-
tematic risk increases significantly after the 
10-K report filing date. On the contrary 
Table 38 reports a volatility reduction after 
this event date. 
The information asymmetry be-
tween management and owners has 
a positive affect on the change in 
volatility and systematic risk after 
auditors’ internal control weakness 
disclosures. 
There is no evidence that information 
asymmetry is related to the change in vola-
tility and systematic risk after the 10-K re-
port filing date (Table 39). 
The information environment of the 
firm has a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic 
risk after the auditors’ internal con-
trol weakness disclosures. 
There is no evidence that information envi-
ronment is negatively related to the change 
in volatility and systematic risk after the 10-
K report filing date (Table 39). 
The agency costs of debt of the 
firm have a negative affect on the 
change in volatility and systematic 
risk after the auditors’ internal con-
trol weakness disclosures. 
There is no evidence that agency costs of 
debt are negatively related to the change in 
volatility and systematic risk after 10-K re-
port filing date. On the contrary, Table 39 
reports some evidence of a positive effect. 
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Going concern audit reports 
 
The first empirical analysis of this study focuses on the event date abnormal re-
turns to going concern audit report announcements. As mentioned above, in this 
study two alternative event dates are used, (i) the audit report date and (ii) as a 
test for robustness the 10-K report filing date.  
 
The empirical results suggest first that in the sample there are no negative abnor-
mal stock returns around the going concern audit report date. Further analysis 
indicates, however, that the firm’s information environment and the agency costs 
of debt have a significant positive effect on abnormal returns. This suggests, as 
hypothesized, that for firms with a rich information environment, e.g. media cov-
erage, analyst following etc., and debt imposed management discipline have sig-
nificantly less negative abnormal returns. The going concern problems are not as 
surprising for the investors of these firms, or alternatively, as suggested by the 
informed trading literature, the use of private information in stock market trading 
is more difficult in these firms. Moreover, financial distress reported the previous 
year also has an affect on abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are less negative 
for firms reporting more distress, indicating that distress reduces the surprise of 
the going concern audit report. 
 
Additional tests using the 10-K report filing date indicate that around the 10-K 
date there is a significant negative abnormal reaction to the going concern audit 
report. Furthermore, the information asymmetry and information environment of 
the firm affect the abnormal returns as expected. 
 
This dissertation also examines the effect of going concern audit report an-
nouncements on the change in volatility and systematic risk of the stock. The pur-
pose of this is to investigate also using additional measures whether the going 
concern audit reports have information content. Abnormal stock reactions can be 
a result of changes in estimates of future cash flows or the riskiness of the firm. 
By estimating the change in systematic risk around the going concern audit report 
the risk effect of the audit report is investigated. Volatility measures the uncer-
tainty or the spread of the stock price estimates. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that the systematic risk increases significantly 
after the audit report date. This implies that the going concern audit report in-
creases the riskiness of the firm. Furthermore, for firms with richer information 
environment the systematic risk is suggested to increase more. There seems to be 
a contradiction in the effect of information environment on abnormal returns and 
systematic risk. This contradiction indicates that the richer information environ-
ment can be used to predict the future cash flows of the firm, i.e. the quantitative 
estimates, but the risk effect of the going concern audit report is more difficult to 
mitigate even in a richer information environment.  
 
The volatility and systematic risk analysis is complemented by analyzing changes 
after the 10-K report. The evidence implies that volatility decreases and systemat-
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ic risk increases after the 10-K report announcement. This suggests that volatility 
reacts to the annual report information as a whole rather than to the audit report 
information because uncertainties and risks are likely to be reduced when annual 
reports are filed, but systematic risk in suggested to have increased due to the au-
dit report. 
 
 
Auditor’s internal control weakness disclosures 
 
The second types of audit reports used in this dissertation are the auditors’ inter-
nal control weakness disclosures. The purpose of this dissertation is to study ab-
normal stock returns and volatility and systematic risk changes around the disclo-
sures of such reports.  
 
First, the evidence from the analysis of the abnormal returns indicates, contrary to 
expectations, that around the audit report date there are no negative abnormal re-
turns. Quite the contrary, the evidence indicates positive reactions. The firm spe-
cific characteristics used in this dissertation have no affect on the abnormal re-
turns. It is difficult to find explanations for the significant positive abnormal re-
turns over a long period, as indicated by Figure 2. One possible reason is that be-
cause the firms with internal control weaknesses tend to be, according to the lite-
rature, smaller, and are growing rapidly, they have ongoing restructurings or or-
ganizational changes. Hence the future cash flow generating ability of the firms 
increases constantly and therefore abnormal returns for these firms are positive. 
 
Around the 10-K report date the abnormal returns are also significantly positive. 
Evidence suggests, however, that around the 10-K date the information environ-
ment also has a negative affect on the abnormal returns. This could indicate that 
internal control weaknesses are more difficult to anticipate using available infor-
mation and therefore the reaction is more negative for the firms with richer in-
formation environments because they are generally expected to be more stable 
and predictable. Finally, contradictory management and auditor assessments of 
internal control effectiveness have a significant negative impact on abnormal re-
turns. 
 
The volatility and systematic risk analysis reveals that after the internal control 
weakness disclosure volatility increases significantly. This suggests that even if 
the abnormal returns, contrary to expectations, are positive, the uncertainty and 
the spread of expectations has increased significantly. This change could derive 
from internal control weaknesses. Moreover, information environment is nega-
tively related to the change in volatility, as expected. The uncertainty increases 
less for firms with more information available. 
 
All in all, internal control weakness disclosures do not seem to have a negative 
affect on abnormal returns as expected. However, internal control weaknesses 
significantly increase the volatility of the stock returns and the spread of the ex-
pectations between investors. 
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Overall conclusion 
 
In general, the results of this dissertation suggest to some extent that audit report 
information may be used in stock market trades around the audit report date. 
There is no direct evidence of this, but the relationship between information envi-
ronment, agency costs of debt, and abnormal returns around the going concern 
audit report suggests that where public attention and management discipline is 
expected to be lower, private information is used more. This is consistent with the 
findings from the informed trading literature and with the findings of e.g. Carter 
et al. (1999) and Knechel et al. (2007) that the actual date of the event may be 
relevant, rather than the date of the announcement. However, in this dissertation a 
significant negative abnormal reaction is documented around the date of the pub-
lic announcement. It is important to note that if there is a reaction due to the use 
of private information around the report date, there may also be a reaction around 
the public announcement. This is conditional on the assumption that investors 
using private information must avoid getting caught and therefore may not be able 
to take full advantage of the private information. 
 
The findings of this dissertation also confirm that information environment and 
agency costs of debt have a significant impact on the relevance of audit report 
information, both going concern and internal control weakness. Public attention, 
increased quantity and quality of information, and management discipline are 
factors that are likely to affect the relevance of the information. 
 
In light of the findings of this dissertation, audit reports are suggested to have 
increased the systematic risk of the stock (going concern audit reports) and the 
volatility of the returns (internal control weaknesses). This is also an important 
extension to the dissertation, because the abnormal stock returns may be a result 
of revisions in future cash flow estimates, revisions in the riskiness of the firm, or 
of both.  
 
These findings confirm the theoretical framework used in this study. According to 
the existing theory, the auditing of financial statements increases the informative-
ness and perceived quality of the financial statements, and the audit report, when 
qualified, reflects the auditor’s opinion of the firm’s condition taking account of 
information that is not available for outsiders. In addition, the empirical evidence 
in this dissertation also confirms the effects of firm specific characteristics on the 
relevance of auditing.  
 
 
Implications 
 
The results of this dissertation have implications for interested parties of the firm, 
financial markets, auditors and researchers.  From the financial markets’ point of 
view in particular, the going concern audit report but also to some extent the in-
ternal control weakness disclosure seem to be relevant sources of information. In 
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particular, where the qualified audit report is not expected, the information is in-
deed relevant. 
 
From the stock market regulators’ point of view the suggestion is interesting that 
for firms with specific characteristics the stock prices may be moving on the date 
of the audit report because of private information. The results of the audits are 
generally announced publicly at a later point in time in the 10-K filing. The evi-
dence indicates that in smaller listed firms with poorer information environment 
the abnormal reaction is more negative. These firms are not in the primary focus 
of the SEC, for example, and the fact that they are monitored less closely may 
enable the use of private information in trading the stock.  
 
For auditors this dissertation confirms that firm specific features affecting the 
conflict of interests are associated with the relevance of the audit report informa-
tion, if not the relevance of the whole auditing process. This information can be 
essential in planning the audit engagement and in making reporting decisions.  
 
Finally, the implications for researchers interested in financial markets and audit 
reporting, or any audit issue for that matter, is that when planning an event study 
the date of the actual event is applicable as the first day of trade. As this study and 
Knechel et al. (2007) suggest, trade may take place earlier than the traditional 
event dates, i.e. the 10-K or 8-K filing dates. Equally important for audit research 
is the evidence of this study on the relationship between the information environ-
ment, agency costs of debt, and reactions to going concern audit reports or inter-
nal control weakness disclosures. These factors should be taken into account 
when studying the relationship between the auditor and the firm or the relevance 
of auditing to the shareholders. 
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